An investigation into the nature of the Kuhnian paradigmatic account of how Science progresses

Abstract

Many philosophers of science are in agreement that Thomas S. Kuhn, a trained physicist, is in the area of Philosophy of Science and second only to Karl R. Popper in terms of contribution in the said area. His works "rank second to those of Popper in terms of number and importance" (John Shand, 1993, p.359). In his work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn attempts at a correct empirical description of science as it is practiced. In the said work, Kuhn argues that science does not progress cumulatively but by what he calls "Scientific revolutions", by which he means, the throwing away of views that fail to work and replacing them with new ideas. On how these new ideas are chosen, he argues that scientific progress is like religious conversion, which is not deliberative. Many critics and commentators have found Kuhn's account of SCIence implausible. Amongst his critics, we can mention Karl Popper, Allan Musgrave, Larry Laudan and Imre Lakatos. All these critics are in agreement that Kuhn's account of science may not only be relativistic but it may also lead to scientific irrationalism. Kuhn defends his position in his later work, The Essential Tension (1977). In this work, he argues that his critics have misinterpreted him. He is of the opinion that he has produced a true empirical account of science as it is practiced and how it progresses. This work is aimed at showing that Kuhn defends what cannot be found in his work, The StlUcture of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Consequently, we show that Kuhn's account of science does not meet the requirements of the scientific method and consequently, the assumption that Kuhn's account of science reflects the actual practice