| dc.description.abstract | Many philosophers of science are in agreement that Thomas S. Kuhn, a trained
physicist, is in the area of Philosophy of Science and second only to Karl R. Popper in
terms of contribution in the said area. His works "rank second to those of Popper in
terms of number and importance" (John Shand, 1993, p.359).
In his work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn attempts at a
correct empirical description of science as it is practiced. In the said work, Kuhn argues
that science does not progress cumulatively but by what he calls "Scientific revolutions",
by which he means, the throwing away of views that fail to work and replacing them with
new ideas. On how these new ideas are chosen, he argues that scientific progress is like
religious conversion, which is not deliberative.
Many critics and commentators have found Kuhn's account of SCIence
implausible. Amongst his critics, we can mention Karl Popper, Allan Musgrave, Larry
Laudan and Imre Lakatos. All these critics are in agreement that Kuhn's account of
science may not only be relativistic but it may also lead to scientific irrationalism. Kuhn
defends his position in his later work, The Essential Tension (1977). In this work, he
argues that his critics have misinterpreted him. He is of the opinion that he has produced
a true empirical account of science as it is practiced and how it progresses.
This work is aimed at showing that Kuhn defends what cannot be found in his
work, The StlUcture of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Consequently, we show that
Kuhn's account of science does not meet the requirements of the scientific method and
consequently, the assumption that Kuhn's account of science reflects the actual practice | en_US |
