

**A HISTORY OF CROSS-BORDER RESOURCE CONFLICT PERSISTENCE  
BETWEEN THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG SINCE 1850**

**BY**

**OGALO JACOB ADIPO**

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**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY**

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## **DECLARATION**

### **By Candidate**

I Ogalo Jacob Adipo, do hereby declare that this research is my own work. To the best of my knowledge, no other person has ever presented it elsewhere for any award, be it academic or otherwise, in any Conference/Seminar, College, Institution, or University. No part of this thesis may be cited without permission from the author or Maseno University.

**Signature.....**

**Date.....**

**Ogalo Jacob Adipo**

**PG/PhD/00032/08**

### **By Supervisors**

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.

**Signature .....**

**Date.....**

**Prof Mildred Ndeda**

**Department of History and Archaeology**

**Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science and Technology**

**Signature.....**

**Date.....**

**Dr. Carey Fancis Onyango**

**Department of Religion, Philosophy and Theology**

**Maseno University**

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my late dad Samson Ogallo Obiero and mother Agnes Ogallo, my dear wife Christine and daughters; Bisky and Diana. Each day, you inspire me to want to make a difference. Each day, you teach me how to love unconditionally; and each day you show me how to keep pushing, even when I do not want to. Thank you for allowing me to learn from you.

## ABSTRACT

A majority of the people living in the arid and semi-arid parts of the world are pastoralists whose livelihoods are dictated by the upkeep and size of their herds. During the dry season, the harsh environmental condition forces them to migrate in search of pasture and water. With limited access to water and competing rights to pasture, inter-community conflicts often arise particularly when one community crosses over to others' territory to share these valuable resources. This case has persisted between the Pokot and Karamojong despite the existence of formal and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, security policies, disarmament programmes and structured ways of sharing resources across the border. The choice of this study area was based on the fact that all other communities along the same border enjoyed mutual and symbiotic relations. The purpose of this study was to find out why the conflict still persists. The objectives of this study were to: Account for the nature of the Pokot and Karamojong relations in the pre-colonial period; analyze the arrival of British colonialism and the creation of the Kenya-Uganda boundary in the Pokot and Karamojong conflict persistence; assess the causes and impacts of the conflict persistence on the two communities and finally examine the appropriate measures in the mitigation and prevention mechanisms of the conflict persistence. The study used historical descriptive research design. It employed purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. The study area was Kenya's West Pokot County and Uganda's Karamoja district whose total population is 1, 244, 142 people. The target population was 384 respondents. Primary data was collected using Key Informant Interview (18), In-depth Interviews (9), and Focus Group Discussions (37) while secondary data was collected from library research and reports. Conflict theory by Oberschall (1973) and *Ubuntu* African philosophy by Mbingi (1987) were adopted as the theories of the study. Data analysis involved document and content analysis as well as the corroboration and validation of the results from both secondary and primary data during collection and write up. This study found that the conflict is spasmodic, covert and a reprisal arising from adherence to traditional norms, climate change, and proliferation of arms and commercialization of cattle raids as its major causes. It has also revealed loss of property, human deaths, insecurity and under development as its impacts. It is recommended that insecurity can be eradicated if Kenya and Uganda governments work together in the sectors of education, health, livestock and infrastructural development. They should be more proactive than reactive to the impasse, involve warriors and women in their hybrid approach of conflict resolution, and consider buying Boeing quadcopter Scan Eagle for surveillance across the border. They should also use Certificate of Transhumance and a micro computer chip with an electronic code number for each animal to help track rustlers within and across national borders. The study has concluded that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors are the major contributors to this conflict. The study is important in strengthening policies on peaceful coexistence, conflict resolution between neighboring communities, boundary survey and political administration.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>AAW</b>	–	Action Against War
<b>AU</b>	–	African Union
<b>ASAL</b>	–	Arid and Semi Arid Lands
<b>BRC</b>	–	Cross Border Resource Conflict
<b>CBRC</b>	–	Cross Border Resource Conflict
<b>CEWARN</b>	–	Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism
<b>EAC</b>	–	East African Community
<b>EAP</b>	–	East Africa Protectorate
<b>EAPCCO</b>	–	East Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
<b>EPC</b>	–	Elders Peace Committee
<b>FD P</b>	–	First Development Plan
<b>GOK</b>	–	Government of Kenya
<b>HZPDA</b>	–	Pokot Zonal Peace Development Agency
<b>IGAD</b>	–	Inter Governmental Authority for Development
<b>JUC</b>	–	Joint Venture Committee
<b>KAMATUSA</b>	–	Kalenjin Maasai Turkana and Samburu
<b>KAR</b>	–	Kings African Rifles
<b>KIDDP</b>	–	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament Development Plan
<b>KISP</b>	–	Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable
<b>KPDP</b>	–	Karamoja Peace Development Plan Peace
<b>KPR</b>	–	Kenya Police Reservists
<b>KNHRC</b>	–	Kenya National Human Rights Commission

<b>LDU</b>	–	Local Defence Unit
<b>LPRC</b>	–	Local Peace and Reconciliation Committee
<b>LRA</b>	–	Lord’s Resistance Army
<b>NARC</b>	–	National Rainbow Coalition
<b>NGO</b>	–	Non Governmental Organizations
<b>N PIC</b>	–	Karamoja Project Implementation Unit
<b>PEDP</b>	–	Pokot Education Development Programme
<b>POKATUSA</b>	–	Pokot Karamojong Turkana Sebei
<b>USAID</b>	–	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WKPC</b>	–	West Pokot Karamoja Peace Crusade

## **OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS**

**Cross- Border conflict persistence** – Denotes the tension, disagreements and aggressiveness with which the Pokot and Karamojong share their natural resources that lie across the international boundary separating Kenya and Uganda, often time leading to either high, middle and low intensity wars in the form of cattle raids, rustling or banditry.

**Conflict Management** – Applied to mean the traditional and government control, mechanisms, interventions and measures taken to minimize or avoid future tension and physical fights between the Pokot and Karamojong.

**The Pokot and Karamojong** –Used in the study to refer to the current inhabitants of West Pokot County in Kenya and the cluster of Karamojong clans in Karamoja Uganda.

**Pre- Colonial Period** – Used in this study to refer to the years between 1850 and 1894.

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Most pastoralists in Africa, particularly those sharing common border resources, have not lived in amity since the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Cases in point are the pastoral resource based conflict between the Damara and Khoe Khoe of Namequaland in Namibia, Wa-Daabe Fulani of Nigeria and Wo-Daabe's in Niger, Toposa and Turkana, Merille of Ethiopia and Turkana and the Pokot and Karamojong (Markakis, 1995).

Of concern are two types of conflict and violence which have emerged; one normative and defensive (commonly experienced by pastoralists in the West) and two, deviant and volatile (mostly experienced amongst the African pastoralists) (Bowman, 2001). This is what Clastres (1999) distinguished as societies "with warriors" and "warrior societies". The former is found in Western societies where only soldiers continually go for war when their community is attacked.

The latter is common among the African pastoral societies where a vast majority if not all men are warriors who go to war not only when their community is under attack but also plan and execute war on their neighbours whenever they deem it fit (Das, 2005). It is in this latter category that the Pokot and Karamojong conflict falls. A further classification of the conflict reflects it as latent or protracted, short or long term.

Writing about the pre- colonial history of the Pokot and Karamojong, Nganga (2007), Vries (2007), Gulliver (1955), Barber (1968), Dyson- Hudson (1960) and Knighton (2005) account not only for their migrational history but also indicate how the relations of the two communities was mutual and symbiotic marked by reciprocal arrangements whenever drought or famine

affected their region. These were moments when they operated in their traditional boundaries of frontier of contact and frontier of separation with their natural resources use and arrangements respected by people of either side. Likewise, these were the times when the ‘enemy image’ syndrome had not been introduced by the international boundary creation which led to persistent conflict over their cross-border access, control and resource use.

Studies by Galanty, (1987); Baxter, (1979); Ocan, (2000); Mkutu, (2001) also allude to the fact that cattle raids between the Pokot and Karamojong was a cultural activity carried out strictly under the guidance of elders and for restocking purposes or replenishing depleted herds. Muller (1989) adds that there was reciprocity in raiding where groups came to help each other in restocking through voluntary exchange or raids. These were the years when the two communities had strong conflict management mechanisms and operated on mutual and symbiotic relations devoid of acts of belligerence.

However, Oba, (1992); Blench, (1996); Guyo et al, (2015); Kimani, (2008) argue that right from the time when their local institutions began to decline, the two communities started struggling to maximize their share of the limited grazing resource especially during drought and famine that led to their frequent conflicts. They singled out resource scarcity as the major factor to spiral violence of the two pastoral groups. In as much as their works have a lot of contribution to this study, they have concentrated on the absence of strong local institutions to the conflict. This study has documented the inclusion of other actors in the conflict management as a way of alleviating it. The two areas (Kenya’s North Rift region and Uganda’s North Eastern area) have along history of perennial pastoral conflict with little intervention by the different regimes in the two countries. Being a border zone, the regions experience pastoral conflicts both internally and across the border which occurs in different forms and at different times. In Kenya, for example,

the north rift and north eastern regions inhabited by the Turkana, Pokot, Samburu, Marakwet, Borana, Rendile and Gabra are the most affected in the changing paradigm of inter-pastoral conflict persistence. Similarly, clashes which always erupt between Gare and Ajuran in Wajir and the conflict between the Borana and Burji community in Marsabit have been due to their differences over water and pastureland (Baque, 2013). In as much as sharing of water and pasture are alluded to as the causes of this conflict the above study is devoid of conflict management strategies which this work has undertaken.

For Uganda, the most common type of pastoral conflict is the intra group raids within Karamojong ethnic clusters. This has seen the Jie, Dodoth, Pian, Bakora and the dreaded Matheniko raid and counter raid each other for cattle. Subsequently, this has transformed what used to be a fluid structural relation within the wider Karimojong society to a rigid and fierce internal division marked by a state of belligerent raid revenge (Ocan, 1994).

The root causes of these conflicts are mainly ecological. This results from intense competition over natural resources such as reduced access to pastureland and water. This dynamic of the conflict has assumed the existence of cross-border angle by concentrating on intra community conflict as contained in studies by Barber (1962); Osamba (1992); Boling (1992); Ocan (1994); Jenner (1996); Satya (2004); and Gabre (2009) devoid of Cross border resource conflict persistence.

Similarly, cross-border conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong as well as between them and their neighbours the Toposa and Turkana are understood to take place at of different levels of their interactions. For instance Nyaba and Omurungi (2010) indicates that the conflict does not involve an entire community from a country as it is usually a specific group of either Pokot,

Turkana, Toposa or Karamojong doing the raiding. The trend also varies depending on intention of the raid and its impact. More importantly is the position held by Mkutu (2007) that the conflict between these two communities has shifted from a traditional or cultural dimension to a commercial and adaptive approach with the acquisition and use of automatic guns changing its scope and intensity.

For Anene (1970) and Rouke (1997), they attribute it to the impact of international boundaries in Africa by pointing out how such boundaries interfered with indigenous people's resource use leading to their frequent conflicts though as a macro study.

A survey of literature show that a buck of works on neighbouring pastoral community conflict in Kenya and Uganda have basically been approached from an intra and internecine angle devoid of international cross border resource conflict. This has been exemplified by studies such as Gulliver (1955), Barber (1968), Ocan (1992; 1994), Oloka- Onyango (1993), Mkutu (2003; 2007; 2008), Knighton (2003; 2005), Vries (2007), Onyango (2010) and Baque (2013).

In addition, these works tend to examine the conflict between two communities from a cultural and environmental lens meant to fulfill customary norms without juxtaposing it to the nexus of other forces of adaptation like the communalization or predatory nature of the raids, proliferation of small arms, the reckless and incendiary ethnic baiting political rhetorics, the failure of disarmament programmes as well as the potential border problems as a good watershed for analyzing this conflict persistence which leads us to the statetment of the problem.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

This study has observed that there exist both formal and traditional ways of conflict management between the two communities. They include formal and traditional court systems, policies on security, disarmament programmes and guidelines on how to use or share border resources. However, despite the existence of all these, there is still no respite in the conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong. Besides, all communities along the Kenya Uganda boundary live in amity with the exception of the Pokot and Karamojong whose relations is marked as all time hostile and belligerent. This study therefore undertook to investigate the dynamics of the persistence of this conflict.

### **1.2.1 Objectives**

The objectives of this study were to:

- i. Describe the Pokot and Karamojong relations in the pre-colonial period.
- ii. Analyze the arrival of the British colonialism and the creation of the Kenya-Uganda boundary in the Pokot and Karamojong resource conflict persistence since 1902.
- iii. Assess the causes and impact of the resource conflict persistence on the two communities.
- iv. Examine the appropriate measures in the prevention, mitigation and management for the conflict persistence.

### **1.2.2 Research Questions.**

This study's research questions are;

- i. What was the nature of the Pokot and Karamojong relations in the pre- colonial period?

- ii. How did the arrival of British colonialism and the creation of the Kenya-Uganda boundary enhance the Pokot and Karamojong resource conflict persistence in the colonial period?
- iii. What have been the causes and impact of the resource conflict persistence on the two communities since 1962?
- iv. What would be the appropriate measures in the prevention, mitigation and management for the conflict persistence?

### **1.2.3 Justification and Significance of the Study**

On its justification, studies about communities living along the Kenya-Uganda boundary by Okalany (1994), Kwamusi (1996) and Wafula (2000) indicate a seamless, mutual and symbiotic relations in their cross border resource use or sharing with the exception of the Pokot and Karamojong whose relations is marked as all time emotive, confrontational, hostile and belligerent. In addition, most studies by Barber (1968), Vries (2007), Mkutu (2008), Onyango (2010) and Baque (2013) have addressed pastoral conflict concisely from an internecine angle devoid of cross border resource conflict.

This study is significant because, today pastoral conflict between neighbouring communities pause a serious security paradox to many African governments more particular to Kenya and Uganda. Cases in point are Kenya's Northern boundary with Ethiopia and her north rift region that have of late been beleaguered by spates of insecurity arising from inter and intra pastoral conflicts same to Uganda's Northern region. This Study recommends the use of electronic method with micro computer chip code for all cattle, economic empowerment of the pastoralist to avoid their further marginalization, the enforcement of the use of certificate of transhumance

to ensure only legally acquired animals cross the border and the use of Boeing Scan Eagle Quadra copter for boundary surveillance and monitoring to curb internal and cross border pastoral conflict problem. This study is also significant in that it has added knowledge to the existing body of literature on pastoral conflict management through its recommendation of the use of bottom-up approach as well as the use of hybrid court system or the inclusion of the elders as part of the formal court jury.

#### **1.2.4 Scope and Delimitations**

This study was delimited to the geographical areas of Kenya's West- Pokot County and Uganda's Karamoja district. This is on the account that the latter forms the neighboring region west of Kenya inhabited by the pastoralists whose interactions are conflict prone. The study was also delimited to pastoral natural resources such as water, cattle and pasture land with other aspects of natural resources like timber and earth minerals such as diatomites, oil, gold, limestone, and geothermal capacity falling out of its scope. Likewise, it did not delve in intra or inter pastoral ethnic conflict within individual countries whose literature is vast.

It covered the period 1850 to the present. The year 1850 marked the point of departure for the study on the ground that it was the defining moment for understanding the two communities' cultural relations before the arrival of British colonialism whose activity of boundary creation provides a good watershed for analyzing the two communities' persistence conflict. Consequently, the new boundary split the hitherto communally use natural resources of water and pasture placing them in different political sides which led to conflicts whenever one group crossed over to use them. This is what has led to the two communities' 'enemy image' syndrome since then.

### **1.3 Theoretical Framework**

This study has been interpreted using two theories that is the conflict theory by Oberchall (1973) and the theoretical perspective of *Ubuntu* African philosophy by Mbingi (1987). The former was used to analyze inter-ethno territorial dispute between Yanonaami and Guayaki communities in 1976 in Amerindia while the latter was used in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1994. Conflict theory traces ethno-territorial border conflict to emanate from sets of suspicious, diverse view on how to share border resources and long standing historical and cultural differences and hostilities by neighboring communities. It states that, under such circumstances, cross-border conflicts are held together not by the positive influences of their shared interest but by the negative influence of their rivalries. The theory is informed by the idea that people living together or sharing a similar set up compete over scarce resources for their survival. And that such conflict may manifest itself in short or long term or may be latent or protracted.

It further opines that scarce resources lead to competition and eventually to conflict especially when the mechanisms of sharing such resources are either weak or not there all together. This study used the former to interpret this conflict after the Pokot and Karamojong youth usurped power from their elders after it became weak.

This theory perceives every individual, group or society to represent a force whose action may give a negative or positive relationship and that if the two forces are combined, they produce what Hegel (1975) Calls a synthesis or a combination of a thesis and anti-thesis in philosophical and logical terms. Its tenets or principles include scarcity, inequality, and marginalization of people, poverty, competition and strict adherence or non observation of traditional or cultural beliefs. This theory was augmented by the theoretical perspective of *Ubuntu* African Philosophy

by Mbingi (1987) given the fact that conflict theory was devoid of conflict management and mitigation mechanisms. For *Ubuntu* African philosophy theoretical perspective, it holds the view that Africans can bond and blend using their own heritage in the management of their conflict. That the divergent African political, social and economic challenges leading to their conflict can be managed as a community enterprise based on the understanding that promoting the good of a community is promoting the good for all which forms the major function of this theory's tenet of collectiveness. Using its tenets of solidarity, teamwork, cooperation and collectiveness in the African expression that "a thumb alone cannot kill a bed bug, it underscores the importance of togetherness in solving or managing a problem like conflict.

This study used the fingers to represent the values of the two communities' and institutions and showed how their political institutions of *Ekokwa* for Karamojong and *Kokwo* of the Pokot have been instrumental to them in their effort to manage their conflicts.

## **1.4 Literature Review**

### **1.4.1 Introduction**

Much of the existing literature on the history of pastoralists in Africa and East Africa in particular has tended not to emphasize cross-border pastoral resource conflict yet the phenomenon is of great significance to African history and the general understanding of pastoralist's lives. Most of the works for example, are focused on either intra or inter pastoralist conflicts within individual states. This is what Ajayi (1968) described as 'limited knowledge' on African history especially after colonialism. The literature for this study has been thematically reviewed based on the objectives of the study. The first part deals with the two communities' relations during pre-colonial period. The second section takes care of the colonial activities more particularly with the role of the creation of international boundary to this conflict, while the third

section handles the causes of the conflict with the last part taking care of the impact as well as the conflict management strategies.

#### **1.4.2 Cultural Relations in the Pre-Colonial Period**

About the the two communities pre-colonial history, existing studies show a picture of African pastoral communities. The works by Barber (1968); Chesang (1973); Kipkorir (1973 and 1978) and Anderson (2000) have particularly given an enriching exploration of the Pokot ecology and culture. Whereas Nganga (2006) and Vries (2007) give a historical trace of the Pokot, their works are generalised providing only a thin account of the Pokot subsumed within the larger account of the Kalenjin mainstream history. Unlike the Kenyan Pokots, the Karamojong are endowed with a relatively rich literature.

These included works by Clark (1950) Root (1964) Barker (1968) Dyson-Hudson (1960) Mamdani (1983) Oloka Onyango (1993) and Knighton (2005). In these studies, the Karamojong are presented primarily as traditional cattle herders. Similarly, works by Spencer (1973) and Ocan (1994) describe the Karamojong pre-colonial history and show how they practiced resilient and ecologically sound mode of production in their dry land. Nevertheless, these studies on the Karamojong and even the Pokot have dwelt too much on the history and description of the migration and settlement patterns without paying any attention to ways in which interaction with their neighbours across the border influenced persistence of large scale pastoral conflict in the region, which this work has fulfilled.

Like most pastoralists in Africa, literature on the Karamojong presents them as cattle herders (Quan, 1996; Broch, 1999). Similarly, these studies have described the Karamojong cultural forms and how they take control of their ecological distress in Karamoja region. Of concern is

the work by Onyango (2010) who explored the Karamojong age set system where he outlined the process of the confirmation of manhood status that began by initiating new members into different levels of age sets. This, he indicated, established a structure in the Karamojong society where decisions were made in stages and in accordance with the seniority in the age brackets. In as much as this work is important to this study in so far as the cultural activities of the Karamojong are concerned, it is devoid of the role played by the age set as the fulcrum for the two communities conflicts. This study filled this gap by showing how the process of the age set system in which one became a warrior after fulfilling it has been the conerstone of the resource conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong.

Peristiany (1951) analyzed how the Pokot and Karamojong expanded from their ethnic core during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. He provided a cultural fusion between the Pokot and Karamojong in which the former borrowed names and learnt the latter's language. This, it indicated, is the situation as the dialect on the Western plains today differs from the Pokot dialect spoken in the highlands. Though informative, Peristiany's (1951) work is a pre-colonial oriented study where the relationship between neighbouring communities was mutual and symbiotic with well defined and accepted traditional boundaries. Implicit in this analysis is the need to reconcile the relationship between the Pokot and Karamojong during the colonial period, which occasioned many changes. Part of these changes spurred the pastoral conflict persistence, which this study has undertaken.

Muhereza (2002) explored the socio-cultural and political relations between the Karamojong and their neighbours in Uganda. He classified this relationship as a conflict based on resources given the fact that all these communities shared scarce grazing zones. He pointed out the symbolic links drawn between these people and cattle and their associations to their cultural processes as

what sustained the ideologies, which underpin cattle raiding. He argued that pastoral violence then characterized the cultural tensions more particularly between the Karamojong, Sabiny, Bagisu, Iteso, Langi, and Acholi in Uganda. This, he indicated, prompted the emergence of different dominant inter-ethnic traditional enemies in Uganda. In as much as the above work is relevant to this study, it focuses primarily on inter pastoral conflict in Uganda without extending its bearing on cross-border communities in Kenya which was the main aim of this study.

In his work on the cattle complex in East Africa, Herskovits (1926) focused on the traditional concept of raising livestock with the individual pastoralists as the principal actor. He described how the East African pastoralists had a lot of love and attachment to their cattle, which he indicated, was overwhelming as they kept infinite numbers for the sake of it. He further, argued that, among these people, cattle seemed to be the masters and not the other way round. This was in reference to their veneration to either a ‘mother cow’ or the ‘steer cow’ that they neither slaughtered nor exchanged but were forever appreciated for their beauty. This study significantly borrowed from Herskovit’s work as it reflected on the socio-economic and cultural relations of the two communities’ right from 1850.

Writing on social history of East Africa, the early ethnographies by Dyson-Hudson (1966), Barber (1962), and Lamphear (1976) treated pastoral conflicts and violence among communities living in this region as a normal cultural activity. Thus, these works viewed pastoral activities such as cattle raiding as a societal norm meant for warriors to fulfill their cultural obligation of either the payment of bride wealth or initiation into manhood. For instance, Mkutu’s (2001) description of how the Turkana, Samburu, and Karamojong integrated their boys into raiders’ group resonates with the notion that pastoral conflicts and even violence was legitimized in the social structures of these societies. More recently, studies have built on the early ethnographers’

works in which they explored how the pastoralists' livelihood in non-equilibrium eco-systems influenced their survival (Little, 1999; McCabe, 1990; Mkutu, 2005; and Knighton, 2005). These studies particularly examined the changing intra and inter raiding practices among the Kenyan and Ugandan pastoralists. In addition, they have indicated how the pastoralists have successfully exploited their dry lands by maintaining a symbiotic relationship between the people and their livestock. However, these studies do not put the pastoralists' conflict in the context of cross-border resources conflict. Moreover, they do not show how the different relationships of varying scales unfolded in between the localized actors and the cultural and historically linked pastoral people to reveal the causes of the conflict persistence between the two communities.

Most pastoral' conflicts have been contextualized from the disciplines of anthropology. For instance, social anthropologists have offered the most refined accounts of pastoral differences and quarrels (Gulliver, 1955; Dyson Hudson, 1956; and Barber, 1968). They have, however, articulated this from tribal and traditional dimensions in which feuding raids between antagonized groups and communities are emphasized. From this perspective, cattle raids are epitomized as an integral part of the herder's life which acts both as a means of conflict regulation and shaping of individuals.

This view was supported by Markakis (1994) and Hagmann (2008) who noted how transhumance generated frequent quarrels among the pastoralists. They argued that disagreements over resources in pastoral areas had become endemic leading to a lot of quarrels amongst the pastoralists since pastoral conflict is a manifestation of a deeper crisis than quarrels over cultural differences. There is therefore need to analyze these quarrels alongside the concrete socio-economic and political issues that have led to the conflict persistence which this study has undertaken.

Similarly, Edgerton 1972; Almagor 1979; Hendrickson et.al. 1996; Abbink, 1995) studied the role of environmental factors in the horn of Africa. These studies also illustrate how the pastoralists' conflicts emanate from their traditional activities of cattle raiding to fulfill cultural norms. They assert that pastoral conflict in most cases is suffused by pastoralists' old hostilities, grudges, hatred, bad blood, and suspicions leading to their "aggressive" and "warlike" attitude. The stereotypic ideology of branding the pastoralists as "warlike" which is encapsulated in the primordial's thinking has however been criticized and challenged by Mamdani (1996), and Lewis (2002), who posit that rather than impute pastoralists as "primitive" and "warlike," a broader perspective that looks at the genesis of the problem and not negative stereotypes should be taken into account and that the above studies are devoid of external economic forces in the conflict persistent which this study has contextualized.

In this study on pastoralism and conflict persistence, we have argued by understanding it from a cultural and historical context while employing conflict theory. It is significant that, to understand an individual, one must also fathom the environment in which the individual lives. Conflict theory locates such issues in social relations and community values from which conflict persistence always emanates.

This study argues that, in as much as Onyango (2010), alludes to the fact that decision made by an individual to raid is the key to the conflict, it, however, does not imply that such an action is enough to explain the resultant conflict as it takes into account a variety of relationships in which the warrior operates from both within and outside. This is part of what makes conflict theory relevant since it covers the action by the warrior, which emanates from either within or outside the group. The skewed argument by Kratli (1999) and Knighton (2005) that Pokot and Karamojong are stuck in their old traditions and obstinately opposed to change or innovation not

only defeats itself as this study argues that this has been surpassed by these people's abilities to conform and use modern technology to spur their conflict.

It argues that the dynamics with which conflict theory perceives social interactions lies squarely in the new social values that are at all times present in the Karamojong and Pokot conflicts. For instance, in the two communities, this study states that cattle raid has a direct link to these people's social values of prestige, wealth accumulation, marriage, and social standings or status. It argues that these values are created, reinterpreted, reinforced, used, and challenged during the processes of interactions, meaning that they are grounded in their everyday lives. It opines that cattle raids were socially accepted but then, there were no guns used in the raiding. Over the years, however, the traditions and rules have changed due to various dynamics in these people's everyday lives. They have incorporated guns, mobile phone use, widened the horizon and perspective of their enemies. The result of this has brought a negative reinforcing conflict cycle. We can discern from it that the social system that generates conflicts and instability, and the system that develops wealth and destitution are inextricably bound.

The above perspective allows us to note that, whereas actors can effectively mobilize available resources to construct, maintain, and enhance social worlds in conformity with what they perceive as their own interest, actors can inadvertently contribute to the problem afflicting them. Each of the key actors defines their identity in relation to the roles they play in terms of the value each adhere to. For instance, this study argues that the warrior groups are primarily guided by the age set system and the values of masculinity, which entails bravery and proving one's manhood. They are also guided by the values that promote security of the cattle and the general well being of the clan.

This study has interpreted the Pokot and Karamajong conflict to be entrenched in their strict adherence to their traditional norms or social system that continues to constantly recreate itself. This study argues that through the conflict theory's tenet of strict adherence to cultural norms, the warrior engages in certain forms of violent acts (cattle raids) to establish and uphold his prestigious position of either showing manhood or earning him a chance to join the group of married men. Consequently, cattle raids was one of their societal mechanism for countering the divergent forces that were inherent within their social order where the warrior was constantly competing with himself and others in the form of accumulating cattle either for bride wealth payment or for societal status which bred their conflict.

#### **1.4.3 Arrival of British Colonialism and the Role of the Creation of the Boundary to the Conflict**

In ordinary parlance, British colonial rule in Kenya and Uganda has been described as brief, violent and a constitutive moment in the history of the two countries. Lasting about sixty eight years, this period constructed on the theoretical model of colonialism was undertaken through divergent radical, alarmist, apologetic and even conservative views on its impact on the Kenya and Uganda communities. Subsequently, the debate has been whether colonialism was retrogressive or progressive with the scholarly consensus being that it was marked by the incorporation of Kenya and Uganda into world's capitalist system. For instance, Ajayi (1968) focused on the ordeal which traditional African institutions went through under colonialism stating that the colonial on the cultural front, was generally uneven with some people completely transformed while a vast majority little affected if at all. Although his observation is pertinent to this study, he does not give any specific examples from his long list of African ethnic groups more particularly those that were affected by the boundary establishment like the Pokot and

Karamojong. Rodney (1989) accounted for how colonialism derailed African development. His work had a direct relevance to this study on the account of the boundary creation to the hitherto African socio-economic activities. He gives the social theory of colonialism which is neo-Marxist but which highlights policies and actions of various colonial agents in Africa which in our case is through the impact of the boundary creation alongside its apparatus of power as they inculcated their socio-political and economic affections in Kenya and Uganda. Atieno-Odhiambo (1995) while using African cosmology to predict the coming of the white man to Kenya interpreted colonialism as the creation of government through its institutions of power and shed light on the impact of the establishment of colonial activities in Africa generally. The studies by Rodney and Atieno Odhiambo are useful springboard on which our work was anchored as they illustrated our understanding of the impact of colonialism in West Pokot and Karamoja.

Anene (1970) gave an account of the international boundary creation in Nigeria. The work was not only concerned with the foreign acts of partition, but with the impact of colonial boundaries on the people in whose history the acts of partition were a major intervention. Though he recognizes that the boundary was a potential source of dispute, it did not outline the criteria which may afford the best guide to a settlement of an unhappy legacy of colonialism like the creation of boundaries in the continent.

Rouke (1997) has succinctly discussed the impact of the colonial created boundaries in Africa depicting them as an epitome of confusion and a time bomb for persistent conflict. He has in particular showed how the creation of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon has led to the two countries perennial oil resource conflict along their Bakasi peninsular since 1993. Although his work is relevant to study as it has also dealt with the impact of international

boundary creation in African, it has however majored on inter- state resource conflict as a macro study without indicating the involvement of the neighbouring border communities yet such a conflict cannot start from a vacuum with the indigenous communities not laying claims over such valuable natural resource like oil. This is what our study has undertaken using the Pokot and Karamojong cross- border resource case.

Ehret (1968) made a study of the migratory movement of the people's found in the border lands of the Kenya- Uganda boundary. However, Ehret ignored the impact of colonialism on the people concerned and the changes that were brought about by the Kenya- Uganda boundary. For Mamdani (1976) he identified the fact borders were used by colonialists to promote the policy of divide and rule but he did so in general terms without accounting for it's creation process as well as stating the societies that were affected by the colonial boundary demarcation which this work has undertaken.

Sastres (2008) explains that prior to colonialism the Karamojong mutually exploited the existing common resources with their neighbours the Turkana and Pokot. She notes that the newly created boundary drew a wedge between these pastoralists whose livelihood depended much on crossing the vast plains in the region without any restrictions. The author holds that the creation of the international border line, formed the limits of the new states prohibiting the hitherto cross-border livestock movement, which simply heightened stress to the debilitated nomadic livelihood. She indicates that since pastoral groups are never entirely self sufficient, they always maintain some reciprocal and mutually supportive relations with their neighbours. This is against the common impression that there were no amicable relations between different pastoral groups. In her view, conflict existed, albeit with symbiotic relations between warring communities. This was sustained by cultural ties like intermarriage, political and military alliances, and trade.

Nevertheless, Sastres blamed the abrupt establishment of the boundary for the escalation of these conflicts persistence, a position which this study upheld.

Kabywegyere (1974) argues that people who had a common culture like the pastoralists were divided by the Kenya-Uganda boundary. In particular, he mentions the Iteso of Kenya and Uganda, the Suk (Upe and West Pokot) and the Turkana. In as much as the people of West Pokot featured in this work, they are not presented in the context of how they related by sharing their resources with other neighbouring pastoralists. More particularly, the study is silent on the role of the created boundary on the communities' relations by emphasizing the communities' perception of the border and the colonial leaders, a gap which this study has undertaken to fill.

Zeleza (1983) addresses the role, intentions and impact of the created boundaries in Africa. He noted that borders were used by colonialists to create divisions among the African people. In his opinion, he points out that one of the reasons as to why the colonial boundary did not have any regard for African traditional boundaries was the European contempt for the traditional African political organizations, more so, the Suk. Although his work remains instructive to our study since it touches on the pastoral Pokot and Karamojong, it did not make case studies of how these communities were affected by the colonial border demarcations and how this has spurred resource conflict persistence between the two communities.

Zartnam (1995) studied the dynamics of imperial boundary making as well as post colonial territorial politics in Africa. Like other Africanist scholars, he agrees with the assertion that interstate boundaries in Africa are colonial impositions, forced on the continent and its people by Europeans whose interests were the only determining factors. He holds the opinion that interstate and community conflict arise due to unresolved boundary issues. The latter is common

between pre-existing ethnic groups that were separated by imperial boundaries. In addition, he indicates that certain factors, including un-demarcated or delayed demarcation of boundary lines, poor policing of the boundary and struggle over the control of natural resources are potential reasons for conflict. In as much as this work zeros in boundary establishment, it sheds light on the potential reasons for conflicts for borderlanders which this study has explored using the case of resource based conflict between the Pokot of Kenya and the Karamojong of Uganda.

Barber (1968) gives an account of the establishment of British rule in North Eastern Uganda. More particularly, he addresses the pastoral community relations in Uganda and how they were affected by the colonial policies. Despite the fact that Barber's (1968) work was majorly a Uganda oriented study, he referred to the relationship between the pastoral communities along the boundary between Kenya and Uganda. He briefly referred to the Turkana, Suk and Karamojong dispute over grazing land where each community kept pushing each other over and beyond their traditional boundaries. This study used Barber's work to further explore how the established international boundary acted as an impetus to the persistence of Pokot and Karamajong conflict in the post-independence period.

#### **1.4.4 Causes of Resource Conflict**

The environmental conflict theorists hold the opinion that unfulfilled demands for grazing land and water points for animals fuel disputes and conflicts between pastoral groups in Africa (Meier et. Al., 2007; Goodnus and McCarthy 2000; Hummer Dixon, 1999; Nugent & Sanchez 1999; Vedeld 1998; Van den Brink et. al., 1995 Oberschell; 1973). Adopting a Malthusian viewpoint of human-nature interactions, these scholars opine that pastoral conflicts have been a response to relative or absolute resource scarcity that in most cases, emanate from environmental degradations. Though important in its contribution, the environmental paradigm neglects the

herders' agency and ability to adapt to rapidly changing climatic conditions. In addition, it fails to take into account the institutional variables that affect resource scarcity as well as resource sharing arrangements. It further ignores key insights of political environment of understanding the interplay of local and extra-local social processes of resource conflict, which this study has undertaken.

On the same note, scholars have also argued that inadequate natural resources probably out of increase in human and animal population and consequent environmental degradation represents a major bone of contention among the pastoralists. For instance, Nori, (2005) indicates the concomitant degradation and shrinkage of natural resources as an aspect that paves way for pastoral conflict. This has been shared by other studies such as Abbink (1995); Fara (1997); Said (1997); Gebre, (2001); Feyyisa, (2003); Markakis, (2008); and Abdusahel, (2009). Pastoralists are also known to operate in two major systems namely the natural resource system and the resource user system. Change in any one system impacts on their capacity to adapt to social, political, and environmental shocks. It is the position of this study that pastoral resource conflict is given a holistic approach rather than concentrate on the two user systems. It has therefore provided more insight on the role of politics to determine resource use alongside other external factors since it analyzed the resources conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong.

Khan (1994) identified three types of pastoralists that is, the mountain flatland pastoralists, Pedestrian flatland pastoralists and mountain dwelling pastoralists. He indicates that pastoralists react differently to changes in the ecological, environmental, and economic situations. In his view, this is because pastoralists' systems are largely products of climatic and environmental determinants. Similarly, studies by Erickson & Lind (1995) and Opiyo (2012) have generally indicated that climate change is one of the global factors that have increased risks and

uncertainties for rural pastoral communities that depend on natural resources for their livelihood. They opine that climate variability manifests itself in extreme events notably droughts, floods and famine which are regular occurrences in pastoral ecology.

Despite the fact that these works hold information pertinent to this study, the authors have not given any case studies on how these climatic conditions enhance resource conflict persistence by neighboring pastoral groups. In addition, they have overlooked the other crucial contributors like cultural, ethnic, political, and economic factors to pastoral conflict in Africa which this study has investigated.

Studies by Odegi-Awuondo (1992); and Osamba (2000) acknowledge the fact that cattle raids are not just a form of conflict but a symptom of much deeper conflict between the pastoralists. They opine that for centuries, raiding other groups for livestock has been a traditional method of replenishing herds in the wake of drought and disease as well as a demand for bride wealth payment. In this case, a cattle raiding was approved as a quasi-legitimate way of sharing resources, permitting groups on the verge of economic ruin and even starvation in a way to re-establish their system of food production, as well as fulfill their marital obligations. This study borrowed from the above works as it articulated the socio-economic reasons for the causes of cattle raids in the Pokot and Karamojong conflict persistence.

Abbink (1995: 109), Ocan (1994:78), Mkutu (2001:39), Onyango (2010: 210) and Knighton (2005: 68) agree that cattle raids were carried out for three reasons: First was the social and economic purpose to construct and enhance one's social status in the society. Secondly, was with the aim of gaining territorial control of grazing areas. Thirdly, it was meant to increase the stock after a catastrophe or as an insurance against unexpected misfortunes such as drought, famine,

and cattle epidemics. However, this study argues that the concepts of scarcity, marginalization and competition that are components of conflict theory provide key tenets from which explanations about the pastoralist conflicts can be embedded. The stiff competition for cattle is a clear explanation from which the Pokot and Karamojong conflict can be deduced. However, it is this study's point of view that where as the environmental changes create scarcity in the context of available pasture and water, the raids also do the same to cattle through its predatory approach.

This study has further expanded the competition dynamics in relation to gender roles in the conflict. Ocan (2000; 18), Easton (2007; 68), and Knighton (2005; 105), indicated that the Pokot and Karamojong women did not have formal access to traditional decision making institutions. In contrast, this study argues that, through their other culturally sanctioned social roles, they engaged in activities that put them in an indirect but very influential position in advancing this conflict. Their influence as prized brides, as wives or mothers and elderly women in relation to cattle ownership and accumulation increased the competition on raiding by their sons and husbands. There is therefore a potential interaction and relationship between cattle raids as a social activity on one hand and cattle raids for economic value on the other.

While Karamojong and West Pokot are peripheral areas located in remote parts of Kenya and Uganda, they have remained neglected by the colonial and post-colonial governments. Hechter (1975; 92), suggests that inequality across economic areas leads to ethnic conflict. This study found a positive relationship between economic marginalization and ethnic conflict and rebellion. It has articulated marginalization tenet within the state neglect of Karamoja and West Pokot and argued that when the state fails to perform its cardinal functions of providing services

to its people, the affected citizens will rebel against the state. Such a situation in turn increases insecurity and underdevelopment of such areas. The Pokot and Karamojong defiance to the states suits the explanation of neglect and marginalization by the state. This is because the primary function of the state is to provide security, prevent crisis, border invasions and infiltration, check and eliminate domestic threats or conflicts, prevent crime and any other related damages and to enable citizens resolve their differences within their formal legal systems.

This study argues that, in the absence of all these, like in the case of Karamoja and West Pokot, inter-community conflict negatively affects development, reinforce insecurity and leads to monopoly of power by either vigilantes or rebellious groups. It is evident from this work that the neglect of the people by the State has caused their continuous operation in their traditional modes of production which are ingrained in their core values and current need for survival.

#### **1.4.5 Impact of the Conflicts and Management Strategies**

The ability of pastoral communities to manage their own resources has been viewed with skepticism. In large part, this skepticism results from the view that pastoral production is the tragedy of the common cause of degradation and desertification (Haro, 2003). Similarly, Sobania (1991) analyzed colonial era documents from the 1930's and argues that, since the pastoralists own many animals, this act alone is disastrous to their environment. Galaty (1994) summarizes the impact of possessing large stocks as disastrous as it leads to environmental degradation. Nangulu (2001) suggests that the objective of conservation is crucial in the management of the pastoral environment as well as conflicts. She advocates for combining destocking with partial removal of human population from the semi-arid areas to ease both human and animal population pressure on the environment. The above studies were important in the interpretation of how to manage pastoral conflict persistence. On pastoral conflict mitigation or prevention in

Africa, there has been some literature on the issue of the local people's participation in natural resource management (Turner, 2004; Ribot, 2002; Barret et al., 2001; Moore et al, 2000; Kellert et al, 2010; Ingles et al, 1999).

These studies illustrate that community participation in conflict management is a vital component of efforts that leads to positive conflict outcome for the warring groups. A similar position has also been taken by (Odegi-Awuondo, 1994; Ocan, 1994; Lind, 2000; Mkutu, 2003; Huho, 2012; Gedi, 2005). However, these works have contextualized their ideas in a macro level while addressing pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. Such results should be tested at a micro level which this work has done using the Pokot Karamojong cross border resource conflict persistence.

As is increasingly understood, natural resource management and conflict management are closely related. It is for this reason that the studies often oscillate between the two. For instance, studies by Lind & Sturman, (2002), Castre & Nielsen (2003); Odhiambo (2000); and FAO (2001) focused on how environmental scarcity leads to conflict. They have also discussed how natural resource management plans can be designed to manage conflict. This study significantly borrowed from the above works as it highlighted the need to use a community participatory approach as a precursor to prevent and mitigate in this conflict management.

On his part, Tafare (2006) documented how, in the North Eastern region, the Uganda state adopted a 'de facto' policy of encouraging the Karamojong to settle disputes on their own. The selective state appropriation of local reconciliation mechanism that fuse customary and religious elements had positive results as it ensured the existence of peace between the clusters of Karamojong clans. Recent studies have also documented intra and inter-community

peacemaking mechanisms among the Africans (Kassa, 2001) the Nyongaton (Bassi 2005), Suri and Duzi (Abbink, 2000) and Somali (Hagmann 2007). Despite the fact that these studies emphasize the local level approach to the pastoral conflict, management, they are devoid of the un resolved long standing historical injustices, broken social relationships and the social dynamic of interpersonal and group differences that are pronounced in the Pokot and Karamojong conflict. This study has documented a strong peace infrastructure as the basis of sustaining the two community's long term peace agreement.

Kandagor (2005) gave his key findings on pastoral conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. He found that such conflicts had diverse effects on the people's socio-economic aspects such as health, education, development on micro-economic and infrastructure in general. In addition, he coined the term 'social orphans' to refer to young men who did not qualify as adults in terms of cultural norms and whose claims on property was denied by customary laws. This uncertain status, combined with the kind of poverty exacerbated by insecurity and marginalization, invited attempts by most young men to enlist as bandits. The limitation of this work is to be found in its lack of complementary interviews, for example with the elders, and traditional leaders whose alternative perspectives would have strengthened the arguments which this study undertook as it suggested the probable ways through which the conflict can be managed.

Macharia (2008) discusses new thinking for peace building. He indicates that, with ethnic and cultural diversities that are open to exploitation by individuals and communities out to achieve selfish ends; with disparities in resource allocation entrenched by colonialists and amplified by post colonial governments, and with a meagerness in natural resources that so often leads to scramble, conflict is a reality that cannot be wished away. He examined the different dimensions

of conflict and shed light on why it has been endemic in Africa. He interrogates the current conflict-resolution strategies and why they have been ineffective. He goes ahead to suggest ways through which African traditions, beliefs and social interaction patterns can be harnessed to provide foolproof approaches to resolving conflicts in Africa. This study borrowed significantly from Macharia's suggestions by further interrogating the Pokot and their neighbours' peace building capacities and conflict management by including women and warriors in its peace building initiatives.

Ruto (2011), while surveying the dynamics of conflicts in Mau forest complex has explored the conflicts indicators and early warning systems. He has classified indicators of conflict into political, social, and economic. He recommends that the government should, among other things, maintain an up-to-date database of the conflict frequency levels, initiate a consultation with representatives of the affected communities, and consider developing community policy methods. He also suggests that NGOs should provide increased support for the communities' peace initiatives. In as much as Ruto's suggestions offer good insights for our study on the aspect of policy recommendation on pastoral conflicts, it is important to note that this study has recommended a bottom-up approach as a conflict resolution mechanism rather than Ruto's top-bottom approach which has not been effective.

The application of *Ubuntu* African philosophy as a theoretical perspective was key to interpreting and analyzing the Pokot and Karamojong cross border resource conflict management. The argument in this study is that, through its tenets of collectiveness and cooperation, it is able to bring on board communities and their stakeholders of cattle raids to make inputs into conflict management. Building on the collective finger role, this study has argued for the interconnectedness of the values and participatory decision-making in the two

communities in *Mis* meetings as the basis of their conflict management going forward. In contrast, other theories like Lederach's (1997;101) Integrated theory, Keashley's (2010;38) Interventions theory and McDonald's (2012;62) Diplomatic theory are narrowly focused and can only contribute to the understanding of intra or inter racial conflict management and resolution approaches but may not effectively handle cross-border conflicts.

Moreover, it is apparent that these theories are not construed with a view of handling Africa's conflict as they ignore the role of the individual in the conflict. Basically, their concern is with inter-state relations or macro studies and not otherwise. This study has contextualised the *Ubuntu* African philosophy theory using reciprocity within its tenets of cooperation. This has shown how it helps to maintain good relations and healthy collaboration such as *Tilia* (leading) between the Pokot and Karamojong, which further ensures that the scope of the conflict is minimized.

This study has also argued that the first false step used by almost all the peace building initiatives was the expansion of the peace initiative membership and the formal recognition of clan leaders, involvement of the members of parliament as well as the inclusion of government officials in the elders' meetings. In contrast, it was this kind of amalgam peace meeting groups that saw peace efforts go to waste or different groups preferred different interests other than ensuring peace between the Pokot and Karamojong. For instance, Mkutu (2005; 2008), notes that the selected leaders competed for recognition over the representations of their kin groups with the elders, members of parliament were either partisan or keen on embezzling funds, while the elders were bent on manipulating the peace deal in favour of their communities. Similarly, Hagmann (2008;310) noted that all the peace agreements were obscured by the fact that they became lucrative ventures due to the payments to participants in meetings such as elders, church and government officials, and members of the NGO's. This study indicates that this kind of impasse

can only be solved when the people's spirit of commitment, openness, teamwork, and dignity is embraced when the two communities blend and bond their heritage, which is the locus of the *Ubuntu* African Philosophy.

Whereas Gedi (2005; 106) insists that neither the local mechanism nor formal framework can offer a lasting solution to the problem, this study argues for a hybrid approach where both indigenous and formal mechanisms are fused may strengthen and make it more effective. Conversely, Niamir (1999) suggests that IGAD and EAC policy approaches on conflict management should be applied for the Pokot and Karamojong pastoral case. He argues further that the National Policy on Conflicts Transformation and Peace Building's (NPCTPB), overall objective of concentrating peace initiative within boundaries should be applied. In contrast, we argue that IGAD and EAC have been engaged in fire fighting by encouraging Kenyan and Ugandan governments to implement disarmament programs and replace pastoralism with sedentary modes of production without any viable structural provisions for the latter.

Furthermore, when disarmaments are executed forcefully, they become inappropriate instruments of providing a solution because it is impossible to disarm all conflict parties at the same time, to the same degree and to prevent re-armaments afterwards. Besides the specific objectives of NPCTPB remain at the respective countries' internal levels. This study therefore, argues that in addition to using the hybrid approach to pastoral resource conflicts management, the Kenya and Uganda governments must be more proactive than reactive to resolve this impasse. This conflict dynamics and its management can largely be seen in the mind of Mbingi (1987) who addresses human cultural values, needs, abilities, dignity and freedom as the best ways to be used to control the conflict. Idris (2011) also concurs with Mbingi's take that conflict management must actively envision, include, respect and promote human and cultural resources

from within a given setting. The theoretical assumption is that this conflict management can only be solved if the two parties operate on trust, sincerity and good will on how to share their border resources.

It, however, does not take into consideration the long standing historical injustices, broken bonds, special relationships and the sociological dynamics of interpersonal and inter group differences that are more pronounced in the Pokot and Karamojong raiders. In addition, this theoretical perspective concentrates on peace, justice and reconciliation without taking into account whether the peace infrastructure in the two communities is strong enough to sustain long term peace agreements.

## **1.5 Research Methodology**

### **1.5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the procedures that were used to conduct the study. It is organized into the following sub-headings: introduction, research design, target populations, sample frame and size, data collection methods, data analysis and expected outcome.

### **1.4.2 Research Design**

Being a qualitative research, this study used historical research design. This design was appropriate for the study on two grounds. First, it ensured that historical evidence was achieved through the scrutiny of the documents to ascertain the authenticity of their sources and validity of their contents. Second, it also enabled the researcher to use non- probability sampling technique of purposive and snowballing which ensured an in- depth understanding of the phenomenon as the researcher engaged only people with deep knowledge about conflict persistence. It is also an excellent vehicle for the measurement of characteristics of large population (Orodho, 2003). This


design was also considered appropriate for the study because it enabled the researcher to draw information from a large population using in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions and key informant interviews while processing and analyzing such data qualitatively.

The methodology involved examination of the perceptions of inhabitants of the two border regions as Rossman and Rallis (1998:102) have noted, “there are few truths that constitute universal knowledge; rather, there are multiple perspectives about the world”. By exploring the perceptions of individuals who have had experiences with persistence of conflict in the two areas of study, it was possible to obtain “multiple perspectives” that informed our understanding of this conflict.

### **1.5.2 Study Area**


The study was conducted in West Pokot in Rift Valley in Kenya and Karamonja District in Uganda. West Pokot borders Trans-Nzoia and Marakwet to the South, Baringo and Turkana Counties to the East and North respectively. It has an area of about 9,100 square kilometers with its headquarters at Kapenguria (see p33 Fig 1). It comprises six administrative divisions namely; Kapenguria, Kacheliba, Sigor, Alale, Chapareria and Lelan (West Pokot Development Plan, 2009). It is also located between 34° 49' East longitude 1° 15' and 2° 45' North latitude. On its part, Uganda's Karamoja District borders the Republic of Southern Sudan to the North, Kenya to the East and Uganda's districts of Sironko and Kapchorwa to the South and Kumi, Katakwi, Lira, Pader, Amuria and Kitgum to the West (see p34 Fig 2). It is divided into five politico-administrative counties namely; Nakapiripirit, Moroto, Kotido, Abim and Kaabong (National Housing and Population Census 2014). It also lies between latitude 1° 7' North, 1° 36' North and longitude 34° 18' East, 34° 48' East.

Figure 1: West Pokot County, Administrative Borders



Source: GoK, 2009

**Figure 2: Karamoja District Map**



**Source:** Uganda Bureau of Statistics Department, 2013

### 1.5.3 Study Population

The total study population was 1,244,142 people of whom 512,690 are from West-Pokot County in Kenya and 731,452 people are from Karamoja district in Uganda.

**Table1: Population of West Pokot**

<b>Sub county</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Population</b>
North Pokot/Kacheliba/Alale	77,995	78,016	156,011
Pokot Central/Chepareria	87,199	88,417	175,616
Pokot South/Sigor, Lelan	21,310	20,253	41,563
West Pokot/Kapenguria	68,488	71,012	139,500
			<b>512690</b>

Source: Kenya Housing and Population Census 2009

**Table 2: Population of Karamoja District**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Population</b>
MOROTO	50,756	53,783	104,539
KOTIDO	85,291	93,618	178,909
KAABONG	79,932	89,342	169,274
ABIM	52,963	56,076	109,039
NAKAPIRIPIRIT	82,326	87,365	169,691
			<b>731,452</b>

Source Uganda Housing and Population Census 2014

### 1.5.4 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

A study by Paton (2002) indicates that there are a variety of sampling procedures available for qualitative research and that it is always advantageous to select sampling methods that allow for

the identification of a group of individuals with diverse experiences. Similarly, qualitative researches also use non-probability samples for selecting population for study. In this study, a non-probability sample was used because it was the study's intention to get an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon which was only possible by getting people with deep knowledge about this conflict.

In this approach, the selection of participants, settings or other sampling units was criterion based or purposive (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002). The sample units were chosen because they had particular features or characteristics which enabled detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles for the study. Burgess (1984) and Honigmann (1982) refer to this as judgment sampling. Le Compte and Preissle (1993) maintain that criterion based is a more appropriate term than purposive because all sampling is purposive, but purposive is the term most commonly used in the literature.

In this study, members of a sample were chosen with a 'purpose' to represent a location or type in relation to a key criterion. This had two principal aims. The first step ensured that all the key constituencies of relevance to the subject matter were covered. The second ensured that, within each of the key criteria, some diversity was included so that the impacts of the characteristics concerned were explored. This ensured that all relevant age groups were included and that any differences in perspective between age groups were explored. The latter required sufficient representation within each age group for the impact of age and other factors to be disengaged. In order to directly address the research questions, this study sampled those individuals who were information rich, specifically, through criterion sampling.

The sample size was 384 respondents. This was arrived at using a formula and sampling table as proposed by Krejcie and Morgan (1960) and Borg and Gall (1996).

$s = X^2 NP (1-P) \div d^2 (N-1) + X^2 P (1-P)$ . Where:

$s$  = required sample size.

$X^2$ = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).

$N$  = the population size.

$P$  =the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample size).

$d$  =the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05).

Therefore:

$$(3.841)^2(1,244,142)(0.5)(1-0.5) \div 0.05^2(1,244,142-1) + (3.841)^2 0.5(1-0.5) = 384.$$

This study had a total population of 1,244,142 people of which 512,690 were from West Pokot and 731,452 from Karamoja. It had a sample size of 384 (also calculated in the formula on p38) with West Pokot having 158 and Karamoja 226

To get each County or Districts sample size, we multiplied its total population by 384 and divided it by the study's grand total population. For example West Pokots sample size was got as follows;  $\frac{512690 \times 384}{1244142} = 158$

For Karamoja it was got by calculating  $\frac{731452 \times 384}{1244142} = 226$

The addition of these two totals then gave us 384.

To get each sub county's sample size, we multiplied the total population of the Sub County/District by its sample size and divided by the County or Districts total population. This was done for each sub county/district. For example, in West Pokot, we multiplied Kacheliba and Alale's population of 156,011 by 158 and divided it by 512,690 and got 48. We then did the same to Chaperaria's 175, 614 and got 54, and Lelan and Sigor and got 13 and lastly Kapenguria and got 43. It was the additions of these i.e.  $48+54+13+43$  that gave us 158 as the sample size for West Pokot. We did the same in Karamoja where we multiplied for example 104,539 with 226 and divided by 731, 452 and got 32 for Moroto and 55 for Kotido, 52 for Kaabong, 34 for Abim and 53 for Nakapiripirit. It was the sum of these that gave us 222.

The study had a total of 37 Focus Group Discussions. Out of these, 15 were carried out in West Pokot and 22 in Karamoja. Each FGD had 10 members. The FGDs were distributed to the sub county/districts. To have a propotional number, we divided the sample size of each sub county/district by 10. For instance, in West Pokot, we divided

North Pokot/Kacheliba and Alale's	48 by 10 which we rounded off to 5
Pokot central/Chepareria's	54 by 10 which gave us 5
Pokot South/Lelan and Sigor's	13 by 10 which gave us 1
West Pokot/Kapenguria's	43 by 10 which we rounded off to 4

This gave us the county's total FGDs as 15.

For Karamoja, we also divided the subdistrict's sample size by 10 as below

Moroto's 32 by 10 which gave us 3

Kotido's 55 by 10 which we rounded off to 6

Kaabong's 52 by 10 which gave us 5

Abim's 34 by 10 which gave us 3

Nakapiripirit's 53 by 10 which gave us 5

In total this gave us the district's total FGDs as 22.

It was the addition of 15 and 22 that gave us the grand total of 37 FGDs for the study.

**Table3: Sample Size for West-Pokot County**

<b>Sub county</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
North Pokot/Kacheliba/Alale	156,011	48
Pokot Central/Chapereria	175,616	54
Pokot South	41,563	13
WestPokot/Kapenguria	139,500	43
	<b>512690</b>	<b>158</b>

**Table 4: Sample Size for Karamoja District**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
Moroto	104,539	32
Kotido	178,909	55
Kaabong	169,274	52
Abim	109,039	34
Nakapiripirit	169,691	53
	<b>731,452</b>	<b>226</b>

### **1.5.5 Data Collection Methods**

#### **1.5.6 Primary Sources of Data**

Primary data collection methods used were in-depth interview, open-ended interviews, and key informant interviews guide prepared before the interview. Key informants provided supplementary data. Un analyzed archival information also formed part of this data.

The use of the interview guide helped to draw out information and comments from the respondents. As Patron also cited in Robin and Babbie (2001) indicated that, one way to provide more information in unstructured, informal conversational interview, while maintaining a relatively high degree of flexibility, is to use the interview guide strategy. It helped to easen the researcher's task of organizing and analyzing interview data. It also helps readers of the study report to judge the quality of the interviewing methods and instruments used.

Additional data collection methods include:

- In-depth interview
- Focus Group Discussion Guides
- Key Informant Guides
- Literature search and desk top review

#### **1.5.7 In-depth interviews**

In-depth interview also described as a form of conversation by Burgess (1982), Lofland and Lofland, (1995) was used in this study with the targeted groups being government officials, elders, church leaders, traders, kraal guards, youth and NGO officials. Their inclusion criteria was on the basis of their age, gender as well as position held or role played in the society. This enabled us cover some diversities in all the key areas so that the impacts of their characteristics

as well as any differences in perspectives were explored which enriched our study. This is what Sidney and Beatrice (2000) describe as the method of interview with a 'conversation purpose'. This method was used to reproduce a fundamental process through which knowledge about pastoral conflict persistence was constructed. The study utilized this method to generate its key aspects.

### **1.5.8 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

The study used 37 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) carried out in the targeted locations using FGD guides developed by the researcher, pre-tested, and extensively discussed with experts. The FGD guides contained a checklist of questions generated from the study objectives. The participants of the FGDs were got through snowballing by the researcher. Each FGD had a uniform number of 10 participants. This exercise was conducted with a broad range of representation within the community which enabled triangulation of findings and incorporation of a wide-range of perspectives.

### **1.5.9 Groups Interviewed**

For Key Informant Interviews, this study had a total of 18 with 8 got from West Pokot and 10 from Karamoja. This we arrived at by multiplying each sub county/district by 2 from which West Pokot's 4 Sub Counties gave us 8 KII and Karamoja's 5 sub district gave us 10 KII totaling to 18 KII for the study. For the KII we ensured they were evenly distributed hence we did not pick from one group e.g. elders alone. In the case of In-depth Interviews we picked an individual from each sub county/district. For instance, we had a total of 9 In-depth interviews where West Pokot gave 4 and Karamoja 5. The total number of groups interviewed for the study was 64 with 37 from FGDs, 18 from KII and 9 from in-depth interviews. This study used snowballing sampling

technique to get the 64 respondents. It started from Kapenguria in West Pokot and Moroto in Karamoja where the researcher introduced himself to the District Commissioner who later introduced him to the District Officers in the two regions. He latter then introduced him to the chiefs and their assistants. Through the help of the chiefs and their assistants, they then organized for meetings with the Pokot and Karamojong elders in their respective areas where the researcher was formally introduced. It was from these elders' meeting that the researcher arranged or scheduled for further meetings with the elders and their other colleagues in the two areas. It was at this point that the researcher was formally introduced to the youths/warriors, kraal guards, traders, other government officials and church leaders.

For the warriors, kraal guards and traders, they introduced the researcher to their trusted colleagues who extended the same to others in the two areas. In many instances, they referred the researcher to three or four other respondents just in case he missed the selected one. This way, the network of Cross Border Resource Conflict (CBRC) was able to reproduce itself until it got to the study's saturation point at 27 in West Pokot and 37 in Karamoja totaling to 64 respondents. Key informant interviews, FGDs and in-depth interviews took 1- 2 hours meaning the researcher handled either 3 to 4 interviews or group discussions in a day. For in-depth interviews, this was carried out more particularly with the respondents who had busy schedules like the government officers, political and church leaders, teachers and NGO officials. This was done through appointments and in places that were convenient to them. It enabled the researcher to get these people's views, opinions, thought, experiences and ideas about this conflict.

The 64 respondents obtained from the Focus Group Discussions, key Informant Interviews and In-depth Interviews were conducted with a wide range of tools developed, pre-tested and discussed before use. See the table bellow for its summary.

**Table 5: Interviewed Groups per Region.**

<b>Type of interview</b>	<b>Number of groups</b>	<b>Areas /Region</b>	
FGD	37	West pokot	15
		Karamoja	22
KII	18	West Pokot	8
		Karamoja	10
In-depth interview	9	West Pokot	4
		Karamoja	5
<b>Totals</b>	<b>64</b>		

### **1.5.10 Secondary Data Collection**

Secondary data was a key source of information for this study. The researcher reviewed all the relevant documents related to the communities, organizations, and projects included in the study area. Archival research included both electronic (i.e., Internet-based) and hard-copy issues of newspapers, journals, publications. This was in addition to already analyzed reports of meetings, letters, and similar documents.

### **1.6 Validity of Research Instruments**

For the validity of the research instruments, this was done through construct validity where the critical judgment of the experts ensured the totality of its evidence to solicit the required information based on the tenets of the study's theories. This is based on Best and Khan (2009) who indicate that validity of any research instrument is better when it is approved by the critical judgment of experts based on carefully designed structure thus ensuring that significant information will be elicited.

## **1.7 Reliability of Research Instruments**

The reliability of the instruments was achieved through the test re-test where the researcher compared the responses of the instruments to ensure their consistency after the same questions were asked to the respondents during the two weeks pilot study. Scholars such as Denzin & Lincoln, (1994); Lincoln & Guba, (1985); and Padgett, (1998) indicate that qualitative researchers should frame their studies in an interpretive paradigm by thinking in terms of trustworthiness as opposed to subjective points of view. Denzin and Lincoln suggest that four factors should be considered in establishing the reliability of findings from qualitative research namely credibility, trustworthiness, dependability, and conformability.

Credibility, which refers to the confidence one can have in the truth of the findings, can be established by various methods. The study employed three methods of choice to enable triangulation, member checking and negative case analysis. With regard to triangulation, data from multiple sources through multiple methods were compared and corroborated with in-depth interviews, focus group discussion (supplemented with data from key informants), non-participant observation, and document reviews. This allowed the researcher to analyse their contents and arrive at representative and reliable study conclusions.

## **1.8 Data Collection Procedures**

A permit that authorized data collection was obtained from the relevant authorities. The researcher booked appointments with the sampled participants and notified them of the mission and purpose of the study. The researcher personally made familiarization visit to the sampled locations to make prior appointment days and dates for the intended interviews. Being a qualitative study, the researcher trained research assistants and supervised the research process.

### **1.9 Data Quality Control**

Since quality assurance is critical in any academic study, the researcher put in place an elaborate system of checks and balances, which ensured all quality control measures were adhered to during the study. These included reviewing of the study tools, participation in the selection of moderators and note takers and got the most qualified, trained of the research teams at a central location. Training was standardized for all those taking part in the exercise by ensuring that the moderators were familiar with local languages. Interviews were conducted mainly in the language which suited the participants. Regular supervision was conducted using a developed survey quality control checklist. This was done by cross-checking the completed tools for accuracy, correctness, consistency, and completeness. This ensured that this study got reliable data for its analysis.

### **1.10 Data Analysis**

This study's data was analyzed into two categories. First, was the archival data where this study used document analysis to analyze such data. This was sort from files on the basis of their relevance to the sub-themes and themes of the study. The analysis entailed internal and external scrutiny of the documents to ascertain their authenticity and validity. Through the use of internal and external criticism, we established the historical facts and truths of the documents that were corroborated with oral information and other supplementary secondary data which finally authenticated their sources and validated their contents.

Second, was the study's field data which was carried out through oral interviews. Such interviews were tape-recorded with permission of the participants before being transcribed verbatim. They were carefully read and divided into meaningful units which allowed for their content translation and analysis. Some notes were taken by the researcher in order to ensure

accuracy during transcription, but the note taking was limited to allow the researcher to focus on the participants and their answers to the prompts. The transcription was analyzed using the constant comparative method.

The constant comparative method of data analysis involves the “process of taking information from data collection and comparing it to emerging categories” (Creswell, 1998). Merriam (1998) defined the constant comparative method as the researcher beginning “with a particular incident from an interview, field notes, or document” and comparing with “another incident in the same set of data or in another set”. These comparisons were conducted throughout the data collection processes so as to inform collection of further data. This method of analyzing data allowed the researcher to refine interview questions and probes as needed and to focus in on responses that are comparable to incidents described by either other respondents or the same respondents.

Patton (2002) discussed the constant comparative method of data analysis as “comparing research sites, doing theoretical sampling, and testing emergent concepts with additional fieldwork”. Since this research was historical and qualitative, the researcher focused on oral information and events in their historical context using the constant comparative method of data analysis. Data was interpreted using inductive reasoning whose ideas were generated from its primary and secondary sources. The last and important stage of analysis involved the corroboration and triangulation of its primary and secondary data.

### **1.11 Ethical Considerations**

Any research study raises ethical considerations, to ensure safeguards, concerns and interests of the respondents were catered for during data collection. Informed consent was administered to all the respondents before the interviews were conducted. Informed consent was sought based on an

understanding that participation was voluntary. The purpose and methodology of the study was discussed with the respondents before any data was collected from them. Recording of the responses to ensure accuracy was done with the participants' consent. All data obtained from the respondents, as well as their identity was held and kept confidential by the researcher. A pseudonym was used to conceal the identity of all participants. The study findings were disseminated to the participants during two seminars one in West Pokot and the other in Karamoja. The study's research permit was got from National Council for Science and Technology in Nairobi and was not subjected to Maseno University Postgraduate Ethics and Review Committee because this body had not been established by the time this study commenced.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG RELATIONS IN THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of the Pokot and Karamojong relations and conflict in the pre-colonial period. It is the argument in this chapter that the symbolic links drawn between these people and cattle, and their associations with their cultural processes sustained ideologies, which underpinned their relations and conflict in the pre-colonial period. The process that involved their social construction of personhood or rite of passage ‘*asaapan*’ was upheld with a lot of esteem in the two communities given the fact that it provided an impetus for their cattle accumulation as well as their personhood. Similarly, it became the ground on which their conflict emanated.

This chapter brings to light a brief account of these peoples’ origin, their socio-economic and political ties as well as their cultural activities and exchanges. More importantly, it accounts for how they used their traditional conflict management mechanisms during this time.

#### 2.2 Origin, Political and Social Institutions during the Pre-Colonial Period.

The Pokot and Karamojong are among the pastoral ethnic groups that inhabit the dry land of West Pokot County of Kenya and Karamoja region in Uganda. The Pokot (*Pochon* in Singular) and sometimes spelt as *Pakot* were also known as Suk during the colonial period. They are a subgroup of the Kalenjin cluster of the Southern Nilotes formerly referred to as Nilo-Hamites (Vries, 2007). The Karamojong are one of the several ethnic groups that inhabit the dry land region of north eastern Uganda. They are part of the plain Nilotes ethnic group which forms the wider linguistic community of the Ateker (Onyango, 2010). They originated from the Ethiopian highlands from where they split into different groups then migrated around the sixteenth century

(Pazzaglia, 1982). According to Gulliver (1955), from Ethiopia, they must have migrated to Lake Turkana area in different directions; one group moved into Kenya and another into Uganda went the Karamojong, Jie and Dodoth with the Turkana and Iteso coming into Kenya. Their elders oral account confirmed that they share and have very close social organization and linguistical similarities with their southern neighbours the Iteso and Turkana.

After migrating into Uganda in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Karamojong settled in Karamoja region that lies in the north eastern corner of Uganda bordering the Sudan to the North, the republic of Kenya to the East, the Uganda districts of Sironko and Kapchorwa for the south and Kumi, Katakwi, Lira, Pader and Kitgum to the west (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2003). It is divided into five politico- administrative districts namely: Nakapiripirit, Moroto, Kotido, Abim and Kaabong. According to Onyango (2010), the districts are divided on the basis of the major ethnic groups of the Karamojong. These include the Jie, Dodoth, Labwor, Bokora, Matheniko, Pian and Chekwii thereby forming the Karamojong cluster. Upon settling at the end of their migration in the present day Karamoja region, the Karamojong acquired their present name derived from the phrase '*aikar*' meaning name, and '*imjong*' meaning the tired old man who stayed behind (Satya, 2004).

It is important to take cognisance of the fact that, in as much as these groups are not homogeneous; they all share the same language '*Ngakaramojong*', except for the Labwor who speak a Luo dialect (Kninghton, 2005). The heterogeneity of these people arises from the fact that among them, the notion of Karamojong as a unified group is non-existent. An elder<sub>3</sub> indicated that this was a creation by early anthropologists and ethnographers who wrote and classified them as a tribe.

Politically, both the Pokot and Karamojong are acephalous societies, meaning that they do not have a highest leading person, such as a governing head or chief (Vries, 2007). They however, recognize individuals that are highly respected based on their wealth and ritual status. In other words, political power in the two communities is diffused throughout the society with decisions made via domestic discussions. For instance, Kipkorir (1978) points out that the most important decisions are made by the council of elders, *Kokwo* in Pokot, or assemblies referred to as *akiriket* in Karamojong.

Studies by Huntinford (1953), Gulliver (1955), Ochieng (1975), Sutton (1976), Mwanzi (1977), Kipkorir (1978) and Ehret (1982), are all in agreement that the Pokot being part of the Nilotic cluster of the Proto- Kalenjin group. However, opinion about the location of their cradle land differs. Ochieng (1975) states it in general as the Lake Turkana region. Ehret (2002) places it as the land south of middle Nile basin in the present day Sudan. Whereas Were and Wilson (1970) place it more to the east, namely near the border of Ethiopia and Sudan. For Kipkorir (1978) and Vries (2007), they are in agreement the Proto Kalenjins (the Pokot inclusive) must have originated somewhere in the triangular region within the common borders of the present day Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.

This was confirmed by the elders' <sup>6&24</sup> oral account that after migrating from the borders of Ethiopia and Sudan their ancestors moved down to the south, briefly settled in Turkana before moving into Uganda's Koton area and later to Cherangani hills. About their presence in Uganda, various scholars argue that the Pokot traced their origin to a proto- Kalenjin (though with a distinct detect group) who inhabited the present day Jie and Dodoth regions. Linguistic evidence confirms that the Pokot were one of the earlier offshoots of the proto- Kalenjin community Vries (2007). Corroboration from their oral accounts also indicates that they form a distinct dialect-

cluster, namely Elgon and Southern Kalenjin. Further more, Rottland (1979), who constructed the language of the Proto- Kalenjin, recognizes Pokot as a separate genetic group. However, even though their location and their linguistic characteristics suggest a distinct historical development for the Pokot, the idea of an earlier offshoot of the proto- Kalenjin community presents a more representative picture of being an offshoot of the core group before individual communities established themselves or got assimilated into clans that later formed the Kalenjin ethnic groups.

In his study, Lamphear (1976) refers to the Koten and Magos mountains as the cradle of the Proto- Kalenjin. This was confirmed by Wilson (1970) that the Pokot left Koten Mountain after they were pushed out by the wave of Jie and Matheniko groups. They vividly described this as the Pokotozek migrated from Koten area towards a place called Nakiloro north of mount Moroto to Chererongit, Cherengani and finally branching to Lake Baringo area. Their oral accounts by their elders<sup>6&24</sup> confirmed this by stating that the Pokotozek were their ancestors who came from parts of today's Koten and Moroto mountains before proceeding to Elgon and Cherengani hills. This also draws confirmation from archival report which indicates that the Pokot ancestors first lived around mount Moroto before moving to Kamalingo currently known as Mt. Napak and later to Mount Elgon and to Cherangani hill.

In general, the Pokot still consider the mountain as their areas of settlement in Kenya and Uganda. This was confirmed by their oral accounts which point to Sekerr and Mwino in northern Cherengani as their only area where their traditional clan land is found. This was before they dispersed to their current settlement in West Pokot County and Baringo County which hosts the people of East Pokot.

For the Pokot, their elders' oral account in an FGD session in Chepareria indicated that clanship which is patrilineal forms a primary source of their identification. That is to say that when a child is born, he or she is incorporated into the father's sub clan from which all members are integrated into the larger Pokot society. One elder<sup>42</sup> from Kacheliba confirmed to us during a KII that among the Pokot, clan identity is often stressed as much as ethnic identity and that clans cut across territorial sections meaning that some from Alale, for example, would most probably have clan relatives in East Pokot.

Among these people, clan members are compared to family, and those of the same generation regard themselves as brothers and sisters, while those of adjacent generations are compared to parents and children (Gravel, 1967). This position was confirmed by an elder<sup>24</sup> during an FGD session in Sigor when he indicated that among the Pokot, clanship is important because critical resources are regarded as the property of clans. This is especially the case for livestock which is the most valued resource among the Pokot. As an indication of this, clan members mark their livestock by peasing the ears according to the pattern stipulated for each (Schneider, 1957).

Similarly, intra-conflicts were regulated and managed at the clan levels whereby the penalty of an individual would be extended to clan members. According to Huntingford (1953), this kind of collective punishment was traditionally perceived as very effective and contributed to ethnic unity among the Pokot. Like many pastoral communities, the political system of the Pokot was such that adolescent boys were incorporated into age- sets namely junior and senior categories. This formed the warrior groups that provided security and ensured the constant supply of cattle through raids to the community. In tandem with observation from interviews, studies by Peristiany (1951), Dietz (1987) and Sambu (2007) have indicated that political power in Pokot was transmitted from one generation set to another under the blessings of the elders. Therefore,

the senior elders held political power and took the responsibility of organizing and leading all forms of ritual activities, peace negotiations, and blessings to the other warriors before embarking on any raid. Most members in the FGD confirmed that other than the retired elders, there also existed Kraal elders among the Pokot. The Kraal elders derived their powers and status from the size or number of herds that they owned. In their (respondents) opinion, the Kraal elders are the most powerful people who trained the warriors, owned weapons, and supervised security for the clans. In addition, the elders had, among other responsibilities, to preside over assemblies, settle disputes on matters of marriage, land, and boundaries. They also gave authority or rights of entry to pasture and water across space and time through reciprocal transactions to common pool resources which sometimes belonged to other groups in different territories after negotiations.

Focus Group Discussions conducted across the two communities indicated that like the Pokot, the Karamojong also organized themselves into clusters of patrilineal groups, coming together in lineages and clans with relationships constructed around livestock, particularly cattle. A similar observation has also been confirmed by Onyango (2010) who indicated that, right from the pre-colonial period, the Karamojong society consisted of clusters of agnatic descent groups that are taken to be sub-clans deriving from one or another of nineteen clans. He emphasized that it was from this that they took their names, stock brands, children's hair makings, domestic ritual observances and food prohibitions.

The political structure started from the homestead. Each homestead or household was headed by a man from whom the children and their mothers were incorporated into the sub-clan and further integrated into the larger Karamojong society. It is at their homestead that interpersonal relationships as well as modes of expressions are bound around reciprocal rights over cattle with many ties and obligations inherent in the kinship system. While responding to questions from

KII, a Kraal leader<sup>37</sup> in Abim maintained that between 10 to 20 homesteads formed a sub-clan from which people were linked by complex ties of kinship, affinity, and contractual friendship. He went ahead to indicate that people in the neighbourhood mutually supported each other, shared communal resources, and tilled land together. This kind of mutual sharing was still in place by the time the British colonizers arrived in their area and was extended to the non-Karamojong who shared the same environment with them like the Pokot, Turkana, and Acholi.

As part of their cultural organization and relations, all Karamojong males went through a series of age and generation sets. These age sets functioned as bonding mechanisms between the different Karamojong territorial groups. According to their elders, they agreed anonymously that they have five to six years that comprise one of the two generation sets; the seniors, and the juniors.

Information got from key informant interviews indicated that it all started with a youth going through the first initiation called *asaapan* where he was admitted to the first age set and earned a voice in assemblies (*akiriket*). He was then recruited into named corporate groups *ngasapaneta* or *ngasapanisia* or age set. Five age sets then amalgamated into a corporate group of a wider time span and larger membership called *anyamet*. Each generation set thus comprised all men of the tribe who had performed initiation within the period of 25 to 30 years.

This is what the Pokot borrowed from Karamojong hence they initiate their age sets after every 20 to 30 years. One warrior<sup>4</sup>, in an FGD session in Kaabong indicated that they followed the order of their generation strictly as every generation set was considered as begetting the one that followed it. According to studies by Dyson – Hudson (1960), and Onyango (2010), two generation sets always had corporate existence: one was senior and close to further recruitment;

and the other was junior and still in the process of acquiring its full complement of five serially recruited age sets. This two generation-sets existed at any one time and were part of a total series of four distinctively named generation sets which succeed each other cyclically and continuously. Power among the Karamojong was transmitted to junior generation sets through a ritual called *a kidung amuro* and seniority of an individual elder was determined by the age-set system. Since recruitment to age-sets is continuous and serial among the Karamojong, the time span of a complete cycle of the total series of generation-sets is ideally 100 to 120 years.

The above opinions from KII and FGD confirmed that it was from their generation sets that they got their warriors who provided protection to the community and their cattle. Similarly, it was from the same, particularly their senior age-set that they got their Kraal guards with the homestead 'Manyatta' head being a Kraal leader. Elders were the senior-most government leaders who were respected for their personal ingenuity, wealth, and access to ancestral spirits and their god 'Akujju'. Elders presided over their local assemblies known as 'ekokwa'. They also made decisions regarding wars, presided over territorial, land and marriage disputes and cursed deviants. They were also responsible for deciding when and where to move next and in what formation.

### **2.3 Role of Cattle in their Relations**

Both the Pokot and Karamojong had great attachment to and liking to livestock, particularly cattle. Subsequently, cattle remained central to their economy, culture and society as their entire livelihood was constructed around it (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Lamphear, 1976; Knighton, 2005). According to an elder's<sub>3</sub> position, during KII in Abim, the cow was rated above all other animals and human beings except for the Pokot and Karamojong. In the two communities, a man's wealth was counted in terms of herds that he owned, power depended on the number or size of

the herd and this marked the socio-economic hierarchy in the society which accounted for the gap between the rich and poor. To these people, cattle were not just a kind of capital commodity from which they obtained a living but were also sacred. Their socio-political and economic behaviour was thus influenced by the strong attachment that they had to their cattle. According to Herskovits (1926), this attachment was not only “irresistible” but also ‘irreversible’ he therefore called it “the cattle complex”. Herskovits (1926) described the complex to consist of the affection for and identification with the cattle to the extent of not wanting to kill them or dispose of them even when such need arose.

This was reiterated by members of FGD in the two communities who indicated that three types of stock are recognized: females, males, and the castrated. These three types of stock had particular roles in the Pokot and Karamojong economy and culture. In subsistence terms, the informants indicated that from cattle, they got food such as milk, blood and meat hides to make sleeping skins, shoulder caps, sandals, and bell collars. Its horns and hooves provided snuff-holders, while wigs were designed from the hair tail. The control of the herds was in the hands of the man who was the head of the family with the wives only managing the herds after his death and only as a custodian on behalf of her sons in case they were still of tender age. All stock in the two communities were penned in the homestead at night and only let out to graze at day time during which time they were guarded by men, women, and children.

In one FGD in Kotido and Lelan, it was observed that in as much as cattle ownership was the point of convergence for all members, one type of animal that caught the attention of all was the *Kamar*. This was due to its beauty or esthetics. It was also known as the ‘steer cow’ or ‘mother cow’ among the Karamojong. This is what the early anthropologists Herskovits (1926) Pitchand (1957) and Schneider (1957) romanticized as ‘cattle complex’. One youth<sup>56</sup> from Abim in an

interview corroborated that a *Kamar* was often decorated with bells, songs composed for it, and it was 'initiated' through a sacrificial feast similar to the one given to a young man entering adulthood. He went further to say that a man who owned a *Kamar* was obliged to protect it with his life. In addition, whoever owned a *Kamar* or steer cow gave it his name or took the favorite animal's name. Steer or *Kamar* cows were never punished or slaughtered. Instead, an arrangement of exchange was often made for that. The point to note here is that in as much as these people had close attachment to all cattle, a *Kamar* or steer was given special attention. However, as the number of animals kept reducing either due to catastrophe or high demands emanating from cultural obligations in the colonial period, the privileges that *Kamar* or 'mother cow' enjoyed also changed as they were used as media of exchange, meat production and sacrificial animals, a position that was initially subjected to the 'other' cattle.

This study therefore confirms that the two communities had a close attachment to cattle where accumulation enhanced one's status in the society. For instance, one's position and even prestige was determined by the size of the herd that he owned. In case one had no livestock, he was considered an outcast popularly referred to as *mey* meaning poor person by the Pokot. A respondent <sub>6</sub> from Chepareria stressed that it is in their tradition that one must have livestock and it is only then that the individual would be respected. He went on to indicate that:

"If you don't have livestock, you are like a dead man, you cannot speak in front of a public, or have an audience, you will not be given the best meat and will not marry" (October 7<sup>th</sup> 2014, Chapararia).

Thus, livestock constituted the lifeline of the Pokot and Karamojong. An elder<sub>18</sub> from Moroto enumerated what they got from cattle by saying:

“From cattle we paid fines, got women to marry, milk and blood to drink, meat to eat, fat for cosmetic, urine as a cleanser, hooves for containers and the dung for construction and fertilizers”. (November 3<sup>rd</sup> 2011 Moroto).

It is evident that cattle served purposes of subsistence as well as maintenance of cultural values of these people. For instance, marriage was facilitated through the exchange of cattle in the form of bride wealth to the girl’s family. In both communities, payment of cattle as bride wealth was important for both the bride and the groom. For the former, it improved her status at her home and where she was married and for the latter, he got the privilege that was associated with decision making in the *manyatta* and the kraal. Cattle ownership and use therefore formed the point of convergence for the Pokot and Karamojong. This was on the basis that it was the link between production and exchange, for the acquisition of desired rights and for the compensation of wrongs.

To the two communities, cattle stood at the center of their common interest. Given the central role that it played in the lives of these pastoralists, its ownership was a pre-requisite for recognition and therefore was the desire of all boys and men. They would obtain them through dowry payment, inheritance, lending, or raids. Of these modes of cattle acquisition, the latter emerged as the most common and preferred way of acquiring and accumulating cattle.

From the FGD sessions on reasons for raids, it emerged that cattle raiding was an activity that involved the entire community including the youth, warriors, and elders in the pre-colonial period. Raids in both communities were carried out to fulfill either dowry payment, prove manhood after their initiation ceremony (*asaapan*), or to replenish stock after a catastrophe. The tradition of the Pokot and Karamojong allowed them to raid their neighbours mainly after their traditional ceremony *asaapan*. An elder’s<sup>18</sup> oral account indicates that immediately after the ceremony, boys were integrated into raider groups. In order to fulfill the *asapaan* ceremony, the

candidate for initiation had to look for a bull to present to the father who would then declare his son's intention by going round the village with him to look for his peers. Upon getting a group of them, they were each required to spear their oxen and, with the help of friends, slaughter them for elders' blessings. In that ceremony, the elders would bless them as they took an oath to ensure the security of their territory, safety of their livestock and more particularly, perfection of their raiding skills. The cattle obtained in the process were meant to boost their stocks individually and communally.

As a tradition, the initiates were expected to prove their manhood by engaging in raiding sprees against their territorial neighbours. For instance, the Pokot would raid the Turkana, Samburu, Marakwet, or Karamojong while the Karamojong did the same to the Turkana, Toposa, and Pokot. It was such raids and counter raids to fulfill the *asaapan* ceremony that encouraged conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong. Lamphear (1998) indicates that owing to the attachment that these people had for cows, the Pokot and Karamojong in the pre-colonial period often conflicted with each other in the context of raids and counter raids after the *asaapan* ceremonies.

Since cattle raids were integral cultural requirements for boys to demonstrate their courage through the rite of passage, this encouraged them to continue with the raids whose part of the reward was special body tattoo or marks. For instance, Pazzaglia (1982) indicates that the more tattoo marks a warrior obtained the more popular and respected he became with more girls seeking his hand in marriage. The general opinion by members of the FGD was that men with scars were always rewarded. Women treasured them, as they were respected as heroes and were greatly admired by young women, especially those seeking marriage. On the other hand, the men who grew to maturity without any body tattoos were ridiculed in the community by women who

said disparaging things about them. This prompted them to join cattle raiding expeditions which increased the two communities' conflict persistence during the pre-colonial period.

Other than the foregoing reasons for the acquisition of cattle, FGDs across the two communities revealed that cattle and other animals were used in ritual and religious activities. According to Knighton (2005), there were a number of ritual or religious occasions. They included *asaapan* in which a young man was initiated into adulthood, *Kerkel*, a feast named after the ceremonial half circle given by a member of a neighbourhood who requests the prayer and good will of his neighbours, *Mis*, a feast conducted during peace meetings between neighbours, and *Kinta*, a funeral ceremony.

Goats and sheep were frequently used by the Pokot and Karamojong as media of exchange in trade and as value items in gift exchange. In case of the latter, they served to maintain good relations between lineage members, best friends, members of a special trading partnership known as *Tilia* in Pokot and between neighbouring communities. Beyond these roles, they usually functioned as adjuncts to cattle in bride wealth. Other than trade, the two communities also practised loaning or lending system known to them as *Tilia*. It was a kind of partnership between a man who desired a cow and one who wished to acquire a steer (Schneider 1957). This transaction took place between people who were not clansmen but people from some place outside the neighbourhood.

In this kind of exchange, which was common between the Pokot and Karamojong before colonialism, the initiator always gave his cow even a steer to the recipient purposely for grain production if it was a bull. The receivers then kept the animal and if it was a cow, then, he had a right to all its milk but gave back a number of calves to the original owner. This practice went a long way in ensuring good neighbourliness as well as sharing of resources by the two

communities during this time. Over many occasions, the holder or recipient of the loaned cow gave gifts like ghee to the original owner other than the calves. These were the shares or dividends from the cow's production. The main function of *Tilia* was cohesiveness between the two communities, which is one of the tenets and core values in Ubuntu African philosophy. During KII, respondents observed that in the years of colonialism, cows and goats were also used in connection with bride wealth. As such, marriage in the two communities was only possible through exchange of cattle in the form of bride wealth paid to the girl's family. Since people in both communities are related through their different lineages, marrying from the same lineage was prohibited as it was considered incestuous. The exogamous nature of marriage in the two communities had a tremendous impact on their socio-political organization.

For instance, the inter marriage between clans encouraged inter-dependence between them. This therefore made it difficult for them to live in exclusive clanships. In most cases, they married from different clans and societies and this was only sanctioned after payment of bridewealth. In a nutshell, cattle for marriage, paid in full, became the binding factor that made marriage official. It was only through the full payment of cattle or bridewealth that the woman became a sanctioned member of the man's clan with complete rights to partake of clan duties.

The full payment of bridewealth also ensured that a woman and her children enjoyed protection of the community as she and her children belonged to the community. Upon the death of her husband, for instance, she would inherit his property particularly cattle only if her bride wealth had been fully paid for. It was for this reason that it was vital for a girl considering marriage to identify a man who was able to pay her bridewealth in full, which, in the process, compelled young men to accumulate cattle through raids that led to the persistence of conflict. As such, cattle possessions in the two communities were objects of great value as it enhanced the

relationship between the Pokot and Karamojong which was at times marked by conflict persistent during its acquisition process. Subsequently, the high demand for cattle to fulfill cultural ceremonies such as *Asaapan*, *Kinta*, *Lokoty*, *Mis* feast and payment of bride wealth resonates well with conflicts theory tenet of competition. The theory espouses that people living together often competes over natural resources which in this study's case are confirmed by the high demand for cattle to fulfill customary demands actualized through cattle raids between the Pokot and Karamojong during the pre-colonial period. Similarly, the position of this theory that when defferences over how to share natural resources between neighbouring communities manifest itself in short or long term violence, to which the result would be conflict persistence that also explains the Pokot and Karamojong relations during this time.

#### **2.4 Cultural Exchanges in the Pre-Colonial Period**

The cultural relationship and exchanges between the two communities is traceable to the pre-colonial time when the Karamojong warmly welcomed the Pokot into their territory with the latter accepting this good gesture by complying with the conditions set for them by their host. The situation was that, for the Karamojong to accept and regard the Pokot as men, they had to first fulfill the initiation rite of *asaapan*. This was against the backdrop that the Pokot had undergone their rite of passage of male circumcision. This was corroborated by an elder<sub>2</sub> in Kotido who became categorical that there were no two ways for the Pokot in that if they were to gain social standing among the Karamojong, which was also to assure them of grazing rights, stock lending and inter-marriage, they had to undergo *asaapan* and adopt certain cultural characteristics.

Consequently, the Pokot adopted *asaapan* from the Karamojong as a way of initiating their male youth into adulthood, a practice that continues to date. As part of marking adulthood through

*asaapan*, the Pokot also adopted a cultural style of headdressing known as *Siolip* whereby the initiate's hair is plastered with mud, coloured with clay and decorated with feathers (Vries 2007). Similarly, they also adopted *atoro*, a beaded head adornment that was mostly worn on specific occasions such as dancing sessions. They also adopted *amumur* and *adongo* dances that were sang in Karamojong language. Huntingford (1953) also listed material cultural features of the Pokot that were like the above, found among the Karamojong but not among other Kalenjin groups, namely: long and narrow shaped shields, wrist and finger knives, skin capes, lip plugs, nose discs, and headrest stools referred to as *a kirding*.

While responding to a question on what cultural activities the two communities adapted from each other, elders from Kacheliba indicated that the Pokot clans on the western plains have adopted traditional clan praises and burn marks for their cattle, a practice that is only common among the Karamojong clans that shared the same totems. In addition, they have adopted Karamojong names for persons and animals as well as their language. The latter was also observed by Peristiany (1951) to have resulted into a dialect on the western plains of Pokot land that is quite different from the one spoken in the highlands. It is important to note that, during the pre-colonial period, the Pokot and Karamojong relations was marked by exchanges of cultural items for instance was the use of *Lokoty* an important Pokot cultural item worn by their women also known as the mothers' belt.

To these people, the belt was symbolically rich as well as socially potent. According to one elderly woman<sup>52</sup> from Lelan, they highly valued motherhood and that the belt was only worn by women whose bridewealth and not bride service were fully paid. *Lokoty* specified the woman's procreative clan as well as the kind of children (single tone or twins) that she delivered. In these people's culture, a mother belt underscored clan singularity by displaying edited versions of the

family tree. As such, women who were married in one clan and gave birth to its members put the same decorative pattern on their belts (Hodgson, 2005). A key informant interviewed in Sigor confirmed that *Lokotyo* patterns were made from a combination of cowrie shells and coloured beads initially referred to clan benefactors. For instance, they explained that one of the Talai clans put two horizontal rows of cowrie shells on its belt to show respect for the white-necked crow that warned them to flee an escarpment about to be crushed by a massive boulder. For the Siwetoi clan, the cowrie shells on their belts displayed the shape of a buffalo horn. They traced this to some time when they never had any bull in their herds and a buffalo came and impregnated the clan's cows. Many clans in Karamoja had various designs that were used by their ancestors whose real connotation could only be traced to the Pokot culture.

Pokot elders in an FGD session at Kacheliba corroborated that it was always derived from a clean, healthy, and unblemished cow. In some cases, the hide from which a *Lokotyo* was made was matched with the gender of the born child. For instance, if the first born child was male, the mother looked for the skin of a bull and in case of a female; the hide was obtained from a cow. However, this kind of matching is obsolete as the young women stated that the womb for the children is one and so is the belt.

Data from key informant interviews and FGDs observed that to the Pokot culture, it was either a midwife or an elderly woman who made a *Lokotyo* for the expectant mothers on their first delivery. In the unfortunate event that she lost her child after delivering, a mother would discard her belt and make a new one in her next delivery. In case one of her grown up child died while she still had a small baby, she had to replace her *Lokotyo* with one untainted by misfortune. However, if a woman consistently lost her children, she was not expected to put on the belt instead, she was advised to see a diviner to determine the reason behind her misfortune. It also

emerged from KII that upon delivery, both the mother and child were to be protected by traditional charms that they wore. A child had a necklace made of several hairs from the tail of a special cow for a good luck charm. For the mother, she wore a rope that was previously used to tie the feet of cattle at milking time around her waist. When not in use, the *Lokoty* was kept behind the women's sleeping place or the calabash or gourd place (*asacha*) reserved exclusively for things pertaining to cows (Hodgson, 2000). *Asacha* held a woman's milking gourd, her *Lokoty* and her *terema* a small knife used to draw blood from a cow's neck thereby promoting its vitality (Herskovits, 1926).

Many elderly women in KII session in Lelan indicated that there was a strong link and attachment between mothers' belt and milk calabashes, which often extended beyond time wearing life of a *Lokoty*. For instance, upon being worn out, a *Lokoty* was still cut into thin strips used as milk calabash handles. As has been noted before, cattle were key to these people with one elderly woman<sup>65</sup> in Alale emphasizing that.

“Without cattle there would be no *Lokoty*, no calabashes, no gourds for there would be neither milk to fill them nor dung to nourish their growth” (March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2014).

A general remark from the FGDs was that, to be effective, a *Lokoty* had to be blessed before being used by any woman. The blessing ceremony involved two old women one of whom was a midwife. As the midwife tied a *Lokoty* around a mother after delivering, the other elderly woman using plant juice *Moikut* spit the juice on the ground while evoking the power of *Tororot* (the highest Pokot deity) to hear, listen, protect, and bless the child and the mother. Since a *Lokoty* was highly valued and respected, a woman would only lend it out temporarily either to a relative or a neighbour. It was out of this good gesture of lending the belt to neighbours that the Karamajong, particularly the Matheniko, Tepeth, and Bokora women sought the use of *Lokoty* when they were losing their children after delivering. Among the Pokot, a mother was free to

give her belt to her eldest daughter only after all her children were grown up and had been initiated. This was reinforced by an elderly woman<sup>34</sup> during KII who indicated that such a daughter would only wear her mother's belt when she (the mother) was still alive and in her menopause. She further explained that a borrowed belt had to be reblessed and if the decorative pattern was incorrect (for those who insisted on that), it was to be worn only for a short time. The Karamojong therefore adopted the following from the Pokot namely; *Lipia* a heavy fine that was paid by the killer family; *Talap* fine given by a member of a neighbourhood to discuss strategy in preparation for a legal contest; *Achula* fine given by a man convicted of an adultery and the use of *Lokoty* or mother belt as explained above.

## **2.5 Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms in the Pre-Colonial Period.**

The Pokot and Karamojong right from the pre-colonial period had their traditional structures through which their conflicts were resolved. In such forums, discussions were carried out, decisions made and communal conflicts solved. Among the Pokot, for instance, an elder<sup>50</sup> indicated that conflict management was accompanied by punishment and fines known as *lipia* and an oathing ritual known as *muma* used to reveal the truth in case the complainant and the accused disagreed on who committed the crime. Given the powers bestowed on elders, their decisions were always respected and adhered to by all members of the community.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, the traditional composition of the judicial structure of the Pokot and Karamojong was in their council of elders. The elders emanated from the two communities' gerontological order where one rose from a warrior in the junior age set, to the senior then to an elder of a Kraal before joining the council of elders as the senior most political and religious position. Similarly, Lamphear (1976) emphasizes that it was only by raising through

the ranks that elders got their authority, blessings, and power from *Akuju* and *Tororot* and became their intermediaries with the people. This was confirmed in most FGDs that it was in the council of elders that the judicial system of the two communities was anchored and that their word or judgments was final. From *Akuju* and *Tororot*, they got the power to bless those who respected them but cursed any members of their society who disobeyed them. They were considered wise and impartial in their undertakings thereby using their position to cement and provide harmony to the members of their communities. Their most important characteristic was their ability to intercede with the deity on behalf of their communities.

According to an FGD session in Kacheliba, the holders of this traditional office could be identified from the rest of the members of the society by their unique dressing style. They put on a cap made from baboon skin, an ivory bracelet, rectangular belt chain metal, a finger hook and carried a traditional stool-cum headrest known as *Achirding* (plural) or *Akaideke* (single) by the Pokot. Since they were imbued with power and knowledge from *Akuju* or *Tororot*, they were revered by their members. This was confirmed by interview sessions in Sigor and Kotido that, to the local people, nothing amongst them was feared more than being cursed by the elders. To them, this meant undergoing a lot of misfortune either as an individual or to members of his/her family. In the case of the latter, they indicated the curse could befall the children or their mothers. This could be manifested in the form of mental instability, poverty or inability to raise children.

## **2.6 Traditional Cattle Dispute Settlement Process in the Two Communities**

While responding to the interview as to when exactly and when they trace the beginning of their conflict, a Karamojong elder<sub>2</sub> confirmed that it started sometime around early 1850s when there was a severe drought in Karamoja as well as in the Pokot area. In Karamoja, with reference to

Matheniko, their senior age set *Ngikok* I disagreed with their junior counterpart *Ngikok* II where the former not only issued social sanctions but also beat up the latter who ran into the bush fearing further social sanctions from the elders. While wandering in the bush, they came across the herds of the Pokots of Kapwor. They raided the animals and took them to Karamoja where they were praised for their bravery. After some days, the Pokot traced their animals to Karamoja and organized revenge attacks on Matheniko. According to the above interview, this was the beginning of the violent raids between the two communities. The other discourse relates to a Karamojong curse, which occurred between 1879 and 1880. The curse was by their elder Lokolimoe. The story given in an FGD session in Moroto goes that Lokolimoe married off his daughter to a fellow Pokot elder in Alale. One day, the Karamojong warriors requested Lokolimoe to grant them permission to go and raid the Pokot but he declined.

The reason they gave for the raid was that it would enable them get more animals for bride wealth as well as to replenish their stock. Since Lokolimoe refused, they went ahead with the raid at Alale area where they killed many people and returned with a large herd of cattle. One of the attacked kraals belonged to Lokolimoe's son in law, Arion. The outcome was that Lokolimoe did not only lose his son in-law but also lost his daughter and grandchildren. It was because of this incident that he cursed the Karamojong by indicating that, from that time onwards, the two communities would persistently and mercilessly murder each other as they raided for cattle. The respondents held the opinion that the mistrust and persistent conflict between these communities emanated from the Lokolimoe curse.

While responding to a question on how cattle dispute was handled in the two communities, respondents generally observed that cattle raiding was accepted as a traditional activity that rarely involved the killing of a person or destruction of property. This was on the account that the

weapons that were used at this time like sticks, clubs, and spears were not meant for either killing or destroying property. They however held the opinion that if elders from a neighbouring community spotted their raided herds, the matter was usually dispensed with through a consultative elders' meeting and the livestock returned. But in case death occurred from such a raid, an extra cattle from the raider's family was given out as compensation to the victim's family. It was approximated that the fine for such deaths was between 60 to 80 head of cattle.

A respondent<sup>49</sup> from Lelan in West Pokot area indicated in a KII that the warrior who killed a person during a raid had to be cleansed before he could join his family and the rest of the community. The cleansing was undertaken by elders who considered the killer to be in possession of evil spirits. For this ceremony, the killer's family had to offer a goat and an ox, preferably white in colour, to be slaughtered.

He observed that the warrior was then asked to spear the goat and ox around the third and fourth rib using his killer spear. After spearing of the ox, a mixture of blood and intestinal content from the goat was then smeared all over the body of the warrior before being driven to a nearby river to be cleansed with water. He further confirmed that the killer would then drink blood from the ox and eat its roasted meat with the elders before taking an oath of commitment not to kill again while the elders requested *Tororot* to intervene in the cleansing. This account was supported by that of Mkutu (2003) who emphasized the fact that the warrior was left alone to stay overnight near the river so that *Tororot* drives away the bad spirit of the deceased into the river.

It was thereafter that he was declared cleansed and free to enter his homestead (*Manyatta*). An FGD session in Kapenguria corroborated that while in his homestead, he was expected to spend another four days outside the *Manyatta* and was not allowed to enjoy his conjugal rights. The four-day period was meant to confirm if *Tororot* had accepted the cleansing by not sending any

misfortune, such as death and diseases to the warrior and that, if by the fourth day no misfortune had befallen him, then he would be considered cleansed. Most of the responses by elders in the KII confirmed the position that the rigour with which the cleansing was taken and, particularly the four-day period out in the cold from one's immediate family members, prevented warriors from killing for the sake of it during cattle raids. Besides, the warriors feared misfortunes from *Tororot* befalling them because this could be marked by death during a raiding expedition. The same applied to the Karamojong whose elders<sup>32&42</sup> in KII sessions indicated that the killer was then arraigned before a traditional court *Akiwo* and interrogated. In case there was need for witnesses, they were also questioned until the elders were satisfied about the guilt of the killer(s). They confirmed that, in case of animal theft, the elders would order the accused to compensate the petitioner. According to an elder<sub>2</sub> from Kotido, in case the accused either resisted arrest or refused to comply with the judgment, the elders had no alternative but to curse him by uttering the words *totwan kaina* meaning "die on the spot".

This was corroborated by another elder<sub>21</sub> from Abim who indicated that the curse always came during the process of offering a sacrifice to their god *Akuju*. The process would begin either in the presence or absence of the accused. The elders would move a few metres from the shrine and all would stand facing east. This indicated the direction of their cradle. They then picked some stones or gravel and threw them backwards between their legs from a bending position towards the West. It was at this point that they evoked the powers of *Akuju* requesting him to dispel doom on the accused. The consequence of the curse for the accused was either mental instability or death. This was confirmed by Tornay (1993:86) who observed that;

"If someone killed a person, *Akuju* was not happy with the killer and that if requested by elders, *Akuju* will ensure the spirit of the deceased will come with chronic illness for the killer, his children or even wife or wives. Stopping the bad or evil spirit involved offering sacrifice to *Akuju* for forgiveness".

According to Karamojong elders<sup>3&7</sup> such a sacrifice always took the form of slaughtering a white he-goat to *Akuju*. During the sacrifice, the skin from the goat was cut into strips to form a kind of rope. This they indicated was then tied around the killer's neck, joint of his limbs and waist. He was then given an enemy's name and he was then asked to dramatize the killing. In case he came back with his spear stained by the blood of the deceased, he was asked to stick the spear on the ground to symbolize returning the blood of the victim to the creator. It was reported that he could also burn the blood from the spear in what they refer to as *akicuri* before it could be used again. They strongly believed that if this kind of sacrifice to *Akuju* was not carried out, then the deceased person's family may seek vengeance, and that the spirit of the deceased (*ecenil*) may do the same.

This study noted that this kind of ceremony took place when spears were the weapons used during raids before they were replaced by guns. The gun used in killing someone was presented to the elders for cleansing. From one of the key informant interviews<sup>29</sup> in Kotido, it was the elders' general opinion that prayers are offered and the blood from either the ox or white he-goat is smeared on the gun. Urine from the warrior's female or mother cow was used to wash away the blood to signify the going away of the bad omen. The interviews also revealed that, among the Karamojong, urine from such a cow was believed to be protective as well as productive. And for that reason, the killer had also to be adorned with a necklace of white ostrich shell and beads among other charms meant to protect him from avenging spirits.

It was only after undergoing this kind of ritual process that the person was free to participate in another raid. With regard to peace building, it was revealed from FGDs that the Pokot and Karamojong traditional mechanism involved sending a peace messenger after which a community dialogue was initiated where elders from both sides discussed how to ensure their

peaceful co-existence. In this kind of arrangement, an elder<sup>18</sup> indicated that the peace messenger extended an olive branch inviting the other community to the negotiating table. The messenger would approach the elders of the counterpart community while holding a white ostrich feather to signify a friendly visit. In tandem, studies by Gulliver (1955) and Lamphear (1976) concur that since this messenger was on a peace negotiation mission, he was not to be intimidated or attacked by any member of the host community. If anything, the peace messengers were always received warmly and given a gourd full of milk to drink and take to the senders.

This study also confirmed that the elders from the two communities encouraged their members to maintain peace and harmony between themselves. Since cattle raids were understood as traditional activities, death rarely occurred. Situations of belligerence were minimal and often amicably addressed. Data from KII showed that in the two communities, their judicial assembly known as *Ekokwa* for the Karamojong and *Kokwo* for the Pokot attended to disputes or problems that would otherwise be taken to government courts like the native courts in the colonial period. In the two assemblies, the elders provided leadership and made judgments, which included punishments and penalties. The punishments would take the form of strokes of canes inflicted on the accused while penalties entailed fines paid by the accused in the form of cattle, sheep, goats, or camels.

All depended on the nature of the offence committed which also varied in the two communities. This was corroborated by an elder<sup>7</sup>, in Moroto who indicated that, in case the offence called for the intervention of *Akuju* or *Tororot*, and then a sacrifice (*Akiriket* for the Karamojong and *Amoros* for the Pokot) was held in a specific shrine where elders performed the necessary ritual. From the foregoing, a fundamental concept of the Pokot and Karamojong morality was respect for the authority of their male elders and the corresponding political institutions. This was

anchored on the fact that it was the elders, through their various councils, that deliberated on matters concerning the community. In both communities, customary rules demanded that all raids were planned, sanctioned, authorized, and supervised by the elders. The warriors who executed the raids had to be blessed by the elders because the latter were deemed to derive their powers from the supernatural and therefore had the ability to curse deviants. The warriors reciprocated the elders' good gesture by slaughtering one of the bulls from the raids to the elders in appreciation of their blessings. It was confirmed from an FGD, in Nakapiripirit that, among the Karamojong, the sharing of the spoils by the elders was known as *lookwa* meaning, "tasting the sweat of the boys".

This ceremony was conducted under a special tree known as *ekokwo* or "the tree of men". All the problems or misunderstandings that arose from the raids were to be settled by the elders under this sacred tree. In tandem with these observations from KII and FGDs, studies by Mkutu (2001) and Knighton (2005) indicate that the elders' meetings in these communities were with regard to the use of land, cattle raids, settling of disputes, and marriage among other issues. Whenever conflict arose from either, it was the responsibility of the elders to solve such a dispute. Given their age and skills, the elders were imbued with the power and knowledge of the supernatural and therefore had great influence over the welfare of their group. This is confirmed by Salih (1993:102) who observed that:

"Prior to colonial rule and even after, the pastoral societies of Pokot and Karamojong were dominated by elders who were collectively responsible for the governance of the community".

The foregoing analysis confirms the position of this study that the Pokot and Karamojong still used their political institutions particularly those concerned with decision making on conflict management or mitigation in the pre-colonial period. This is in tandem with *Ubuntu* tenets of

collectiveness and participatory decision making in conflict resolutions. Building on the collective value system, with core virtues as solidarity, openness and respect to traditional order, the Pokot and Karamojong traditional conflict management mechanisms recognize the importance of people and their good relationships, participatory leadership and decision making, loyalty and reconciliation as reflected in their use of peace messengers as an avenue of initiating their dialogue. As espoused in *Ubuntu* theory, Heuvel (2008) also stresses the importance of dialogue as the point of departure for building consensus with the aim of allowing or giving room for constructive debates and achievement of peaceful co-existence between neighbours like the Pokot and Karamojong.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has established the nature of the Pokot and Karamojong socio-political and economic relations and exchanges in the pre-colonial period. More importantly, it has detailed how their traditional ways of cattle acquisition to fulfill social norms more particularly “*Asaapan*” and bride wealth payment enhanced their competition for cattle ownership which at times led to their conflict persistence. It has also articulated how the two communities adopted different cultural styles from each other. They include *siolip*, *atoro*, *Lokoty*, *Talap*, *Kinta*, *Mis* and *Akirnding*. It has ended by shading light on how the two communities used their traditional political institutions of *Ekokwo* and *Kokwo* to settle their difference before it was usurped by rebellious youth that enhanced the conflict persistence. The next chapter, we now turn to the role the arrival of British colonialism and the creation of the Kenya-Uganda boundary in the Pokot and Karamojong conflict persistence.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE ARRIVAL OF BRITISH COLONIALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE KENYA-UGANDA BOUNDARY IN THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG CONFLICT PERSISTENCE**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The historical event which culminated into the actual arrival of colonial rule in eastern Uganda and western Kenya and later the creation of a boundary between the two colonies was the declaration of the British protectorate over Uganda in 1894 and Kenya in 1895 (Kwamusi,1996). This was in fulfillment of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 (Heligoland treaty) in which Uganda became a British sphere of influence.<sup>1</sup> At this time, western Kenya formed part of the wider region of eastern Uganda. Consequently, it was the 1894 declaration that ushered in British imperialism in Karamoja and Kenya thereafter. This led to significant administrative changes through the imposition of British imperial authority particularly the creation of the boundary over the various communities in the region. This chapter commences with the role of the colonial officers in the establishment of their rule as well as their perception of West Pokot and Karamoja.

#### **3.2 Role of Colonial Officers and their Perception of West Pokot and Karamoja**

Right from 1894, the early British Colonial Officers in Kenya and Uganda had intolerant ideas and views about West Pokot and Karamoja. For instance, William Grant, Hesketh Bell and Colonel Colville (the British colonial officers in Uganda) described northern Uganda and Kenya as areas where the British will only fritter away their resources without any reward.<sup>2</sup>

1. National archives Entebbe, Boundary Treaty file no. A4/146/1901.

2. National Archives Entebbe, Joint memo by colonial officers 2804 16/1/1902.

Consequently, the extension of the British imperialism into northern Kenya and Uganda took a gradual process that was completed much later in contrast to the southern regions. According to Ogot (1968) and Kabwegyere (1981), these areas were perceived as marginal in two main ways. First, they are dry and sparsely populated and thus did not strike the British as regions that could offer any economic value. For instance, when the new British Commissioner to Uganda, Hesketh Bell, visited the regions in 1906, he was not impressed by both northern Uganda and North western Kenya describing them as regions with little or no promise of successful development.

He said, "I cannot think of a single product that might be grown here which will pay for the cost of carriage to the seaboard".<sup>3</sup> Second, the inhabitants of the regions, particularly the Pokot and Karamojong, were perceived by the colonizers as uncivilized, war like, and hence had little to contribute to the development of their areas. In most cases, they were unwilling to submit to colonial authority. Therefore, in the colonizers' view, the two northern areas only offered heavy expenditure without any economic reward. Besides, their decentralized and small scale political organization did not impress the British at all. As Barber (1968:86) puts it,

"No tribe in northern Kenya and northern Uganda had an effective Central political leadership to make it powerful enough to capture attention of the British. At best, they were seen as potential threats to British interests and as potential allies to share the burden of administrative expansion."

The change of guard where Lord Lansdowne succeeded Salisbury at the Foreign Office in London also came with a change of heart and policy on the British expanding to the north.

3. National Archives Entebbe, Sir Hesketh's Correspondence to Secretary of State in London file no. 58617, Sep 13.1910.

James Hayes Sadler, who succeeded Sir Harry Johnson and Fredrick Jackson as the new Commissioner in Uganda, had favoured Johnson's policy of expansion but was forced to abandon it very quickly due to opposition from London. Similarly, the British East African territory which bordered north east Uganda had little or no British activity (Ingham, 1957). For instance, Sir Charles Elliot who was commissioner in British East Africa between 1900 and 1904 had mixed feelings about expansion. With the exception of the administrative post at Lake Baringo also known as "the place in the wilderness," Elliot never advocated for expansion for its own sake or administering an area because it is there Barber (1968). He vividly expressed this when he wrote to Lansdowne saying that,

I am convinced that it is useless to spend lives and money on subduing the barbarous inhabitants of barren deserts... not unless it is absolutely necessary to protect our borders to allow the general movement of the protectorate not to be retrogressive.<sup>4</sup>

In effect, what Elliot had in mind was that given the fact that northern Kenya and northern Uganda had little if any economic value, they could only be brought under British control if there was external threat to the borders and for easy movement of the British officials and perhaps troops. Consequently, British activities in northern Kenya and northern Uganda were marked by a fierce opposition. For instance, by 1905, the position was still the same. In particular, Sir Donald Stewart, Elliot's successor in British East Africa, had London's policy confirmed to him in a dispatch which read:

It is not the policy of His Majesty's Government to extend their practical administration over the remote parts of the protectorate until it is thoroughly consolidated around existing centres and stations as the advantages of getting small tax is not commensurate with the risks and expenses which such expansion would entail.<sup>5</sup>

4. Kenya National Archives Nairobi Elliot's Annual Report PC/NRB/, 67/7. 1904.
5. Kenya National Archives Nairobi Correspondence from London to Commissioner Stewart file no. 53160 October 10<sup>th</sup>, 1904.

However, as time went by, it became necessary for the British to extend their control in the areas North of Elgon and between the Nile and Lake Rudolf which is now Lake Turkana. This was in conformity with Johnson's view that expansion to the north was in itself desirable. On his part, Sadler had expressed the same view but stated that it should only be undertaken if it could not be avoided.<sup>6</sup> It was not until there were ethnic based wars and constant attacks on the British officials by the Suk and Karamojong, the people referred to as 'quasi civilized', that the British made their control felt by 'pacifying' them. The point to note here is that right from the beginning, the British imperialism in northern Kenya and northern Uganda was marked by poor relationship between them and the local people.

Elders<sup>3&34</sup> who were interviewed unanimously agreed that this arose from the mistrust and how they perceived each other. To them, the British were viewed as intruders or (*Ngiserukale*) in Karamojong out to interfere by maligning them in the context of entrenching their political authority and their way of life. On their part, the British colonizers perceived the Pokot and Karamojong as pockets of disgruntled "primitive" people trying to resist the British "superior civilization" that had been "accepted" by the majority. It was for this reason that the two communities engaged the British colonial authority in persistent wars. Despite the fact that the Pokot and Karamojong were perceived as primitive, their regions were gradually incorporated into colonial Kenya and Uganda respectively.<sup>7</sup> For instance, in 1903, the British were compelled to abandon their halfhearted policy of occupation of East Africa. This was after the Sudanese troops presented their grievances of low pay at Eldama Ravine in the Kalenjin territory, inadequate, and delayed basic needs to Macdonald who was a British official in the area (Karugire, 1980:30).

6. Kenya National Archives, Sadler's Annual Report PC/NRB/17/7, 1906.

7. National Archives Entebbe, East Africa Annual Report file no. A4/126, 1910.

When their grievances were not settled, they killed three British officials on their way to Buganda with the intention of toppling the British and establishing themselves as rulers of the region. According to Karugire (1980), the British only managed to defeat the Sudanese after receiving assistance from Nabongo Mumia and Nandi mercenaries when he stated that “the idea to ask for reinforcement from Mumia and the Nandi came about after it emerged from the British colonial circles that the Sudanese could easily team up with the ‘war like’ communities of Pokot and Karamojong”. To ensure that the British remained in control of northern Kenya and northern Uganda, Colonel Colville who was in charge of the colonial administration in Uganda, dispatched Velvet Spire in 1904 to establish an administrative post in Mumias and Karasuk (Ochieng, 1986).

The setting up of administration posts in Mumias and Karasuk areas intended to open up the Kavirondo and the turbulent Rudolf region even though they were perceived as areas with little or no economic significance to the British. However, the major turning point in the colonial attitude of the government towards the Pokot and Karamojong regions was in the years after 1904. This was prompted by persistent fighting in the region. First, was the colonial government’s report of 1904, which revealed the fierce ethnic fighting to control the lucrative ivory trade that had been on going in the region.<sup>8</sup> This report indicated that the British interest in the two protectorates was under intense threat from the Ethiopian Emperor, the ivory hunters as well as from the fighting communities.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, a touring officer was appointed by the acting Governor of Uganda Stanley Tomkins to check on Ethiopian intrusion and poachers in Karamoja and Turkwell South of latitude 30<sup>0</sup> N.

8. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Annual Report, no. A4/122, 1910.

9. National Archives Entebbe, Uganda Annual Report file no. A4/106, 1902.

The officer had the duty of controlling ivory trade as well as to enter into negotiation with the northern communities to stop their ethnic conflicts as it had been observed by the colonial authorities that they persistently raided each other all year round. The Ethiopian threat to the British was made real when, in 1903, Emperor Menelik sent a circular to the European powers (Britain included) declaring that he intended to extend his empire to its traditional limits of Khartoum in the west and Lake Victoria in the South. This was confirmed by Sir Rennell Rodd who had been sent by the British government in 1904 to negotiate with Menelik when he wrote to Salisbury: "I am convinced of the fact that Menelik is straining every effort to bring under his sway all the countries he lays claim to in his proclamation of 1903"<sup>10</sup>.

It is important to note that Menelik's claim and threat went into the years after 1904. Consequently, the colonial government to change its policy of 'concentration' or keeping the British occupation to the more "economically viable" south to that of "expansion" into the north. Accordingly, in 1902 Governor Fredrick Jackson extended the British authority and control in Karamoja and Rudolf areas from 1902 because of the persistent raids by poachers and Menelik's forces.

In 1903, Jackson reported that the entire country lying West of Lake Rudolf and for some distance South was continuously swept by raiding bands of Abyssinians or Ethiopians and this had to be stopped (Barber, 1968). From this time onwards, the colonial government then viewed the North more positively as a source of revenue though not for a long time. This was because most fortunes from ivory trade went to individuals and not to the government.

10. National Archives Entebbe, Rennell's correspondence to Salisbury file no. A4/106, 1904.

The colonial government could not rely on revenue from ivory because the elephants had by then been depleted through destruction by poachers. Second was the prevalence of inter-ethnic raids, which forced the colonial government to change its attitude towards the pastoral communities in the region.

The emphasis then was not how economical the region was to the British but how effectively the areas could be put under British control. This came about after reports were made about the persistent ethnic fighting in the area. For example, in 1903, T. Grant, an administrative officer in Karamoja reported tribal raids for goats, cattle and sheep and in 1906, H. Rayne, a police officer, made a full report of the unlawful activities in the area.<sup>11</sup> In 1908, Lieutenant Fishbourne also wrote about the people living in northern Uganda and northern Kenya stating that though they are “excitable”, they like interfering and fighting.

To end the ethnic animosity, the Governors Edward Northey of the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya) and Sir Robert Coryndon of Uganda came up with the policy of punishing what they called the “Wild Tribes” in East African Protectorate and in Uganda.<sup>12</sup> However, after close consultations within the British circles, it emerged that their method of countering violence with violence was bound to undermine their administration as well as consume a lot of their time and resources. As a way of showing their commitment to the administration of the protectorate, the British colonial government opted to provide ‘protection’ for each of the ethnic groups that they brought under their control.

11. National Archives Entebbe, Rayne’s Report to Uganda Commissioner, file no. A4/108, 1906.

12. Kenya National Archives, Joint Commissioners Report file no, PC/NRB/147, 1910.

This was confirmed by a government report that stated,

“By 1912, the gradual extension of the British rule in northern Kenya and Uganda began by increasing their obligation of colonial protection in the two protectorates... this was evident in their protection of the ethnic groups under their control that included the Karamojong, Suk (Pokot), Sabiny (Sebei), Samburu and Turkana”<sup>13</sup>

Similarly, elders from the two communities in the KII session confirmed the British intervention in 1914 when a combined force of Turkana and Pokot raided the Matheniko clan in Karamoja and drove away 400 heads of cattle and about 3000 sheep and goats. It was this particular raid that prompted the colonial government to establish military outposts in Dodoth, Magosi, Kakaman, Lokosomal, Kameon in Uganda, L. Rudolf, Kacheliba and along the Turkana Escarpment (Barber, 1968). To ensure that there were no future raids between these neighboring communities, British military patrols were introduced in Karamoja in 1915 while the Kings African Rifles (KAR) alongside the Kenya Police Battalion sought to maintain law and order in Pokot and Turkana (Morris, 1961).

Despite the fact that the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda made tremendous efforts to control the persistent inter-ethnic conflicts in these pastoral areas, the situation escalated after 1902. Respondents generally confirmed that the colonial government not only despised them as “uncivilized” and “backward” but also created the idea of them being ‘warlike’ and ‘violent’ by pitting them against each other so as to control them. Mamdani (1996), describes this as the creation of enemy image among the Africans by the imperial forces in their ‘old fashion’ divide and rule policy. To this effect, elders confirmed in both KII and FGDs that each community was polarized and prejudiced against the other.

13. National Archives Entebbe Joint Commissioner’s Report file no. A33/10, 1914.

This justified their persistent aggression and counter-aggression against each other. The enemy-image syndrome is backed by the fact that it was during the colonial period that the Karamojong started calling the Pokot *Karecha*, meaning enemy while, the Pokot referred to them as *Punyon* i.e an enemy.

In colonial discourse, the problem of stabilizing alien rule was referred to as the 'native-question' (Mamdani, 1996). As a tactic, it was used to turn one group against the other with the aim of ensuring the unity of the rulers and disunity of the ruled. This happened in the context that the beneficiaries of the rule were the alien minority with its victims as the indigenous majority. It is, however, important to note that the local communities of Karamojong and Pokot did not understand the British system of administration. For instance, whereas the colonial government was determined to have all communities in their respective areas marked by district and international boundaries, the locals thought that it was a way of denying them opportunities to raid each other for animals. By 1922, the colonial administration in the two colonies had become strict on ethnic boundaries that were drawn on the basis of perceived common origins, political organization, and language which designated every ethnic community as unique from others and were administered as a discrete ethnic unit.

This study noted that, in as much as the idea of restricting local people to their own boundary was good for colonial administration, it was understood differently by the affected communities. The pastoralists in particular, found fixed boundaries as a hindrance to their free access to water and grazing land. Subsequently, such boundaries or restrictions by the colonial authorities increased conflict and violence among the affected people like the Pokot and Karamojong. To be more precise, more often than not, the Pokot and Karamojong started raiding each other for cattle, goats, and sheep. They knew too well that the raided group would be barred from crossing

to the raider's territory. It was this kind of restriction that the Pokot and Karamojong elders confirmed in an FGD session as having increased their animosity. Consequently, friction between neighboring communities over grazing land, water, and cattle escalated at this time. According to Ocan (1992), when the colonial government fixed boundaries, each community found itself surrounded by an enemy. For example, the Karamojong found themselves surrounded by the Jie, Turkana, Suk and Sebei while the Pokot of Kenya were surrounded by the Turkana, Samburu and Karamojong. Since amity among the ethnic communities had been affected by colonialism they regarded themselves as enemies, which gave way to their persistent state of belligerence.

This was corroborated by one Karamojong elder<sup>3</sup> at Abim who stated that their relationship with the Pokot right from colonialism was so bad that it was only the sun that brought them together. In 1919, as an attempt to curb or probably end the incessant inter-ethnic wars in Northern Kenya and Uganda, the colonial government called for a peace conference in Karamoja (Gulliver, 1955). It involved elders and chiefs from Suk, Karamojong, Turkana and the Bantu and Nilotic elders from Bukedi. However, the study observed that this conference failed to achieve its objective of bringing harmony between the hostile communities particularly between the Pokot, Karamojong and Turkana. Two reasons have been advanced for the botched conference.

According to Mkutu (2008), the first reason for the failure of the conference was the fact that the colonial government lacked viable alternatives to cattle raiding and commitment to African livestock development. He argues that the latter was vehemently opposed by the colonial government because of the competition it was imagined it would offer to the white settlers. The white settlers were the colonial administrative partners in revenue generation for the colony. Therefore, the development of the African livestock sector as a way of ending cattle raiding and

the insecurity that it caused was regarded by the colonial government as a ‘minor factor’ in their development agenda. In fact, they were comfortable with the status quo. Karugire (1980) argues that the second reason was the use of administrative variant of chiefships as the full-blown village based despots. The chiefs were meant to replace the council of elders in the case of stateless societies like the Karamojong and the Pokot.

In Uganda for instance, chiefships were only instituted in communities that could not adapt the *Kiganda* model of political administration which the British had wanted to export into all parts of the protectorate (Karugire, 1980). The *Kiganda* Model had received a lot of accolades from the colonial administration as probably the most viable and cheapest political organization as compared to the decentralized system. To the British colonial administrators, the latter was defined in terms of what political institutions they lacked rather than in terms of how they organized their political life. Consequently, the Pokot and the Karamojong systems of governance, which fell in this category, did not strike the colonial officials as appropriate for collective presentation of law and order, administration and the protection of human rights among people.

Confirmations from KII and FGDs in the two communities indicate that the British use of indirect rule with local chiefs as their main instruments of administration in East Africa Protectorate and Uganda only epitomized their politics of manipulation and division in these areas. As a result, the appointed chiefs were not only seen as an integral part of the new system of alien rule but were also hated, ridiculed and rebuked by their subjects. This situation resulted from the fact that the colonial authorities in Kenya and Uganda had mandated the chiefs to undertake administrative and executive functions for which there was no precedent in their ethnic organizations. Cases in point were, first, when they presided over judicial cases in the

villages, a privilege that was accorded only to the elders' *pooy* in the case of the Pokot. Second, was when they forcefully carried out the colonial government's disarmament order on their subjects. This came about after the British signed the Brussels Arms Regulation Treaty in 1890. Consequently, the British colonial governments in the two protectorates implemented what became known as the Firearms Ordinance in 1903 as a way of fulfilling the Brussels Treaty.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the 1903 firearms ordinance permitted the colonial chiefs to disarm the Karamojong and Pokot to what respondents in KII referred to as an 'acceptable level'.

The worst scenario was that the chiefs acquiesced to the new political arrangement to exacerbate division in West Pokot and Karamoja areas (Mamdani, 1996). Besides, respondents confirmed that the chiefs retained their firearms as they maintained a monopoly of force in northern Kenya and north Eastern Uganda. A church leader<sub>11</sub> from Alale indicates that in contrast to what was expected, the chiefs used their firearms as instruments of vengeance on their old and new rivals and not for ensuring peace and order. As such, the colonial disarmament in Karamoja and West Pokot areas created serious imbalance because not all people in possession of illegal firearms were disarmed. This enhanced rather than curbed the raids and violence between these communities.

Consequently, this study noted that the large presence of the colonial chiefs at the Karamoja Peace Conference meant to create harmony between fighting communities only led to failure of the conference even before it commenced. The problem of the acquisition and misuse of small arms in northern Kenya and northern Uganda was due to the European, Swahili, Ethiopian and Nubian incursions into these areas in search of elephant tusks. These foreign traders gave the local people guns to hunt down elephants while others exchanged them for elephant tusks.

14. National Archives Entebbe, International Arms Treaty, file no. A4/148, 1911

As a result, almost every community in northern Kenya and northern Uganda that were in contact with these ivory traders became armed with guns, hostile to each other and later to the British. It was this kind of situation that was used to justify the stereotyping of the Pokot and Karamojong as “war mongers”, yet this was the outcome of their interaction with foreigners such as ivory traders.

Given the fact that northern Kenya and northern Uganda areas largely remained arid or semi-arid, sparsely populated and relatively “volatile” to the British colonizers, between 1902 and 1960 the two regions remained “closed districts” (Zwanenberg, 1975). Consequently, apart from the established administrative and military outposts, who were created to pacify the local people, there was little if not nothing in terms of development that the British colonial government did in these areas. In any case, the leaders of the two colonies, Sir James Hayes, William Grant, Charles Elliot, Edward Northey, Fredrick Jackson, and C.W. Hobley, were all under instruction from the British Foreign Office in London to concentrate on the “economically viable” areas in the two colonies. This kind of situation got the support of a detailed Foreign Office dispatch to the commissioners of East Africa and part of it, which read,

You will bear in mind that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, it will not be desirable to push too quickly amongst tribes in outlying districts who have little to offer of commerce and have not yet accustomed to the sojourn of the white man. Such tribes should rather be attracted to larger centres where they will see the work of civilization in progress and begin to appreciate its advantages.<sup>15</sup>

Based on the foregoing, the northern Frontier District of Kenya and Karamoja remained not only peripheral but also marginalized throughout the era of British colonization in Kenya and Uganda.

15. National Archives Entebbe, correspondence from foreign office in London to E.A Commissioners, file no. A4/141, 1930.

This not only hardened the Karamojong and Pokot ethnic consciousness and belief but also changed their perception both about the colonizers as well as the other citizens. The situation was that they considered themselves heroes who were capable of blocking the White man from interfering with their culture or as second rate citizens who were abandoned during the White-man's development moments.

Consequently, the decision of the colonial government to classify these areas as either "closed" or "restricted" encouraged cross-border resource conflict persistence and also how these communities perceived colonial administration as well as those of the post independent regimes. They confirmed this in KII and FGDs as being the reason behind incessant raids and rustling that has persisted to date.

### **3.3 The Process of the Kenya – Uganda Boundary Creation**

In Africa, two broad types of boundaries were identified according to the process of their creation. First, are the boundaries created between territorial holdings by different colonial powers. This is what Anene (1970) calls boundaries established by international agreements. Secondly, are those boundaries drawn between the territorial possessions of the same colonial power also known as unilateral boundaries. The Kenya – Uganda boundary establishment falls in this latter category.

However, it is important to take cognizance of the fact that in both cases (whether unilateral or by international agreement), territories were carved out in spite of pre-existing social formations and patterns of community interactions. Convenient boundaries were phenomena that accomplished the arrival of European colonialism in the continent. They are referred to as convenient boundaries for two reasons. First, such boundaries were meant to help the Europeans preserve their balance of power and friendship among themselves. Kabwegyre (1974) calls them

“bargain boundaries” between European imperial powers that had spheres of influence in Africa. Secondly, is what Mamdani, (1983) observes as boundaries used in the colonial tactic of divide and rule. This kind of boundary was used to divide the African communities arbitrarily by placing them in two different colonial territories. The Kenya – Uganda boundary is a case in point where the Samia, Teso, Pokot and Bagisu have all been separated by the boundaries establishment with a section placed in Kenya while the other is placed in the Republic of Uganda. Mamdani (1996) argues that the main purpose underlying the divide and rule tactic was to preserve the unity of the colonial rulers and disunity of the majority African subjects. Due to the fact that the convenient boundaries did not take into account the interest of the affected communities prior to their creation, they have been reported to have had an enormous potential for the persistent tribal conflicts (Butt, 1990).

Unlike many established unilateral boundaries, the creation of the Kenya – Uganda boundary was expected to be less controversial. This derives from the fact that unilateral boundary creations involved officials from one imperial power. Conversely, the process of creation of the Kenya – Uganda boundary went out of this cardinal norm. Instead, it was marred by confusion and differences by British officials in the two colonies who operated on two different ideological confines. The ideological differences were such that one group supported a merger of the colonies (Kenya and Uganda) while the other pushed for a boundary creation to separate them. The points of departure were the changes to be brought about in East Africa Protectorate (Kenya) and Uganda which was made by the British officials some time towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Subsequently, suggestions of a possible merger between the protectorates of Kenya and Uganda came up in London at the office of the Colonial Secretary.<sup>16</sup>

16. National Archives Entebbe, correspondence from Colonial Secretary to E.A Commissioners, file no. A4/122, 1901.

As a result, Sir Harry Johnson was made responsible for choosing a suitable administrative capital for the envisaged merger (Kwamusi, 1996). In his view, Johnson had come up with the idea that the new capital should be known as “King Edward’s town” to be situated at Entebbe but later changed his mind to have it at Kipchoria near the present day Londiani Township.<sup>17</sup> However, by 1901, the whole idea of having a merger between the two protectorates was already facing vehement opposition from those who favoured and voiced for a creation of a boundary to separate the two protectorates. The proponent of this school of thought was Sir Clement Hill, the then superintendent of African protectorates administered by the British Foreign Office.

His idea on boundary creation was anchored on the fact that prior to 1900, he had visited East Africa to inspect the administrative trends in the protectorates. His report to the Marquess of Lansdowne in May 1901 had two issues with the merger idea. First was that the merger was tantamount to creating one huge area, which would be impossible to man by one person. Second, was that Uganda’s infrastructure was inadequate to the extent that it was not going to provide a smooth link or coordination with the East Africa Protectorate (Ingham, 1957). In addition, Hill confirmed that the Uganda Railway was near completion and with a few territorial adjustments, would improve by making it easy to administer the Kenya protectorate. This drew support from Hugh (1961:87), who noted that,

“The transfer of the East Africa Protectorate headquarter from Mombasa to Nairobi, appeared to imply that Kisumu could be more effectively administered from Nairobi than across the Lake in Entebbe”

It was Clement Hill’s idea that prompted the transfer of Uganda’s Eastern Province to East Africa Protectorate that today covers the former provinces of Nyanza, and Western, as well as parts of Rift Valley (Ochieng, 1974).

17. National Archives Entebbe, Correspondence from Sir Johnson to Secretary of States, file no. A4/120, 1901.

It is, however important to note that Hill's boundary creation idea had a few flaws. The first flaw was that it had the great potential for disrupting the social setting of African ethnic groups in the two protectorates. The second flaw was that it did not consider the existence and use of natural boundaries which the indigenous people already recognized. Besides, going by Hill's proposal, natural features like Mount Elgon, River Yala, Lake Rudolf and Elgeyo Escarpment would be fearlessly contested by the African communities that were going to lose them to the transferred territory.

Although H. Johnston's proposed merger received support from C. W. Hopley, the then Commissioner of the East African Protectorate, and Sir Charles Elliot, they were rejected outright by the Marquess of Lansdowne. This was despite the fact that Harry Johnson and Charles Elliot were the British officials on the ground in Kenya and Uganda respectively. Subsequently, the decision by Hill prevailed upon those of Hopley, Johnson, and Elliot, as Kwamusi (1996:39) observes:

“The Marquess of Lansdowne preferred to act upon the advice of a foreign Office official Sir Clement Hill instead of the recommendations of experienced man Sir Harry Johnson, special Commissioner in Uganda, and in spite of views exposed by Sir Charles Elliot Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate.”

It was the rejection of the merger proposal and the acceptance of boundary adjustment by the transfer of Eastern Province of Uganda in 1902, and Karasuk and Rudolf Province in 1926 that marked the evolutionary milestone in the establishment of the Kenya – Uganda boundary.

### **3.4 Boundary Transfers 1902 to 1926**

Boundary development and function in Africa has always depicted two ideas, that is, boundary “delimitation” and boundary “demarcation”. In his words, Campell Mc Ewen (1969) indicates

that, delimitation comprises the determination of a boundary by signing of a treaty or verbal agreement and demarcation as the actual establishment of a boundary on the ground marked by beacons or other similar physical means. Considering the above definitions, all the colonial boundaries in Africa that confirmed the imperial force's sphere of influence then constitute delimitation. This is because the treaties that were signed involved establishing the territorial limits of one European power or the other (Kwamusi, 1996). A case in point was the signing of the Helligoland treaty between the British and the Germans which further created the Uganda and Kenya protectorates as the British sphere of influence and Tanganyika as the German sphere of influence.

As such, the first ever international boundaries to be created in East Africa came as a result of the signing of two treaties between the British and Germans. First was the signing of the Anglo-German agreement of 1886 in which the German spheres recognized the line of demarcation from Vanga passing through Taita and the Chaga, skirting the northern base of mount Kilimanjaro and along Lake Victoria at the points of latitudes 1<sup>0</sup> south.<sup>18</sup> The second Anglo – German treaty signed in July 1890 provided for the proclamation of a British protectorate over Zanzibar and a ten mile coastal strip leading to the withdrawal of the German protectorate over the Sultanate of Witu and the coast upto Kismayu (Kenya National Archives 1908). In exchange, the British were to assist the Germans to secure possession of the Coast. The second British protectorate was declared in 1894 and this included Buganda kingdom, Bunyoro, Ankole and Busoga. The third protectorate was the East Africa Protectorate, which was established in July 1895 over the territory between Uganda and the East Coast. According to Ogot (1995), the exact boundary of the new protectorate was not only arbitrary but also vague.

18. National Archives Entebbe, boundaries of East Africa file no. A4/104, 1926.

He points out that it followed the Anglo-German frontier of 1886 from Vanga in the south to the Uganda border, which at that time was Guasso Maasai River. From there it followed the Kedong' River and Laikipia escarpment up to the northern shores of Lake Turkana (Ogot, 1995). It is important to note that the border between East Africa protectorate and Ethiopia remained undefined just like the border between the British Somalis and Italian Somalis. On its part, creation of the Kenya – Uganda boundary fell within the confines of boundary demarcation. Moments before the implementation of the boundary creation, the Uganda Protectorate underwent a few leadership changes. In a span of less than one year, Harry Johnson was replaced by Colonel Hayes Sadler. Before Sadler assumed office, Fredrick Jackson was entrusted with the responsibility of Acting Commissioner in Uganda (Kwamusi, 1996).

At this point in time, Sir Charles Elliot was the Commissioner of East Africa Protectorate. Sadler together with C.W. Hobley had the immediate task of working on a process of the boundary creation as the latter had been given the responsibility to define it. Subsequently, the instruction given to the acting commissioner confirms the earlier position about the adoption of Clement Hill's proposal by the colonial office. The instruction to Fredrick Jackson stated that:

“In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is better that the boundary creation process be fast tracked to enable its implementation”<sup>19</sup>

As a follow up to this instruction, Fredrick Johnson, Charles Elliot, and C. W. Hobley met at Njoro in December 1901 and agreed that the boundary would have to take into account the ethnic divisions of the area.

19. National Archives Entebbe, Correspondence from foreign office on London file no. A4/148, 1956.

Their idea was informed by the consideration that the ethnic population in northern Uganda should have remained there while placing the 'Kavirondo' in the East Africa Protectorate (Kwamusi, 1996). In spite of this noble idea meant to sort out ethnic divisions through the boundary, the Hobley team still had a problem with Hill's "natural boundaries". This interfered with many communities in the two protectorates. As if this was not the only problem, C. W. Hobley and F. J. Jackson could not agree on which side of the boundary Mt. Elgon should fall.

In their disagreement, Hobley supported the idea that it should be placed in the East Africa Protectorate while Jackson favoured that it remains in Uganda.<sup>20</sup> According to Hobley, the western and southern slopes of the mountain were "full of rather turbulent natives" who, in his opinion, "were in very low state of civilization." For this reason alone, he took them to be akin to the Kavirondo of the East Africa Protectorate where he wished them to belong (Kwamusi, 1996). On his part, Jackson indicated that, for effective administration, the mountain should fall on the Ugandan side.

The differences between Jackson and Hobley provided Elliot, who favoured a merger, with an excuse to temporarily delay the boundary creation process. To solve this impasse, a two-man commission comprising Hobley and William Grant was appointed to delimit the boundary (Kwamusi, 1996). This commission was faced with two challenges. The first was the need to consider the ethnic differences of the people who would fall on either side of the boundary. The second was the advantages that could be derived from administering a given area regardless of ethnic considerations. Subsequently, 'Kavirondo' (Luo and Luyhia) fell on the East African Protectorate side while on the Uganda side was the Basoga and Bakedi.

20. National Archives Entebbe, Joint Commissioners Report file no. A4/120, 1910).

It is important to recognize the fact that the administrative “position” was also considered by this commission of two men. For instance, on Lake Victoria, Berkeley Bay, that was placed in Uganda inhabited by the ‘Kavirondo’ was placed in Uganda because they traded with Basoga and could therefore be administered from there. Similarly, the Babukusu were included in Kenya because they paid their tax at Mumias (Wafula, 2000).

In July 1902, the two-man commission completed its work. It was marked by the transfer of Uganda’s Eastern province to EAP. For the transfer of Karasuk to EAP, the process began from 1919. In his letter to the Secretary of State for Colonies in July that year, Edward Northey, the governor of Kenya raised serious concerns about the portion of the Kenya – Uganda border in the areas occupied by the Suk (Pokot), Turkana, and the Karamojong. The boundary, in his words, Kwamusi (1996:87) was:

“Unsatisfactory because it cuts northern and southern Turkana into two and does not satisfactorily define the borders of the Turkana, Suk and Karamoja tribes...the boundary should, if possible leave the whole of any one of these tribes under one administration.”

It was later agreed between Governor Northey and Robert Coryndon, the Governor of Uganda, that the Turkana and Suk be placed under the administration of EAP while leaving the whole of Karamoja in Uganda. According to Kwamusi (1996), there were two reasons given for this decision. First, it was argued that the EAP was more convenient in managing issues relating to the Turkana and Suk because, for a long time, it had been closely connected with them. Secondly, those areas of southern Turkana and Suk territories were in the vicinity of Trans-Nzoia, an area that was already under white settlement and controlled from Nairobi. In September 1919, the Secretary of State for Colonies gave a formal approval to the proposed boundary adjustments between the two protectorates and the two governors were to organize for

the demarcation of the new boundary.<sup>21</sup> As a result of this; further territorial transfers from Uganda to Kenya were made involving Rudolf province and the Suk territory in 1926.

Even with this approval, it still emerged that the establishment of the boundary between East Africa Protectorate (EAP) and Uganda remained a challenge especially the area north of Elgon. This was for the simple reason that the area was completely unknown to the Europeans. This position also emanates from the fact that it is a rugged terrain, which makes its accessibility impossible. For instance, the very few explorers and colonial administrators who visited the area only managed to reach either Lake Rudolf or Turkwel River (Barber, 1968). Cases in point include explorers Von Hohnel who reached the eastern shores of Lake Rudolf in 1888 and Cavendish who made a rapid march down the western shores of Lake Rudolf in 1897. On his part, Fredrick Jackson, the Commissioner of Uganda, had been to Turkwell River for the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1890. It is important to note the fact that these people only skirted the fringes of the region while their knowledge of the entire territory remained vague and quite limited.

It was against this backdrop that it became challenging to the British colonial officers in the EAP and Uganda regarding where and how exactly to draw the boundary in the northern region. A further confusion and complication emerged in 1902 when Major Macdonald extended his expedition in Uganda to Lake Rudolf. This elicited a furious reaction of infringement from Sir Arthur Hardinge the Commissioner of British East Africa. As a way of getting a solution on where exactly the boundary separating the two colonies in the north was, Hardinge referred the problem to the Foreign Office in London.

21. National Archives Entebbe, Correspondence from foreign office file no A4/14, 1920.

A reply from the Foreign Office indicated that, although the upper or northern boundary had not been demarcated well, the territory was within the British sphere and Hardinge was to assume that Lake Rudolf was within his protectorate. The dispatch to Hardinge to this effect read,

“As time goes on and the Uganda Protectorate is more clearly defined it may be extended eastwards so as to comprise Lake Rudolf within administrative sphere, but for the present purpose... the district lies within your jurisdiction. It is proposed that you proceed with the administration of the country as soon as circumstances admit”.<sup>22</sup>

The admission of the Foreign Office that the upper or northern boundary had not been demarcated well was a clear indication of the uncertainty that surrounded the establishment of the entire boundary. For instance, the decision to transfer parts of Eastern Uganda to EAP was based on Clement Hill’s false assumption that Uganda’s main commercial outlet would be down the Nile and upon his desire to place the railway under one administration. This transfer of territory challenged Johnson’s policy of a union of the colonies in two ways. First, Johnson had not seen that Uganda’s natural outlet was via Mombasa and secondly, he had thrown the boundaries wide open to the north and east for future expansion and development.

Just like in the first transfer that involved taking the Eastern Province of Uganda to EAP, a two-man team of C.W. Hopley the sub-commissioner of EAP and W. Grant the sub-commissioner of Busoga was asked to make recommendations for the northern boundary. Again, the major challenge at that time was how to divide the already administered tribes on and around Mount Elgon (Kabwegyere, 1981).

22. Kenya National Archives Correspondence from foreign office to Hardinge file no. PC/NRB/07/7, 1902.

Besides, so little was known of the territory and the people north of the mountain that Jackson and Elliot were anxious to keep the northern boundary flexible and open for future modification or changes.

Well before receiving the reports from Hobley and Grant, Commissioners F.J. Jackson of Uganda and C. Eliot of EAP had agreed on a gentleman's arrangement that an arbitrary line should be drawn north from Elgon with the peoples to the West falling to Uganda and those to the East to British East Africa.<sup>23</sup> They were prepared to recognize this arbitrary arrangement on two grounds. One, they knew little about the northern peoples and two, in the event of a problem, it would still fall in their administrative ambit for a solution.

It is, however, important to note that this boundary arrangement was never recognized because Hobley and Grant came up with another recommendation. The new recommendation by this technical team was that the boundary should follow river Suam from its source on the Elgon to its junction with River Turkwel and then follow the Turkwel to the mouth of Lake Rudolf.<sup>24</sup> In as much as Commissioner Eliot was hesitant about this recommendation by noting that not much was known of the ethnic divisions along the Turkwel, the recommendation by the technical team was accepted by the Foreign Office. With this as the new boundary position, it then hived off part of north eastern Uganda and divided the Suk and Turkana between the two protectorates but left the Karamojong in Uganda. It is this kind of arrangement that has created a persistent source of conflict on how to share the natural resources around the current border.

23. National Archives Entebbe, Busoga Correspondence file no. A4/233, 1930.

24. National Archives Entebbe, Busoga Correspondence file no. A4/143, 1901.

On 14<sup>th</sup> March 1927, the office of the Chief Secretary of the government of Uganda provided a detailed description of the recognized boundary between Kenya and Uganda. The description gave three parts as follows;

“(1) Boundary from 1° south latitude, through lake Victoria to the North of Sio River. (2) Boundary from the Sio river to the summit of Mount Elgon..... (3) Boundary from the summit of Mt. Elgon to Mt. Zulia, on the boundary of the Anglo-Egyptians Sudan”<sup>25</sup>

From this boundary description, it is important to point out that it was the second and third proportions, which cut across the ethnic territories of the Pokot and Karamojong.

### **3.5 Role of the Established Boundary in Pokot and Karamojong Conflict**

The establishment and operationalization of the Kenya – Uganda boundary had a far-reaching effect on the indigenous people who lived along it. Since it involved the definition of new areas to be occupied by each community in terms of geographical demarcation, it also constituted a barrier and source of resource conflict to such communities. This was particularly true between the Pokot and Karamojong since 1926. In the FGDs, the study noted that the major problem that accompanied the boundary establishment was the fact that in the process of its establishment, none of the indigenous people was involved.

Besides, there was no civic education given to the people when it became operational. To the British officials in the two protectorates, the main purpose of the boundary was not only to ensure effective British administration of their respective areas, but also to control what they called “the people’s primitive way of life”.

25. National Archives Entebbe correspondence from foreign office to E.A. Commissioners file no. A4/152, 1926).

As Barber (1968:64) puts it:

“The British officials wanted a clear boundary which could be identified easily both on the map and on the ground, and to keep the tribes and their livestock firmly behind the line”.

According to elders during KII session and to the communities in reference (Pokot and Karamojong), such a boundary was incomprehensible. This was due to the fact that they wanted to operate on their traditional boundaries that had no diverse impact on their pastoralist mode of life. This study observed that the two communities rejected the creation of the new boundary on the basis that in terms of their traditional boundary classification and operation, they only recognized two types of boundaries namely; traditional and natural boundaries. A study by Anene (1970) indicates that traditional boundaries imply those boundaries that were accepted, legitimized and respected by traditions and the people on either side adding that they were also known as frontiers of contacts. Such boundaries he noted were prevalent in areas where there were no natural barriers between ethnic territories. On their part, natural boundaries were determined by natural geographical terrain.

These included rivers, mountains, forests and swamps which Anene (1970) referred to them as frontiers of separation. It was these two types of boundaries that the Pokot and Karamojong adhered to since the colonial period. Owing to the fact that the new boundary cut across the grazing lands of the pastoral groups, it seriously affected the Pokot and Karamojong not only in terms of animal pasture and water but also the free movement of animals and humans. All this was against the backdrop that, prior to the boundary creation, the Pokot and Karamojong exploited the existing common resources in their geographical region. The newly created boundary therefore, drew a wedge between the nomadic people whose conflict persistence escalated due to the policies of the newly created boundary operations during the colonial period.

The establishment and function of the boundary therefore marked a radical shift in the Pokot and Karamojong way of life. For instance, they now belonged to different political entities and were expected to come to terms with that. The new political order was in relation to their movements and trading requirements. For instance, it was already clear that these pastoralists had close social-economic ties that saw them move and transact their activities with less restriction. This was confirmed by one British administrator, who observed,

“The pastoral tribe of Kenya and Uganda on either side of this boundary are closely related ...and often carried their socio-economic activities together”<sup>26</sup>

The observation here is that, since pastoral groups are never self-reliant, they always maintained some reciprocal and mutually supporting relations with their neighbours. However, given the demands of boundary operations, it was now a requirement that all people should stay within such boundary limits. In case of any movement or interaction across it, such persons were to seek permission from their respective authorities. It is important to note that the border movement restriction was only on paper. This was because, by 1926, the entire boundary did not have a physical barrier hence the pastoral communities could cross it freely.

This was against the colonial border policy that stated,

“Every person, Kenyan or Ugandan, Pokot or Karamojong must have valid permission issued by the appropriate and competent authority of one’s respective country. All must report their arrival or departure with the same authorities”<sup>27</sup>

Data from KII and FGDs observed that the Pokot and Karamojong, who were in contact with the colonial authorities on either side of the border, interpreted this kind of restriction as a denial of their fundamental right to freely relate with their neighbours.

26. National Archives Entebbe, Saddler’s Annual Report file no. A4/116, 1930.

27. Kenya National Archives, Border Report PC/NZ/2/2, 1928.

Consequently, most of them rejected the requirements of the created boundary. In their view, they only accepted and operated within their traditional boundaries that were marked by natural and geographical terrains. This explains the frequent and discrete manner in which they continued with their cultural activities.

Therefore, immediately after Rudolf Province was transferred to British East Africa and the boundary functions became clear, the Pokot and Karamojong relations worsened. For instance, it emerged as a major observation from FGD by the two communities that in the process of its creation, the colonial governments used the geographical and natural features of two rivers, Turkwell and Kanyangareng, to separate the two communities. However, instead of separating the two communities, the two rivers brought them together. For instance, the River Turkwell after leaving Elgon flows through and cuts across two mountains Chemerongit to the north west and Suk Hills to the south east. Just before it cuts the mountains, the Turkwell is joined from the West by a major tributary, the Kanyangareng, which, in its course, flows around the western edges of the Chemerongit Hills. It was at the river valley that the Pokot and Karamojong conflict became frequent after 1926.

It also emerged as a general observation from elders, women and warriors who responded to interviews that the conflicts would mainly arise due to the boundary perception more particularly now that it determined which side of the colony the natural resources of rivers and hills fell. In this case, the conflict was both due to boundary issues and natural resource claims. These opinions also arose from the fact that the boundary demarcation was perceived differently both by the colonial government and the people. To the colonial officials, the boundary was supposed to be easily identifiable both on the map and on the ground. The latter was intended to help prevent inter-tribal conflict by keeping the pastoralists and their livestock firmly behind the line.

The pastoralists' position during FGDs was that they did not understand, let alone recognize, the functions of the established boundary. They therefore concluded that when the boundary became operational, it denied them a chance to cross and use water and grazing land on either side. This move prompted frequent conflicts between the communities from the colonial period. According to information gathered from KII and FGD, the transfer of part of eastern Uganda territory to Kenya affected the Karamojong in two ways.

First, the areas of Chemerongit and Kanyangareng River, which they hitherto used for pasture and water, became no go zones for them. Secondly, the international boundary demarcation meant that they could not raid their Pokot and Turkana neighbours for animals as before. However, what they did not like was the perception that the transferred territory was meant to compensate their bitter rivals, the Pokot, who had themselves lost large tracts of land to the white settlers in Kitale. On their part, the Pokot held the position that the boundary restriction denied them a chance to graze on the Pene Plains, which were their alternative grazing lands during droughts. Similarly, they could not raid their neighbours the Karamojong during times of replenishment or for bride wealth demands. The foregoing analysis then informs the relevance of the tenet of conflict theory namely; scarcity and competition over resources to this study.

In tandem with these observations from interviews, studies by Markakis (1993) and Ocan (1994) have indicated that it was the inability of these two tribes to comprehend the functions of the boundary that led to their persistent conflicts. This was more pronounced during the colonial period. In essence, the international boundary that separated the Pokot and Karamojong had far reaching effects on these pastoralists. For instance, it was in their tradition to raid and counter-raid each other for animals. Practically, these fell outside the legal demands of the boundary operations, which required that anybody crossing it had to report to the authorities on both sides

and declare their intentions. Each community was therefore expected to carry out its activities within the boundary jurisdiction unless permitted by officials of the colonial government. Subsequently, raids and counter-raids across the boundary were tantamount to abusing the boundary regulations. More importantly, the raiders who were caught or fell into the trap of the colonial government officials who kept vigil along the boundary had their animals confiscated and were arraigned in court at either Kacheliba, Kapenguria, or in Karamoja (Dietz, 1987).

This boundary restriction also meant that cultural activities such as bride wealth payment, ritual activities and the ability for one to replenish their stock especially from across the boundary were on the decline. In addition, an oral account from a government official<sup>58</sup> corroborated that the boundary restriction increased intra-community raids and conflicts as some of the communities and clans turned on each other for their much needed animals. For instance, Onyango (2010) observed that, in the years after 1930, intra-community raids between the Pian, Jie, Tepeth, Matheniko and Bokora was on the increase. Similarly, Yurco (2011) maintained the same argument but with reference to the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu. The same line of thought has been espoused by Mkutu (2003), Satya (2004), and Vries (2007). In their argument, they hold the opinion that the boundary establishment squeezed the Pokot since most of their land in Kitale was alienated for settler farming. It is as a result of the above activities that the tenet of conflict theory on scarcity, inequality, and marginalization remain relevant in interpreting the Pokot and Karamojong conflict. A case in point is the fact that these people's traditional dry season and drought reserve areas were adversely affected by the new boundary demarcation because these fell on either side thereby causing scarcity. For instance, interviews from Pokot elders during KII indicate that the area around Mount Kadam and River Kilim in Karamoja was their drought reserve point before establishment of the boundary. On their part, the Karamojong point to the

Turkwell and Kanyangareng rivers with similar claims. The establishment and operationalization of the boundary implied that the system of resource use and ownership also changed. For instance, by the East Africa Order in Council, Karasuk was transferred from Uganda to Kenya in 1926. This transfer of territory marked the beginning of resource scarcity and competition claims by the pastoral groups. The transfer adversely affected the Karamojong clan of Pian, Matheniko and Bokora who lost their grazing land and water points in Chemerongit and Kanyangareng rivers that were transferred to Kenya in order to provide land for the Pokot in Karasuk. This happened after they were displaced from Trans-Nzoia and Kitale by the white settlers.

Consequently, the two communities had, from the time of the boundary establishment, fiercely contested the scarce resources in the areas around Turkwell and Kanyangareng. Similarly, studies by Barber (1968), and Onyango (2010) confirmed that the two tribes (Pokot and Karamojong) based their claims of entitlement to the disputed territory on different criteria. For the Karamojong, the area was in their possession from previous times, while for the Pokot, their argument is informed by “what had been rather than what was” in claim. The years after the establishment of the boundary soon saw every group begin to claim not only their demarcated territories but they also went on to claim areas that hitherto did not belong to them as a way of cushioning themselves from resource scarcity.

While responding to KII and FGD questions as to what promoted the Pokot and Karamojong conflict after the 1926 boundary transfer, the elders<sup>24&36</sup> traced part of it to some time in December 1928 when the Suk had exhausted their scale grazing land near Mount Kadam, Apolodar, and Erimot their leader asked for grazing land from the Karamojong near river Kilim. When this request was turned down, the Pokot forced their way into Karamojong territory. In the process, one Karamojong was killed and fifteen donkeys and herds of cattle were stolen. In

response, the Karamojong launched a series of counter attacks, which drove the Pokot back to Turkwell. Conflict theory's tenets of scarcity and marginalization come in handy at this point in the sense that, through the colonial activity of boundary operations, resources became unevenly distributed between the two communities which led to them being scarce. With the communities restricted to their respective countries, they became strangers whenever they crossed over to the territory of the others and by extension, marginalized they were in the use of such resources.

However, it was the growing intensity of cross-border raids between the Pokot and Karamojong areas that compelled the District Commissioner of Karamoja, Ashton Warner, to write to commissioner Hayes Sadler expressing grave concern about what he referred to as the "constant raids going on across the boundary". While expressing desperation at a situation that could go out of hand, Werner said,

"Altogether, unless we put a police post there or East Africa protectorate can keep their people in from raids, which would certainly be difficult, I don't quite see what we can do"<sup>28</sup>

Owing to the attitude within the British colonial circles that these pastoral groups were primitive and barbaric, they thought the raids and counter-raids across the boundary as activities that would soon end. However, chances of sealing the inter-ethnic conflict across the boundary were slimmer for the British. Saddler himself concurred when he said that, the establishment of law, order or effective control over "the people of this wild border was no easy matter". Given the fact that the two ethnic groups did not live in amity, it compelled the colonial authority to try and provide 'protection' to each ethnic group along the entire boundaries. Other than the Pokot and Karamojong, this protection was extended to the Turkana, Samburu, Teso, Samia, and Sabiny (Sebei) (Barber, 1968).

28. National Archives Entebbe, Werner's Annual Report file no. A4/ 132, 1920.

In 1930 and 40's the colonial administration in Kenya and Uganda tried several attempts at achieving peace and harmony but with very little success. The chance of finding a lasting solution remained elusive because the colonial authorities lacked a viable alternative to cattle raiding, as they were not keen on livestock development. Instead, they were pre-occupied with white settler activities (Kwamusi, 1996).

Consequently, throughout the era of the boundary operations, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and Karamojong in Uganda remained "closed districts". This, in many ways, went along to interfere with the extent to which their ties with other communities could be promoted. However, it is important to note that the boundary operations neither stopped the people's movements nor the cattle raids. Eventually, the idea of using the boundary to contain the people became self defeating.

More importantly, the impact of the boundary demarcation has been felt more on the Pokot side than the Karamoja area. This is given the fact that the pastoralists use their natural environment to their advantage and survival. In what is emerging as a direct result of the boundary restriction, the Pokot side has, in the past, experienced a lot of land degradation arising from the over-stretched piece of land grazed by many herds. To their effect, Vries (2007) confirmed that these areas are now prone to extensive soil erosion. This can be confirmed by the deep gullies observable from the southern highlands. The elders<sup>50&52</sup> also confirmed this position during FGDs by stating that the area is set for its worst ecological times given the high level of soil erosion during the rainy season.

Just like in Kenya, the colonial policies in Uganda after the transfer of territories appeared to favour the economically productive areas while unproductive ones like Karamoja and West

Pokot were neglected. For, instance throughout the colonial period, the Kenya-Uganda boundary remained substantially un-demarcated (Mc Ewen, 1969). This contradicted the case where some parts, especially the former Eastern Province of Uganda, had been marked while there were considerably big portions of it at Karasuk and Rudolf that remained unmarked. However, it is important to note that even where there were signs of demarcation, the alignments were not reliable enough to provide it with a precise demarcation (Kwamusi, 1996). Despite the fact that the boundary was poorly demarcated, it remained a political and legal phenomenon. Therefore, its demarcation and functions fitted well within the legal and political confines of a boundary. This remains so because boundaries are understood to be ‘imaginary lines’ that mark the limits of legal, political, and administrative power of a state or administrative area (Melwa, 1991). It is such boundary demarcations that cover both intra- territorial and international boundaries.

Consequently, the Kenya- Uganda boundary provided both countries with their new status as international states. Given the ignorance with which the Pokot and Karamojong had over the boundary, they kept crossing it at will. By 1926, the careless cross-border movement had caught the attention of the British officials who hoped to put it to an end. It was observed from an FGD that the Upe and Kenyan Pokot lodged a complaint to the colonial officials about the boundary that had split and put them in two different political units.

They complained that they were one ethnic group that had the same cultural and economic activities and that the boundary denied them the chance to interact as a people. In their complaint, their leaders did not understand why they had been split into two and more importantly, they could not comprehend why they were not allowed to cross over to be with their relatives and cousins on either side. The impact of the boundary on these people, including the Karamojong, was in the frequent manner in which they conflicted with each other especially

after and during their cattle raids and counter raids. The foregoing analysis then makes conflict theory's tenet of lack of respect to traditional beliefs relevant to this study. It is informed by the idea that in case a people's belief or culture is tampered with, they will always resist the new idea like has been the case in the creation of the international boundary between the Pokot and Karamojong in this study.

In as much as the boundary was negatively perceived by both the Pokot and the Karamojong because it curtailed their hitherto operations, it also had some positive results for the local people. For instance, it was observed that between 1902 and 1907, a protozoan parasite known as trypanosomes responsible for causing sleeping sickness in human beings and nagana in livestock was thriving at the shores of Lake Rudolf and the river banks of Suam, Turkwel, and Kanganyareng.<sup>29</sup> Being the inhabitants of these places, the Pokot, Karamojong, and Turkana were extremely affected by this new animal and human disease. Other than the existence of trypanosomiasis, the other infectious diseases that had been reported were dysentery and small pox. However, the point to note is that nagana was recorded as being the most fatal and dreadful in this area at this time.

Consequently, the immediate response of the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda was to try and confine as much as possible the outbreak of sleeping sickness and nagana to the affected areas and to ensure they did not spread across the boundary. As an immediate measure, the colonial officials in Uganda enacted the Uganda Customs Consolidation Ordinance of 1904 in which the movement of livestock between Uganda and her neighbouring countries without special permission was prohibited. On the Kenyan side, a livestock quarantine policy was strictly implemented with both the people and livestock restricted not to cross the boundary.

29. National Archives Entebbe, Busoga Health Correspondence file no. A4/169, 1908.

In addition, the two colonial governments carried out anti-sleeping sickness and nagana education among the people. Unfortunately, it became impossible to educate the Pokot and Karamojong on this problem on two accounts. The first account was that it was not possible to access the terrain in Karamoja and more particularly the Kenya Pokot side. The second was on the ground that these people had little, if any trust, in the colonial officials whom they regarded as brutal intruders. It therefore compelled the colonial officials, together with their officers from the department of livestock and agriculture, to wait for the people and their livestock at the water points to educate them on the effects of nagana as well as persuade them to allow for the vaccination of their animals.

According with interviews to traders<sup>29&35</sup>, youth<sup>54</sup> and women<sup>20&45</sup>, the local people only respected the impact of confining them behind lines after they realized that they were losing their animals to the wrath of nagana. Initially, it occurred to the Pokot and the Karamojong that the government was always happy about their confinement and that its policies were not necessarily to their benefit. Despite the fact that the governments put these measures to curb the spread of both sleeping sickness and nagana, some of the Pokot and Karamojong still defied the orders and moved their animals across the boundary but this time under cover of darkness. The restriction on animal movement was compounded when rinderpest outbreak was reported in Uganda in 1914 and in Kenya in 1923.<sup>30</sup>

30. National Archives Entebbe, Busoga Health Correspondence file no. A4 A4/169 1908.

Inasmuch as the arbitrariness of the boundary was already beginning to influence the effectiveness with which anti-epidemic measures were being implemented, it emerged that if it were not for the existence of the boundary and its operations, the toll on both animals and humans between the Pokot and Karamojong during the epidemic years would have been overwhelming.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter analyzed the role of the British commissioners in the process of the establishment of the Kenya-Uganda international boundary and their perception of West Pokot and Karamoja. The historical analysis was done by taking into account the broad types and classification of boundaries. It was noted that the established boundary, though unilateral, caused a lot of confusion and division within the British colonial circles in London where some officials advocated for a merger of the two colonies while others favoured a separation of the boundary. It was the latter that finally took precedence.

A clear observation during this time was that the colonial officials were not keen on the impact of the established boundary on the Pokot and Karamojong. The boundary operations therefore had little or no regard to the relations between the Pokot and Karamojong of Uganda before colonialism. This was reflected by colonial officials' ignorance about the local people, the geographical features in place, and how natural resources were shared by the people. The boundary therefore not only split the people but also their natural resources by placing them administratively in either Kenya or Uganda.

This aggravated how the people related and shared their natural resources thereafter. Consequently, this chapter observed that the relationship between these two communities was henceforth marked by a lot of tension and incessant raids and counter raids which encouraged their conflict persistence. In the next chapter, we turn to the causes and impact of cross-border resource conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong after the creation of the interterritorial boundaries.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **CAUSES AND IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT PERSISTENCE BETWEEN THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG SINCE 1902**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

By the time of the establishment of British protectorate in Uganda in 1894 and in Kenya 1895, there were only two absolutes in the policy handed down from the Foreign Office in London. The first, which concerned Uganda, was that the Kingdom of Buganda would be the headquarters of the administration. This was intended to enable the colonial government to establish a foothold on the Upper Nile from which to observe the movement of the Belgians and the French. The second which concerned the two protectorates was their policy of concentration or keeping the British occupation to the more “economically viable” areas while considering the other “uneconomical” areas as insignificant. According to this policy, and by extension, to the British colonial officers in Kenya and Uganda, it was in their belief that the resources of the protectorates should not be wasted on inadequate efforts in outlying areas but be concentrated in the more favoured localities where soil was excellent, the people industrious and the country full of economic promise. This formed the point of departure for the marginalization of West Pokot and Karamoja that in effect enhanced conflict persistence between the two communities. This chapter presents the causes of the conflict persistence beginning with marginalization since 1902.

#### **4.2 Role of the Colonial Government in the Marginalization Process.**

Right from the beginning of its rule in Kenya and Uganda, the British were prejudiced against north Eastern Uganda and north Western Kenya. This was confirmed by the perception of their colonial officers in the two colonies. For instance, C.W. Hobley the sub commissioner of East Africa Protectorate and W. Grant the sub-commissioner of Busoga held the strong position that

the tribes of northern Kenya and North eastern Uganda were a recalcitrant group out to oppose colonial authority at all costs. On many occasions, they stated that these pastoralists were unwilling to submit to colonial rule. Consequently, the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda came up with discriminatory administrative laws. These laws saw West Pokot and Karamoja witness what Ogot (1968) calls the era of separate development. The Pokot and Karamojong were therefore treated with suspicion from the onset before being relegated to the peripheral areas in Kenya and Uganda.

On legal justice for instance, it was realized that the early administrative officers and policy makers appeared to be more concerned with administrative issues regarding the operations of the legal justice. Consequently, a major re-organization took place in the system of justice that moved away from traditional court systems. This saw the coming into effect of the East Africa Native Courts Amendment Ordinance 1902 that introduced special courts, constituted by the collectors or assistant collectors of a district declared special having full criminal and civil jurisdiction over all natives in the district.<sup>31</sup> At this time, Jurisdiction was to be exercised according to the laws in force in the two protectorates. Now that neither West Pokot nor Karamoja were classified as special districts, the 1902 East Africa Native Courts Amendment brought a lot of confusion as they confirmed that the legal notice did not apply to them. More importantly, the two areas had been classified as closed districts. For that matter, the protectorates' judicial structure did not cover them.

31. National Archives Entebbe, Legal Notice Regulation file no. A4/ 561, 1902.

Part of the 1902 Amendment Ordinance read:

“All civil and criminal cases to which natives are parties shall be guided by the native law to be headed by chiefs so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council or Ordinance or any regulations or rule made under any Order in Council or Ordinance.”

By the position of the new court ordinance, the re-organization excluded the elders from the tribal courts but reaffirmed the powers of the chiefs in the courts. Part of the Amendment Ordinance reaffirmed the Commissioner’s power to recognize the jurisdiction of tribal chiefs’ courts and the exercise of such authority as vested in them. More importantly was the enactment of the Village Headman Ordinance in the same year that conferred powers to the appointed headman by the commissioner to hear and determine petty native cases. It is significant to note that these official headmen were not traditional office holders but persons chosen by the administration and therefore they owed their allegiance to the administration.

To confer executive and judicial powers on such persons signified a deviation from reliance on traditional institutions which created a direct linkage between native courts and the colonial administration. The shift from the use of traditional elders on judicial matters to government chiefs and village headmen therefore made the two not only superior but also dominant even where the elders were still respected like in West Pokot and Karamoja. The general opinion from both KII and FGDs was that the Pokot and Karamojong were prejudiced towards the appointed chiefs and headmen. In 1931, the Courts Ordinance Act, which operated up to independence and thereafter, replaced the East Africa Native Courts Amendment Ordinance.<sup>32</sup> However, it did not change the legal framework of colonial courts neither did it touch the traditional elders’ courts. As such, it established three classes of subordinate courts and tribunals.

32. National Archives Entebbe, Legal Notice Regulation file no. A4/ 561 p76, 1902.

The first class court was to be headed by a Principal Magistrate and senior Commissioner (later Provincial Commissioner) with jurisdiction throughout a province. Second class courts were, to be headed by a magistrate at the district level and a District Commissioner. Third class courts were to be headed by resident magistrates and district officers.<sup>33</sup> This ordinance also drew a distinction between subordinate native courts and native tribunals. The latter were to consist of any headman to whom jurisdiction was granted by the Governor through rules made under the Ordinance.

On their part, the subordinate courts had the same supervisory, transfer and enforcement powers in relation to the native tribunals as had been introduced by the 1902 legislation. Consequently, the ordinance envisaged the use of both traditional and non-traditional appointed persons in these native tribunals. The tribunals were given both civil and petty colonial jurisdictions. In civil cases, they could adjust claims while in criminal ones they could award compensation according to the customs of the tribe and even imprison offenders.

Their decisions were, however, subject to revision by administrative officers where they deemed it fit to do so but this revision was to take the form of re-hearing of the case under the provisions of the court ordinance.<sup>34</sup> This provided a link between the High Court and the native tribunal, since a case, which had been re-heard, could be appealed at the High Court. It also emerged as a concern by the elders and women during FGDs that the colonial administrators did not consider during their appointment the social order that guided the local communities in the course of picking elders to constitute its council.

33. National Archives Entebbe, Legal Report file no. A4/ 307, 1940.

34. National Archives Entebbe, Legal Notice Regulation file no. A4/ 561, 1902.

In particular, the Pokot and Karamojong disregarded the colonial appointments and continued to operate within their political order of council of elders even in the post-independence period. It is in this regard that conflict theory's tenet of respect to traditional beliefs is rendered relevant to this study. Studies by Barber (1968) and Mamdani (1996) indicate that the concepts of the marginalization of West Pokot and Karamoja began immediately the colonial governments established indirect rule in Kenya and Uganda. For instance, in as much as all districts in Uganda were run by a District Commissioner who administered through appointed local chiefs; Karamoja was the only area that was under Kings African Rifles (KAR) military officers.

The study also noted that when the colonial administration finally incorporated the region into a centralized administrative structure, they replaced all the Karamojong leaders and other local institutions unlike other areas in Uganda. While responding during FGD session, most elders<sup>2,3,12&18</sup> indicated that in the entire colonial period in Uganda, the British did not build on any traditional structures of Karamojong. At best, they gave their attention to pacifying them with a view to reducing their military strength. Similarly, Onyango (2010) observed that it was the presence of these private armies and the perception that they were dealing with people who were well armed that drove the colonial administration to handle the people ruthlessly with the intention of 'pacifying' them.

From the foregoing, the tenet of marginalization by Oberschall (1973) was manifested when the colonial government in Uganda totally ignored the roles played by the Karamojong elders and their social-political institutions. For instance, in Karamoja, no elder was ever appointed to any administrative post yet they were the social and political kingpins on whom the community anchored their authority. It was for this reason that administrators like Tufnell preferred to work with the Swahilis as chiefs (Barber, 1968). The chief had the duty of maintaining law and order,

recruiting labourers as well as providing food to the colonial authorities whenever need arose. In Karamoja, the chiefs had powers to sit as a court, tried offenders and sentenced them up to a maximum penalty of two months imprisonment (Barber, 1968). Given the fact that elders or people of high social standing in Karamoja were not considered for administrative duties, the Karamojong read mischief and disregard for their social and political hierarchy by the colonialists. Pessimistic stereotypes of the Karamojong as wild, unruly, primitive, barbaric, irrational and unfriendly eventually informed the thinking that operationalized colonial policies in the areas.

Subsequently, the social services and infrastructure that often suggest the presence of a government in an area, such as roads, health facilities, schools, housing, courts, police stations, and prisons, were for a long time non-existent in Karamoja during the colonial period. In as much as this kind of situation may have been caused by harsh climatic conditions and remoteness of the areas, most of it was by omission and sheer neglect by the colonial government in Uganda. This is true since the central and southern areas of Uganda got the same social services from the colonial government, which were denied to Karamoja.

Focus Group Discussions in Karamojong indicated that, by the 1950s, there was only one prison situated at Kabong. Besides, it took the colonial government close to 30 years to post a veterinary officer to Karamoja and over 27 years to construct a cattle dip and sink water points in the region.<sup>35</sup> The colonial period in Uganda therefore reflected a state of neglect and alienation of Karamoja. This was evident in the isolationist policies of the British and the absence of state and judicial institutions in the area.

35. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Annual Report file no. A4/152, 1954.

It is important to point out that two reasons informed this kind of marginalization. The first was the initial non-acceptance of Karamoja as part of Uganda following the British use of “concentration” policy. Second was the lack of a comprehensive understanding and recognition of pastoralism as a viable mode of production suitable for arid lands (Onyango, 2010). In Kenya, the North western region, which is also inhabited by the Pokot among other pastoralists, underwent similar treatment of marginalization under British colonial rule. Suffice it to say that the region’s economic disparity with other parts of Kenya is discernible by its poor infrastructure, inadequate and dispersed health facilities, poor telecommunication networks, bad or vandalized schools, no piped water and no electricity supplies (Nyanchoka, 2000).

Right from the colonial period, the region seemed to have been so neglected that one hardly notices government presence in the remote villages, which qualified conflict theory’s tenet of marginalization of West Pokot, by the colonial government. The situation of the Pokot, just like that of Karamoja, was a by-product of the British colonial rule. For example, right from the beginning in 1895, the colonial government came up with the idea of dividing Kenya into three regions. The first was the developed white highlands, the second was the less developed native lands, which was a source of cheap labour and the third was the frontier or closed districts (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012).

The marginalization of the Pokot began when the British colonial government alienated their arable land in Trans-Nzoia and gave it to the settlers (Mkutu, 2003). This fits well with Oberschall’s conflict theory’s understanding of marginalization of denying people what by right belongs to them. The result was that the Pokot were relegated to the drier parts of the Rift Valley. This exposed them to conditions of hardship given that they depended on pastoralism. Even after this alienation, the colonial government did nothing to redress the new situation in which the

dispossessed people like the Pokot found themselves. It was for this reason that the Pokot resisted colonial rule from the onset. To them, the colonial administration was inimical and disruptive. For instance, right from the moments of direct contact between the Pokot and the colonial government, the activities of the latter were based on expeditions on the former in the pretext of pacifying them. Moreover, during the colonial period, the areas with agricultural potential became the cornerstone of colonial development in Kenya. Such areas recorded good infrastructural developments while West Pokot remained isolated and neglected from mainstream Kenyan society (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012).

In the minds of the colonial officers, pastoralism was inferior to settler agriculture in their rating and policy development. Since the colonial government perceived the Pokot as warlike and a threat to colonial authority, they did too little to economically uplift these people (Barber, 1968). In fact the colonial administration used this perception as a justification for the isolation and marginalization of the Pokot region and maintained a close military watch over the people. This was corroborated by an elder<sup>42</sup> in Kacheliba when he stated that places like Kitale, Eldoret, Kisumu, Nakuru and Nairobi are referred to by the Pokot as Kenya *mpya* (modern Kenya) while they consider their region as the original Kenya. In their opinion, Kenya *mpya* was a by product of colonization having embraced westernization.

It is this kind of perception that has seen the Pokot identify more with their traditional laws unlike the rest of Kenya that embrace formal law. From the foregoing, the official policy of the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda was skewed towards developing what they called “economically” viable areas rather than the frontier or “closed” districts. Through their efforts of demarcating tribal reserves, they also created borders which limited areas of grazing lands and water points thereby creating conflicts between the Pokot and Karamojong. With no meaningful

development in place and no alternative mode of production, the Pokot and Karamojong continued with trans-humance. This came with a number of problems namely the rise of hostilities among various groups competing for grazing land and watering points. Moreover, the loss of animals during droughts was in itself a cause for the persistence of inter-community raids that were aimed at restocking herds especially between the Pokot and Karamojong. Due to the near absence of the government, laws have not been adequately reinforced in these marginalized areas. This left the communities with no option but to arm themselves for protection and self-defence. Of critical importance was the colonial governments' lack of action on the root causes of the conflict. Instead, they resorted to high-handedness and inhuman ways of disciplining the pastoral communities which resulted in an escalation of conflicts.

The chances of ending cross-border arms trade and inter-ethnic conflict were becoming difficult for the British. Sadler himself acknowledged this fact when he observed that, "the establishment of effective control over these turbulent natives of low state of civilization is not an easy matter as they don't respect the law".<sup>36</sup> Subsequently, the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda sought to stop illegal arms trade and to prevent inter-ethnic raids by establishing military outposts in Dodoth, Kakamairi, Magosi, Lokosomal, Kamim areas of Karamoja, Kacheliba in West Pokot and along the Turkana escarpment.<sup>37</sup> As reinforcement, both the Kings African Rifles (KAR) and one Kenya Police battalion were stationed at the frontiers of Kenya and Uganda to keep an eye on the raids and arms trade (Zwaneberg, 1975). Consequently, throughout the era of British colonialism, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and Karamoja in Uganda remained 'closed districts' under close supervision of colonial government.

36. National Archives Entebbe, Saddler's Annual Report file no. A4/147, 1930.

37. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Correspondence file No. A46/265, 1930.

This went a long way in controlling small arms flow along the border and minimally restricted contacts between the pastoral societies of Pokot and Karamojong. Even with the establishment of British garrisons to reinforce the operations of the border patrol units, small arms trade and inter-ethnic conflicts were not contained. This was because borders remained porous with very few patrols hence trade in arms flourished. Consequently, the spiraling gun trade augmented a sturdy military buildup in West Pokot and Karamoja. This eventually breached peace in the region.

The point to note is that during colonialism and the subsequent years, this conflict became more violent. Consequently, warriors on either side rarely considered whether the people they targeted were the actual ones who had raided them. On many occasions, this paved way for asymmetrical retaliation for the persistence of the conflict. Given this new dimension, members of the victim's community often retaliated on behalf of the victim (Eaton, 2007). The traditional culture of revenge that is deeply rooted in the minds of the Pokot and Karamojong stands out as the synergy to the cycle of persistent conflict and violence between these two communities. Currently, these youths have usurped power from the elders and possess considerable influence over their peers and the entire community.

For instance, they now have the ability to organize raids or defend their community in case of an incursion (Mkutu, 2008). It is important to note that it is this radical shift of power operations that have disregarded the Pokot and Karamojong gerontology from traditional elders to the wealthy youth that has equally brought a new dimension in conflict persistence in which children and women are their targets.

### **4.3 Marginalization in the Post Independence time 1962 to 2016.**

The history of post-colonial Africa is replete with accounts of socio-political and economic conflicts most of which arose from marginalization. The phenomenon of marginalization and conflict has over time been explained largely in terms of old hatred and rivalry between and amongst communities and political parties in post-independence Africa (Nasongo, 2000). Of great concern have been the contests between the pastoralists and agriculturalists in what Turton (1994) describes as cattle raiders against the more industrious and progressive farmers.

In Africa, the concept of marginalization and patron client loyalty was actualized by the post – independence leadership who were keen on favouring their people as they excluded those they perceived as their opponents. In Kenya and Uganda, this was illustrated by the entrenchment of politics of ethnicity and regionalism in which one-man rule was a characteristic feature of political headship. For instance, four years into independence in Uganda, Prime Minister Milton Apollo Obote suspended the constitution, deposed Edward Mutesa and adopted a new constitutional order with himself as executive president (Mazrui, 1990).

In a similar way, Jomo Kenyatta (Johnstone Kamau) instituted a series of constitutional amendments that reversed the Majimbo constitution and adopted a republican state with all powers centered in his presidential office (Ghai and Mc Aston, 1970). All these were grounds on which the politics of patron-client loyalty and marginalization were to be perpetuated. From this time henceforth, state resource allocation and development in Kenya and Uganda depended on how well a region related with the president and his political cronies who consequently marked the point of departure for marginalization in post-independence Kenya and Uganda. The post-independence period in Kenya and Uganda thus replicated the colonial policies while dealing with the Pokot of Kenya and Karamojong. Given the fact that these pastoral communities refused

to abandon their way of life, the Obote I and Jomo Kenyatta governments continued from where the colonial authorities left by using immense force on the two communities. In Uganda for instance, the Obote I government demarcated part of the Karamoja grazing territory of the Dodoth and turned it into what is today the Kidepo Game Park, hitherto a grazing reserve for the Karamojong (Onyango, 2010). Similarly, during the process of demarcating district boundaries, part of the Karamojong grazing reserve was curved out and placed in Teso District (Gatrell, 1988). Of great concern to the Karamojong was the new governments' policy of confiscating their cattle as a way of subduing them.

Yet another concern was the government's implementation of the 1958 Special Regions Ordinance Act 19, which had given the Provincial Commissioner of Karamoja the power to declare any section of the region a prohibited area.<sup>38</sup> The point to note here is that this was only applicable to Karamoja and not any other part of Uganda. For instance, the other pastoral groups such as the Ankole had their area intact yet it was also suitable for the creation of a game park. Besides, it was only the Karamojong area that experienced a loss of territory during the creation of districts.

When the Obote I government implemented the 1958 Special Region Ordinance Act 19, this emerged as the first marginalization policy by the new government on the Karamojong as it did not only delienate Karamoja from the rest of Uganda but also restricted the movement of both cattle and humans in the region. In effect, this legislation expelled all the traders from the district and the consequence was that the Karamojong became cut off from any form of external contact or influence.<sup>39</sup>

38. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Correspondence A4/131, 1958.

39. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Correspondence A4/131, 1958

In addition, it required that the Karamojong swear peace bonds, which committed them as a group, to ensure that no one amongst them engaged in acts of violence. The breach of this pact through cattle raids would result in the entire community being punished through the confiscation of cattle as a “collective fine”. This measure, however, did not stop the cattle raids. If anything, oral accounts<sup>63&64</sup> indicate that it triggered more raids especially across the international boundary that was poorly patrolled.

In their view, the bond was only operational within the state of Uganda and therefore did not stop them from raiding across the border and escalating conflicts with the Pokot in Kenya. Marginalization of the Karamojong was worsened when the Obote I government and other regimes amended the laws in Uganda. For instance, the Karamoja Amendment Act of 1964 was amended by Cap 314 Act of 1970 (Section 241) and repealed by the Special Regions Act (Cap 306) in the 1996 Revised Laws of Uganda.<sup>40</sup> By and large, the amendment and repeal of Special Regions Act were to prohibit cattle raiding and stealing in Karamoja. In addition, the government considered it a way of implementing its laws by providing effective governance. More importantly, the government was out to ensure that armament in Karamoja was put under check and control.

In 1971 when Idi Amin Dada took over power from Obote, the confiscation of cattle and use of force went a notch higher as the military employed brutal methods to deal with the Karamojong. This was corroborated by an oral account<sup>59</sup> that stating that Amin’s army always went after the raiders with excessive brutality and vengeance. A further marginalization of the Karamojong during Amin’s reign was witnessed in 1975 when the government passed a decree that changed the land tenure system in Uganda.

40. National Archives Entebbe Special region Act file no. A4/106, 1958.

The decree was that all land in Uganda was owned by the state in trust for the citizens (Mamdani, 1996). This meant that all land in Uganda became public land and was, from 1975 henceforth, administered by the state. Consequently, the decree had far reaching effects on the Karamojong as their vast land, which initially was crucial for seasonal trans-humance, was taken up by the state. In Karamoja, such land was set aside for game parks, forest reserves, mission stations, or administrative centres (Bazaara, 1994).

The outcome of the decree was the reduction of Karamojong grazing land against the backdrop of increasing human and animal population. This perpetuated the vicious cycle of Karamojong and Pokot raiding and counter-raiding as a way of salvaging the region's chronic livelihood difficulties. The years after Idi Amin was deposed from power saw the worsening of State - Karamojong relations worsen. This was because the different regimes that came to power never bothered to change the longstanding state of marginalization in Karamoja. In any case, they were more prejudiced against the Karamojong's military strength. This saw them use a lot of coercive measures on them.

For instance, the fall of Amin's government in 1979 saw the Karamojong, more particularly the dreaded Matheniko, re-arm themselves with sophisticated weapons with which they looted from Moroto Garrison (Mkutu, 2008). The result was that the Matheniko together with other Karamojong sub-groups were now well armed at the expense of their neighbours and capable of countering government troops. The wider picture of this situation was the escalation of cross-border resource based conflict persistence. In addition, the less armed groups took advantage of the security lapse in Uganda during the turbulent period to buy guns from traders as well as rebels and disgruntled army officers (Kwamusi, 1996; Mamdani, 1996; Mkutu, 2003 and Onyango, 2010). Convinced that all the regimes in Uganda were prejudiced against them, they

now turned to defending their hard earned weapons for security, livelihood, and status purposes. In their opinion, the gun enabled them to maintain their pastoral identity and sustain their livelihood so they had to jealously guard it. The existence of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the Karamojong and their neighbours only exacerbated pastoral resource based conflict persistence more particularly across borders. The coming to power of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in 1986 did not change the Karamoja marginalization situation. Like the previous regimes, Museveni's government began its reign by instituting a disarmament programme in Karamoja. On ascending to power, the National Resistant Movement (NRM) drew up a 10-point programme as a solution to ending the political turbulence in Uganda (Satya, 2004). The new regime's 10<sup>th</sup> point was known as the "Karamoja problem".

The main aim of NRM's government was how to integrate the region into other parts of Uganda. They envisaged that this would be done through institutionalized structures of development in Karamoja. Consequently, a Ministry of State in charge of Karamoja development was formed with a host of other developments lined up like the Karamoja Project Implementation Unit (KPIU). The projects were specifically meant to address the unique needs of the Karamoja. Nevertheless, all these existed on paper with a lot of their implementation dogged by corruption. For instance, the Karamojong Development Agency (KDA) which, was created by an Act of Parliament in 1987, was largely known for its failure in Karamoja (Oxfam Report, 2004). Similarly, the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs equally performed below par. This drew support from the New Vision newspaper, November 2009, which read partly that,

"Even president Yoweri Museveni is aware of the failure of the ministry, a fact that prompted him to appoint his wife (the first lady) to head the Ministry...to at least salvage the Karamoja neglect".

All these numerous ventures failed because of the top-down approach that lacked “ownership” from the Karamojong. The biggest challenge and major contributor to the failure of this Ministry were numerous. Part of it was the fact that all its activities were centralized in Kampala, which is hundreds of miles away from Karamoja. The next was that Karamoja, for many decades, had never known any meaningful infrastructural development hence the terrain is rugged leading to very difficult communication. In addition, the Karamoja problem was further compounded by the fact that the NRM government allocated the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs meager resource that could not facilitate its smooth operation.

This has since left the Ministry cash strapped and unable to respond even to the smallest emergency in the region that is best known for crises. The fact that although there exists the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs; it lacks the structures and the goodwill from the Karamojong and the government to make it realize its goals. In a nutshell, Karamoja has never been a priority for any regime in Uganda including the NRM government. A trader<sup>14</sup> at Nakapiripirit lamented why the NRM has forgotten about them saying, “We thought this government (NRM) was for us. We supported them while they were in the bush fighting Obote II and Okello. It is a pity they have turned their backs on us as the situation is now worse than bad” (January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2013).

The above opinion reflects the levels of neglect and marginalization of Karamoja by the Museveni government. The worst of the situation was from the end of 1980s when the NRM government decided to arm militia groups in Karamoja as a strategy of fighting off the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgents in northern Uganda (Satya, 2004). As a matter of principle, this was to help them contain any rebellion in Karamoja as they policed the region. However, in practical terms, the government ended up attracting more actors into the crisis, which has contributed to the runaway insecurity and subsequent marginalization of the region. Unlike central, western,

and southern Uganda that enjoys the government's goodwill through the provision of modern infrastructure, administrative facilities, and other social amenities, such facilities are only scattered in Karamoja. The few roads, schools, health facilities, government offices and security machineries in Karamoja are in a deplorable state. In Kenya, the marginalization of the Pokot by the Jomo Kenyatta government was not any different from the Karamojong case in Uganda. A study by Nasongo (2007) reiterates that, as a concept, marginalization came from the fact that the African leaders in Kenya were conditioned by the years of exposure to the colonial government whose legacy of marginalization they sustained.

This was so because the KANU leadership had been co-opted and socialized in mechanisms and processes, which tended to concentrate in the more "economically" viable areas of the country. By treading on the familiar path and benchmark of colonial policy, the Jomo Kenyatta government became primarily concerned with and articulated the ideology of separate development where the interest of capital reproduced itself (Aseka, 2010). As a result, remote areas such as those occupied by the Pokot became victims of marginalization by the national government.

As a way of ensuring that the country began on the same footing, the KANU government then came up with its First Development Plan (FDP) whose ideological blueprint was articulated in Sessional Paper Number Ten on African Socialism (Ndege, 2000). The content of this Sessional paper was that power and wealth in Kenya were to be apportionately distributed between and among all Kenyans. Like in Uganda, these ideas remained on paper and were never implemented. The Jomo Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki governments found themselves more inclined to link development to political regions or areas that did not oppose their leadership. It was on this ideology that they marginalized regions with Moi coining the popular phrase *siasa*

*mbaya, maisha mbaya* (bad politics, poor livelihood). Therefore, the recalcitrant nature of the Pokot of Kenya against the post-independence regimes saw them being classified as “anti-development.” As such, their marginalization continued during this period. It more often than not, came because of their persistent conflict with state authorities. As a result, during the last fifty three years into independence, the West Pokot region not only remains under developed but also knows very little of state security leaving the raiders as the *defacto* administrators of the region (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012). An indication of state neglect of the Pokot can be summed up in the county’s food security situation. This has been expressed vividly by various humanitarian agencies such as Action Aid, Red Cross, and World Vision that operate in the county. Whenever hunger strikes the area, concerns have been expressed regarding the governments’ poor attitude and reluctance to avert the problem (Oxfam, 2004).

One oral account<sup>41</sup> confirmed that the region’s food problem remains an annual event because the government prefers it that way. Even when a rapid assessment carried out by the Kenya Red Cross Society revealed that Pokot County’s household food situation was getting bad, the government waited until private media houses like Citizen came up with the “Kenyans for Kenyans” initiative. This mobilized funds and food to the hunger stricken areas. Interestingly, the government was a late comer in this noble initiative (Oxfam, 2004). An assessment carried out in 2012 by Oxfam concluded that the perennial food shortage in the region is attributed to many factors such as the climate and terrain but above all, the government’s neglect on its citizens in such regions.

On security, a member<sup>10</sup> of the County Assembly in West Pokot indicated that in his Sub County of Sekerr with an estimated population of 34,000, there are hardly 10 police personnel. There is also no court and that there was no presence of the government. In other words, the structures of

the government existed on paper. His counterpart in Kapenguria<sup>23</sup> confirmed that over the years, there has been one operational court situated at the regional headquarters in Kapenguria. Statistics from the County Commissioners' office also indicate that in the entire region, there are approximately 100 police personnel and on average, 18 police officers per Sub County. This is against the internationally accepted ratio of one police officer for 400 citizens (UN Security Council Report, 2000). This oral account<sup>23</sup> confirmed that most of the security personnel were either stationed at the headquarters or at Sub County posts leaving most of the villages with serious security lapses. One political leader<sup>44</sup> confided in us when he said that,

“We hardly live here... when raiders come it is terrible as there is no government security at all. For the few who dare come, they always hide on hearing gun shots. We don't know why the government doesn't want us to have guns yet they don't protect us. We pray that one day God will give us a listening government but for now we and our children will just die in the hand of raiders”(June 28<sup>th</sup> 2013, Kapenguria).

The degree of marginalization in West Pokot has been such that the roads are in a deplorable state, schools and health centers have either been vandalized or closed down. There are no chiefs' camps and police stations or posts are far apart. One teacher<sup>30</sup> at Kacheliba confirmed that the kind of situation in West Pokot is neither new nor strange as there has been no consistent government service for a long time. Instead, few non-governmental organizations occasionally carry out mobile operations that provide health services and food aid among others. The majority of people in West Pokot hold the view that no government initiated project has ever been completed with most of them remaining as white elephants. The most conspicuous ones are boreholes, chiefs' camps, schools, and hospitals.

Still on security concerns, West Pokot remains one of the few areas in Kenya that is occasionally volatile and insecure for non-Pokots. This has sent ambiguous signals to the community with the

implication being that they should take care of their own security. This has solidified their belief that the government has been unable to take care of this basic need (Kiflemarian, 2002). The security neglect has over the years, seen the Kenya –Uganda border remain porous, which has epitomized the level of sporadic bandit activities along it. Moreover, this kind of situation has for some time been perpetuated by the influx of small and light weapons, which the Pokot have always used for criminal purposes (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012).

The Pokot generally assumed that the Moi regime (1979-2002) would offer them respite. This was on the ground that they were not only his staunch political supporters, but were part and parcel of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) ruling elite. However, a growing disquiet soon emerged within their circles that they were not gaining much as compared to the other ethnic groups within the KAMATUSA conglomeration (Magaga and Ogalo 2012). In the view of the Pokot, it was the Tugen and Keiyo who benefited more from this regime. Their disappointment was not due to the fact that the regime failed to provide infrastructural development but that it did nothing to return their land that had been alienated to the white settlers in Trans-Nzoia and later bought by non-Pokots.

This study observed from KII that it was out of this discontent that in 2002 general election, many of the Pokot voted against Moi's preferred candidate Uhuru Kenyatta in what appeared as a 'protest' vote. According to respondents from FGDs a misconception that has pervaded the regimes in Kenya is that they have always approached the West Pokot problem from a political angle in the hope of solving it. For instance, they confirmed that both the Moi and Kibaki regimes assumed that appointing political leaders from the region into government positions would succeed at integrating the community into the nation state. This belief informed the appointment of Francis Lotodo, Samuel Moroto, Samuel Poghiso, John Lonyangapuo and

Asman Kamama to different posts in the government in the hope that the Pokot would look at the government and its policies positively. The only problem with this approach was that the government forgot that these were people who were socially attached to their cultural values. In addition, the Pokot people cared less about politics, have little if any interest in formal education but instead have a lot of regard for their traditional leaders and their pastoral way of life. The appointment of individual leaders from the Pokot region has thus been a misconception and has failed to achieve its objectives. Given this failure by the previous regimes and the high level armament by the Pokot, the Uhuru Kenyatta government has remained wary of their intentions. In the meantime, runaway insecurity in Kenya's North Rift region which pits the Pokot against their neighbours continues unabated.

Even after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010 that increased the number of representatives at county level and the devolution of basic services such as health and infrastructure, West Pokot still faces neglect and marginalization. It was expected that, with the devolved government, poverty and marginalization in West Pokot would be managed if not resolved. This was on account of the region's representation having increased significantly and it was also allocated a larger percentage of money in the new dispensation so as to bridge its economic disparity with the rest of the country ( Kenya National Budget Report, 2014:106).

It is important to note that all this was against the back-drop that previously, the national cake in Kenya was in the hands of the central government and West Pokot was one of the regions that complained about unfairness in the distribution of the national cake. Since 2013, the county government of West Pokot has done little to radically change this trend. All indicators show that apart from a few government offices, hospitals or health centres and murram roads, West Pokot's development remains wanting. This goes against all expectations since the county government

comprises of leaders from this locality who are familiar with the needs of the region. A report by Oxfam 2014 confirmed this situation when it indicated that it is perhaps in the education and security sectors that the reality of decades of marginalization are most evident although other social indicators of development are more or less dire. In the sector of education, for instance, the current situation is such that despite free primary and affordable secondary education, many children from the region cannot go to school due to insecurity and inadequate and dilapidated schools that are far apart.

From the foregoing, the Pokot and the Karamojong are evidently victims of state neglect. Consequently, these people continue to struggle for meaningful development. They have undertaken this within the confines of social and ecological realities of their arid regions. Carter (1996) in his social cubism theory, states that marginalization is one of the factors that leads to dispute between and within communities. The case of the Pokot and Karamojong's cross-border resource conflict persistence is a clear reflection of marginalization in the context that the neglect by the state had paved the way leaving a vacuum for these communities to fill. In this situation, the focus has been their debilitating and fierce struggle over the same resources.

As part of the tenets of the theory, Oberschall (1973) states that in every society or bordering groups where some, if not all people are marginalized, it produces different access to resources. This breeds conflict in such a society or group. Oberschall (1973) further states that in such situations, the marginalized group will often feel aggrieved, become emotional, tend to operate outside the law, use force to secure itself and get things they need. Right from the colonial era, all the regimes in Kenya and Uganda have failed to fully integrate these pastoral groups into their societies. This has left the communities socially and economically steeped in their old traditions leading to endemic resource conflict persistence between them. One consequence of state neglect

and marginalization of the Pokot and Karamojong is on the runaway insecurity and their persistent conflict in the two regions. This has compelled these pastoral groups to arm themselves. The easy access to arms in the two regions has made life manageable for the local people and bandits yet causing serious stress to the Kenya and Uganda governments. Due to the fact that firearms are cheap, banditry thrives in the endemic poverty that springs from neglect and marginalization by the existing state structures of Kenya and Uganda (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012). Therefore, as a tenet within the conflict theory, marginalization of the Pokot and Karamojong emerges as a crucial factor that has bred cross-border resource conflict persistence between these two communities that has left the affected people with no option but to operate on their traditional activity of cattle raids.

#### **4.4 The Proliferation of Arms and its Misuse.**

Right from the beginning of colonialism in Kenya and Uganda, the British colonial government tried to keep the Pokot and Karamojong away from each other. They did this by creating a boundary between them and followed it by establishing police posts and garrisons in the region. It was only after independence that constant interaction between these pastoralists intensified. For the pastoralists, it was their desire to live autonomously by following their own way of life and rules. For the colonial government, it was their obligation to inculcate civility and guarantee good leadership.<sup>41</sup> The interaction and inter-pastoral conflicts over water and pasture controls persisted between the Pokot and Karamojong in the post-colonial period. Notably, the upsurge of this conflict was exacerbated by the proliferation and use of sophisticated weapons.

41. National Archives Entebbe, Joint Commissioner's Annual Report file no. A4/143, 1902.

A case in point was in 1962 when the conflict continued between these two communities especially when the Karamojong were disarmed by the Uganda government. During this raid, the Karamojong lost thousands of their animals approximated as close to 20,000 heads to the Pokot.<sup>42</sup> FGD sessions in Karamoja held the position that between 1963 and 1972, the Karamojong were the most vulnerable group often under attacks by their neighbours from Kenya. During these years, the Obote I government took the trend of amending and altering laws to oscillate between extensive marginalization and outright military pacification of northern Uganda. In this context, (Mkutu 2008) observes that the independence government of Obote became a mere continuation of the British colonial hegemony.

As such, the Karamoja Amendment Act of 1964 was amended by Cap 314 Act 13 of 1970 (Section 241) and subsequently repeated by the Special Regions Act (Cap 306) in the Revised Laws of Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2006). Furthermore, the 1965 Firearms Ordinance that was used to restrict gun ownership was replaced with the Firearms Act of 1970. This Act made it an offence for anyone to possess a firearm without a license. Its section 3(1) (Cap. 299) states that:

“No person shall purchase, acquire or have in his or her possession any firearm or ammunition unless, in respect of each such firearm he or she holds a valid firearm certificate.”<sup>43</sup>

This legislation was a big blow to the Karamojong who traditionally assumed that it was their right to own firearms. In addition, by the military law of Uganda (Act 1995) (Cap. 307), only Ugandan military officers are allowed to possess firearms by law. Subsequently, the Karamojong warriors found themselves subject to this military law and deemed it to be in unlawful possession of arms, ammunitions and other proscribed weapons was ordinarily the monopoly of the army.

42. National Archives Entebbe, Karamoja Correspondence file no. A4/149, 1962.

43. National Archives Entebbe, Security on Fire Arms Report file no. A4/161, 1970).

By the content of this Act any such person was liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years (Security Report Republic of Uganda, 2006). The seriousness with which Amin's decrees were enforced pushed the Karamojong into a defenceless position thereby exposing them to lethal attacks from the Pokot who, by this time, were re-arming themselves with guns from Ethiopia and Sudan (Kamenju, 2003). Inasmuch as the small arms laws existed in Kenya, they were not implemented with the strictness that the Ugandan government did with the Karamojong. As a way of protecting themselves from their arch rivals (the Pokots), the Karamojong resorted to fabricating their homemade guns known as *ngamatidai* (Mkutu, 2003 and Markakis, 2004).

The acquisition of large amounts or unparalleled quantities of arms in the hands of pastoral civilians was experienced in 1979. This followed the successful overthrow of Amin from power by the Tanzanian army (Mamdani, 1996). The sophisticated guns, mainly G3 automatic rifles and AK -47 were in the garrison of Moroto which Amin previously used against the Karamojong. In April 1979 when Kampala fell to the Tanzanian forces, Amin's soldiers who were poorly paid abandoned the barracks and fled to the villages. The Karamojong, especially their cluster of Matheniko and Tepeth, stormed the barracks and took all the available weapons for themselves. The Jie also raided the smaller armory in Kotido (*The East African Standard, Editorial team 27<sup>th</sup> May 1979*).

This new reality changed the security situation along the Kenya – Uganda border for the worst. From the onset, a large part of the pastoral population of the Pokot and Karamojong were in possession of sophisticated guns. The Karamojong, who had for over 18 years been denied the chance to effectively use guns, got an opportunity to revenge on their neighbours. As Mkutu (2003) indicated, this gave the Karamojong an advantage over their neighbours “as within a few

months the Pokot had been stripped of almost all their cattle”. Similarly, an elder’s<sup>53</sup> account stated that in 1980, there was a protracted war between the Karamojong and the dreaded Pokot in Churchor along river Kanyangareng. The bone of contention was that each group desired to control the river and its pastureland following the severe drought that was ongoing in Kenya and Uganda. The Karamojong lost this war to the Pokot who thereafter acquired G3 and AK- 47 rifles in large numbers from the losers (Mkutu, 2001). Satya (2004:126) confirms the acquisition of arms by the victors noting that:

“When one group raids and in the process they are repulsed, some of their ranks are killed and arms captured. The captured arms are not handed over to the authorities, they instead become part of the arsenal of the victors”.

It is for this reason that the occurrence of raids and counter raids were and are never reported to the police or security forces because these authorities would demand for the captured weapons as well as those used to repulse the enemy. As such, the actual number of small arms in the hands of civilians in Karamoja and West Pokot can only be approximated. This is due to the fact that such information was concealed and therefore missing from the security data base.

A further process of acquisition of small arms occurred in 1986 when herders of Karamojong warriors were recruited into the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) to fight for the failing Obote II regime (Mkutu, 2001). However, when the National Resistance Army (NRA) demobilized them, the Karamojong soldiers fled with all their guns back to Karamoja. On the same, an oral account<sup>58</sup> corroborate that the fall of Obote II regime saw the disbandment of the military groups that were set up by the regime to protect the Teso from Karamojong raids. The result of the acquisition of these arms was that they became easily accessible and cheap for civilians to own. According to one oral account<sup>58</sup>, “guns became so plentiful that they were like hoes in the kraals or houses.”

The ease with which guns could be accessed then disturbed the balance of power between the various actors. The Pokot used this opportunity to purchase as many guns from across the border in Uganda to be able to put up a good fight just in case their well-armed rivals attacked them. According to Oluoch (2002) in the *East African* newspaper on December 16<sup>th</sup>, it is estimated that by the end of 1980s there were between 500,000 to 700,000 firearms in the Karamoja region while in West Pokot, the number was between 150,000 to 200,000. Although it is not possible to know the exact number of small arms and automatic guns in the hands of civilians in this region, it is clear that the threats posed by the gun users and the frequent raids carried out by the Pokot and Karamojong not only attests to this fact but also enhanced these people's conflict persistence during this time.

From the 1990s, there has been a transformation in so far as the involvement in the movement and acquisition of arms is concerned. For instance, some of the arms at that time originated from legal sources such as official security forces and militias (Mkutu, 2001). The Museveni government considered it appropriate to involve vigilantes, anti-stock theft units, and Local Defence Unit (LDUs). However, in Kenya, the Moi administration used Kenya Police Reservists. Other than the undisciplined government soldiers who deserted duty with LDUs, the other source of guns and small arms proliferation was via rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Defence Force or Toposa militia from Southern Sudan (Mkutu, 2001). About the sources from LDU, one trader<sup>29</sup> at Kotido, confirmed that most people get their arms from government soldiers by adding that:

“Since 2002, LDU members became discontented due to poor pay and condition of service as Museveni uses them to fight Kony with little pay or no pay at all. So most of them leave with their guns which they sell to us cheaply” (April, 31<sup>st</sup> 2015)

In Uganda, the government decided to support vigilante groups in almost all regions. For instance by 2000, the Teso and Lang'o created vigilantes to defend themselves against the Karamojong. They were known as *Amoka* boys. According to the editorial team in the *Monitor Newspaper* of March, 2010, the Museveni government gave an assortment of weapons to the youth to protect themselves against the Karamojong raiders. On the Kenyan side, the government provided arms to the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) under the control of the police and District Commissioners. It is important to note that KPRs were hired on a voluntary basis with no allowance nor benefits but were supplied with arms and ammunitions.

Among the Pokot existed kraal warriors known as *Karocuna*, *Ngoroko*, *hodari* or *Chelolos* (Kamenju, 2003 and Mkutu, 2008). These were young men living on the margins of the major centers and survived on hired labours or petty crimes (Magaga and Ogalo, 2012). They were the raiders for hire who got their arms from either kraal elders or from the warlords. The latter were mainly businessmen including some of Somali origin also known to the locals as either *Mafuta Mingi* or *Mabwenyenye*. In terms of costs, one gun in the 1980s would see the buyer use between 10 to 20 cows, which was indeed exorbitant. One trader<sup>39</sup> in Sigor noted, "When our family got our first gun from the Karamojong, we paid 20 cows for it".

During the 1990s, the cost of guns came down to between 5 to 15 cows and five to ten cows in the 2000s. Oral sources indicate, that the cheapest gun known as SAR (Chinese made) costs between Kshs. 6,000 to 10,000 or one to two cows while the popular AK-47 costs Kshs. 15,000 to 20,000. The latter is, slightly expensive because it does not heat up during use (Mkutu, 2001; Eaton, 2007). Women also play a role in the promotion of the pastoral conflict persistence along the Kenya-Uganda border. Those who brewed local beer exchanged a tin of beer for a bullet, which they kept for their husband's or son's use. A traditional liquor trader<sup>29</sup> in Kotido

confirmed that in a day, she gets close to 50 bullets. Since they are least expected to ferry arms, most pastoral women do not just carry them in sacks for exchange for shop items or animals but are today well drilled to use the firearms (Eaton, 2007). One elderly woman<sup>12</sup> at Nakapiripirit confirmed this by saying;

“Even before I lost my son and husband to Karamojong raiders, I knew how to use a gun. I always slept with it using it as my pillow and whenever the raiders attacked me I didn’t need to wail, I simply aimed and shot at the enemy”

This has realized a paradigm shift in the acquisition of arms and its use by women. This reveals them as active participants and beneficiaries of the tirade of violence in the region. A new status has thus been conferred on the women as they gather bullets, sell them and even own guns. By and large, this has not only sustained the conflict persistence but increased the violence between the Pokot and Karamojong. Studies by Mkutu, (2001; 2003); Eaton (2007); and Satya, (2004) agree that there are four main routes through which small arms are trafficked into either Kenya or Uganda. These include first, the Sudan-Karamoja route. This route a trader<sup>31</sup> confirmed passes through Kotido district from Sudan is also popular with the transportation of *mira* by Somalis. Upon reaching Katido, some of the small arms, are taken to Pokot and Samburu while the rest are transported to Moroto and Nakapiripirit in Uganda.

The source of supply is the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army SPLA who sometimes cross into Uganda with donkeys carrying loads of ammunition and guns that they exchange for grains and livestock (Eaton, 2007). The second is the Sudan-Lokichogio route that often passes through Turkana villages where the traders buy arms and resell them to the Pokot and in Karamojong in Uganda (Mkutu, 2003). The third route is the North-East route also known as the Somali route. A government official<sup>60</sup> indicated that it begins in Somalia moving through Ethiopia in Merille area then into Turkana or Karamoja and Pokot area. It is said to be the longest and most

expensive route as the traders have many brokers to deal with. The main traders are people of Somali origin and their various agents along this long route. The last route is Karenga to Lopoch and lastly to Kotodo route. According to Mkutu (2003), it is mainly dominated by the Jie clan of Karamojong due to its geographical location. After getting their arms either from Sudan or Eastern Congo DR, they sell them to the Turkanas. It is along this route that we have Kangole and Moroto arms market whose days are on Tuesday and Thursday respectively. One trader<sup>5</sup> corroborated that it is at these market points that the Pokot often buy their arms in cash and not by barter trade. By and large, the ease with which the Pokot and Karamojong got their arms stands out as the backbone through which their conflict persistence has been sustained especially from independence.

#### **4.5 The Commercialization of Cattle Raids and Emergence of Cartels.**

The commercialization of cattle raids across the Kenya-Uganda border can be traced to the early 1990s. This was marked by the transformation of cattle raids into an entrepreneurial activity, which inspired raiding. As Odegi-Awuondo (1992) shows how a cattle raiding is mainly driven by commercial considerations. This new form of raiding activity is characterized by the role and presence of 'external forces' whereby the locals act as 'agents' doing the raids in the villages. The most noticeable change is that a cattle raiding has metamorphosed from a one track movement where warriors transferred the animals to their communities and villages to a triangular structured movement. This was confirmed by a trader<sup>39</sup> who indicated that wealthy and affluent individuals (cattle barons), who are said to be politically connected and powerful, bankroll the raids by making money, phones, and sophisticated guns available to their agents who, in turn, proceed to organize the local youths to engage in raids.

Evidence from the editorial team of *The Monitor*, March 13<sup>th</sup> 2000 linked business tycoons and politicians from across Kenya and Uganda as the people behind the commercialization of cattle raids in West Pokot and Karamoja. The financiers of the raids popularly referred to as *mafuta mingi* by the Karamojong and *mabwenyenye* by the Pokot, live in some of the towns in the arid and semi-arid places and in the cities of the two countries (Satya, 2004). In tandem, Scholars Ocan, (1994); Mirzeler and Young, (2010); Osamba, (2000); Mkutu, (2003) and Amutabi, (2010) have attributed the commercialization of livestock economy between the Pokot and Karamojong to the phenomenon of cattle barons and cartels.

These scholars perceive barons as persons who harbour political and economic control, have sophisticated guns at their disposal. They also have close attachments to cattle, drugs, and gun trade. In Kenya, cattle barons can be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s as the self-proclaimed groups that influenced the youth in undermining traditional authority of the elders in West Pokot region. Vries (2007:210) adds that:

“Barons emerged among the Pokot since 1980s and that these people attracted young warriors to form private militia *Ngoroko*, they became the final authority on cattle relations in the region thereby overriding the traditional powers of the elders”.

A youth<sub>19</sub> from Sigor in West Pokot confirmed that, out of the financial wealth that the warriors get from the barons, they have contracted the services of *Kawurok*, the senior most warriors among the Pokot who were known for their wealth of experience in military skills especially in mass raids. A kraal guard<sub>10</sub> in Lelan indicated that as part of the organization, the raiding bands are provided with guns and cell phones on credit. Upon carrying out the raid successfully, they are then paid handsomely by their clients for the raids based on the number of livestock stolen. A trader<sub>35</sub> from Nakapiripirit confirmed that the stolen cattle are herded into trucks stationed by the roadsides or to their agreed destinations for picking the animals. The animals are then

transported to either the local towns or to the slaughter towns like Dagoretti in Kenya. The other popular towns being Kotido in Karamoja and Kacheliba in West Pokot. It is important to take cognizance of the fact that commercialization of raiding has been popularized not only by the financial boost and the provision of cell phones and guns but also by the fact that the stolen animals are sold in distant markets and cannot therefore be traced by the local losers nor can they be recouped by counter-raids. Besides, it undermines the restitution of the stolen animals.

In contrast to traditional raiding which redistributes rather than completely transfers cattle, commercialization of livestock raiding distorts social and cultural reasons that cattle fulfill (Satya, 2004). A case in point is the fact that young men in West Pokot and Karamoja have been disadvantaged by the high demands of bride wealth payment and have resorted to participating more in raids for pay. In his view, Odegi - Awuondo (1992) argues that this is the reason why victims of contemporary raiders are no longer restricted to the warriors in the two communities. Respondents in KII sessions across the two communities were in agreement that the value of livestock in West Pokot and Karamoja is no longer tied to cultural connotations but to the vibrant global market forces.

Consequently, the aggressiveness of the middlemen and the cartels have scaled up the levels and manner in which cattle raids have been conducted in the recent past in Karamoja and West Pokot. With this in place, the new dynamics are that the raids are no longer done in the traditional context by warriors. Instead, the cartels and middlemen organize and sponsor their own raids by hiring mercenaries and bandits to execute their scheme (Amutabi, 2010). Thus, there exists a link between shifts in power and changes in the adaptiveness in the livestock operations in West Pokot and Karamoja. For instance, the shift has been occasioned and marked by the way in which traditional raids were carried out, who did it and within whose power. This

has been replaced by a more radical profit making movement through banditry, theft and cattle looting (Ocan, 1994). In their view, Mkutu, (2008) and Onyango, (2010) attribute the changes to the commercialization of the raids, incorporation of modern weapons into these societies' economy and breakdown in the traditional culture. As a result, all these have transformed raiding from the crude form of primitive accumulation into procuring the animals for sale and to make profit. In West Pokot and Karamoja, this has become trendy where prominent business barons, politicians and senior civil servants provide hired raiders with sophisticated guns and cellphones to carry out their trade. A trader <sup>39</sup> in Sigor confirmed that some of the raided livestock are then sold to the local abattoirs in Katido, Kapchorwa, Alale, Kacheliba, Kapenguria, Dagoretti and Athi River. Some of the popular outlets for these animals' meat are Muthurwa and Burma in Nairobi known for *Nyama Choma* or roasted meat. The animals meant for overseas export are then transported to Yatta for further fattening before being shipped to either Asia or South Africa (*Daily Nation*, Editorial Team 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2014). Based on the foregoing, this trend has not only led to escalation of armed insurgency in West Pokot and Karamoja but has also exacerbated cross-border livestock raids, rustling, and banditry.

In his estimation, Mkutu (2008) observed that, between 1996 and 1999, over 25,770 cattle were stolen from West Pokot and Karamoja with the cost approximated at 5 million US dollars or 484 million Kenya shillings. He indicates that some of the animals are sold as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia by the barons. In a nutshell, commercialization of cattle raids has at best increased materialistic criminality and at worst escalated conflict persistence in West Pokot and Karamoja. This is because control and limits on raiding ceased to be governed by social sanction. This has, in the recent past, seen violent raiding and revenge killings increase, and cycles of violence thrive between the Pokot and Karamojong.

#### 4.6 Role of Politicians in Conflict 1962 to 2016

The nation-state theorists like Max and Lenin perceive culture as the basis of politics and hold the view that ‘self’ in the notion of self-determination is a cultural self. The doctrine of self-determination is perpetuated by individual politicians to either defend the state or his/her group’s common culture. In many if not all cases, politicians assume that cultural issues are identical to and are explicitly political (Morgenthau, 1985). As with the Pokot and Karamojong, the years of independence then saw them acknowledge politicians whose main concern was with the defense of the group’s common culture and beliefs. In practice, the custodianship later became the epicenter from which the Pokot and Karamojong ethnic tension and politics was practiced and exacerbated. This view is shared by Vries (2007:241) who observed that:

“An important new catalyzing factor in the inter-ethnic conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong since 1980’s has been the influence of politicians who have been more concerned with their ethnic politics”.

As representatives of their various ethnics groups, the politicians of the two communities often inflamed violence between the two societies. This was, in retrospect, related to their outbursts that rekindled their conflicts. Cases in point were the activities of members of parliament namely, Lotodo, Moroto, Poghismo from West Pokot and Lolem Member of Parliament from Upe County, Uganda (*Etengu 2002 in the New Vision, January 20<sup>th</sup> p41*).

For instance, the inflammatory statements by Francis Lotodo, a former KANU Minister for Environment and Natural Resources also known as the ‘King of Pokot’, always sparked off conflict persistence between the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and more particularly the Karamojong. Nguguna (1998) in the *Sunday Nation (May 20<sup>th</sup> p12)* reads, “Each time he issued an ultimatum to one or the other ethnic group to return stolen cattle or face the wrath of the Pokot, a murderous raid would ensue”. In fact in 1984, he was jailed for being in possession of a

huge arms arsenal in his compound and for ‘promoting war like activities’ (Barsito, 2010, *Daily Nation* November 18, 2000). A Pokot elder<sub>6</sub> indicated that Lotodo’s main concern was the general discourse of marginalization and historical injustices that the Pokot have experienced under the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Two reasons were expressed to explain the above position. The first is that the Pokot are bitter with post independent Kenyan governments which they thought would reverse their historical land issues in Trans-Nzoia. The second reason was the construction of the Turkwel Gorge Dam in Pokot land during which the Pokot were poorly compensated by the Moi government (Omonso 2001 in *The Daily Nation*, April 26<sup>th</sup> p21).

After Lotodo’s death in the year 2000, his successor Mr. Moroto continued with his ideology. On several occasions, he is said to have incited the Pokot against the government and more particularly, against their arch rivals the Karamojong. For instance, in 2001 after encouraging his people, the Pokot to carry out a counter raid on the Karamojong, he informed the successful raiders not to worry as he was going to protect their interests (Onyango, 2003 in *The Daily Nations* August 15<sup>th</sup> p28). Similarly, in 2005, he was jailed for inciting the Pokot against the government’s order to vacate land that belonged to non-Pokots by urging them to stay put (Obare 2005 in *East African Standard*, January 3<sup>rd</sup>, P41). Consequently, the Pokot cattle raiding activities and defiance to the government earned them the name of ‘tribal terrorists’ (Olupot and Olita 2017 in *The Sunday Vision*, July 25<sup>th</sup> p46).

Using their political positions, Lolem and Poghisio have articulated ethnic raids and counter cattle raids between the Pokot and Karamojong. For instance, Poghisio operated on a populist policy and supported the raids by the Pokot on the Karamojong. This was a way of wooing voters against his expected position of renouncing the vice. A respondent<sub>43</sub> confirmed that Lolem

often protected them by siding with the Karamojong cattle raiders upon being tracked and identified by the Pokot. The point to note is that although cattle raids and competition over grazing rights across the border is responsible for a measure of traditional violence among the two communities, it has since become clear that the persistence of conflict has lost much of its customary elements and is now organized for financial gain at higher political and commercial levels. The local leaders<sup>23&60</sup> hold the view that, in order to maintain a constant supply of people willing to carry out raids for cattle, local political warlords in the two areas, have created, promoted and supported the ideology of the need to “protect our land and people.”

While the ideology is deployed as the justification of cattle raids and aggravating neighbours, it also ensures the continued political survival of the warlords in the two areas. The involvement of politicians both at the national and inter-state levels has become the impetus that perpetuates the conflict. This is on the simple account that part of the planning involves the supply of fire arms that are used to mount cattle raids. More importantly is the provision of political protection for the perpetrators by politicians in the two areas. Consequently, the involvement of political leaders from West Pokot and Karamojong is the reason for this conflict persistence that is used to woo voters against respective local rivals. In these circumstances the issues of control and access to land for pasture fuel this conflict persistence since the activity is commercialized with most of the raided animals finding their way to markets outside Kenya and Uganda.

More importantly is the need to underscore the role of inter-state relations in this conflict persistence. For instance, immediately after the creation of the boundary, the Pokot were placed on the Kenya and Uganda sides whereby the Upe in Uganda were considered as the “lost Pokot tribe of Kenya” (Barber 1968). The reason for describing them as such was because the boundary placed them in the Karamojong area. A Pokot elder<sub>6</sub> confirmed that by 1963, the Upe Pokot had

been complaining about “Karamojong dominance and subjugation”. This situation compelled their kin in Kenya through their leaders to constantly attack the Karamojong with the objective of “liberating” them from Karamojong oppressors. This situation saw each political leader support their people against their “perceived” enemies. According to Wakabi – Kiguwa (1973), as at 1962, Uganda had three distinct foreign policies towards her neighbours. The first related to the policies directed towards her own interests as a nation. For instance, getting access to world markets, ensuring her own security and seeking beneficial trade with her neighbours. The second category entailed policies that were related to issues or occurrences outside her international borders, but which were perceived to be affecting her.

Cases in point included the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries and her political fugitives in exile. The third included policies aimed at fostering the desires and aspirations of Ugandans as Africans. In Kenya, her foreign policy centered on good neighbourliness and the desire to continue dominating the East African market for her economic gains (Kurgat, 2001). It is important to take cognizance of the fact that it was Uganda’s second foreign policy that her leaders often evoked that created a state of tension between Kenya and her as well as between the border communities like the Pokot and Karamojong during such times.

For instance, in 1964, the first Obote regime accused Kenya of using foreigners from southern Africa to destabilize her. The immediate response of the Kenyatta government was to reject in the most outright terms, the claims made by president Obote. Notably, Kenyatta stated that Kenya had no reason whatsoever to tolerate the “presence of conspirators against Uganda” (Kwamusi, 1996). Elders<sup>3&6</sup> from the two communities confirmed that after such political utterances by their leaders, conflict between them rose to sweltering levels. The friction between the two countries intensified in 1987 when complaints about Uganda rebel Alice Lakwena

operating from Kenya's West Pokot area were countered by a accusations that Museveni was harbouring left wing Kenya dessidents and serving as a conduit for their military training in Libya (Khadiagala, 1993). This drew support from *African Confidential* (1991:3) which stated that:

“As the dissident threat” has established itself as a theme in Kenyan politics, Kampala in regularly blamed for sheltering Kenyan dissident (Odongo) and providing training for them with Lybian sponsorship”.

It was this situation that saw the Karamojong raiders supported by their government forces launch incessant attacks on the Pokot with a view to flashing out the leader of Holy Spirit Movement Alice Lakwena from West Pokot. This is what their elders <sup>3&18</sup> called “operation redemption of Uganda from the dark hours of despair”. This state of affairs continued for almost two years with a series of incidences in which Kenya's anti-stock theft police force repulsed the Karamojong cattle rustlers in 1989 (Khadiagala, 1993).

The escalation in distrust and recrimination between president Moi and Museveni as well as between the Pokot and Karamojong along their border went a notch higher when, in the same year (1989), the ruling party newspaper in Nairobi described president Museveni as a ‘disciple of violence’ for all the border conflicts and misunderstanding between the people of Kenya and Uganda more particularly the Pokot and Karamojong (*Kenya Times* Editorial Team April 4<sup>th</sup> 1992 p8). Consequently, Uganda's foreign policy towards Kenya shifted from being “conservative,” ‘cautious’ and ‘non interventonist’ to ‘ antagonistic,’ ‘combative’ and ‘gangbustic’ (Kwamusi, 1996). This led the Pokot to rearm them and retaliate on the Karamojong and vice versa. In a nutshell, the intermittent tension and conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong was encouraged by the inter-state belligerence between Kenya and Uganda.

#### **4.7 Failure of Disarmament Programmes in Independence Kenya and Uganda.**

The first ever forceful disarmament programme to be carried out in Kenya and Uganda was in 1962. This occurred when the British colonial government realized that they were about to hand over power to African leaders (of Kenya and Uganda) yet Karamoja and West Pokot were awash with guns which encouraged cattle rustling in the region. To put this menace to an end, the British colonial governments sent a junior army officer, Idi Amin, in early 1962 to go and quell cattle rustling between the Pokot and Karamojong. Archival information indicates that Amin used excessive force to accomplish his task.<sup>44</sup> Amin's brutality was experienced in Matheniko, Turkana, and Pokot where his army tortured, brutalized, and killed several people (Onyango, 2010). In Pokot, elders<sup>45&50</sup> can still recall the ruthless manner in which Amin carried out his operation. One respondent<sup>63</sup> corroborated that the bodies of those who had been killed were left un-buried for scavengers to feed on. His operation created fear and despondency among the Pokot and Karamojong to the extent that any rumour of his troops advancing towards an area would cause massive migration. In this operation, any warrior or man found with a gun would be flogged and marched publicly before being shot (Omonso 2005 in the *Daily Nation*, 11<sup>th</sup> May p48). An elder<sup>45</sup> recalls that:

“Whenever warriors or men were arrested, they would be paraded in a public rally and each forced to put their penis on the table to be cut or he reveals the whereabouts of guns. One day in Moroto, he did not just threaten to cut off the organs but actually did so to eight men who refused to reveal where their weapons were. This forced the others to shout out where they had hidden their guns”.

This operation managed to disarm the Pokot and Karamojong briefly. In the process, they resorted to making their traditional guns *ngamatidai* or *amatidai* as the perpetuated their conflict Persistence.

44. National Archives Entebbe, Security Report on disarmament A4/310, 1977.

This situation continued when Amin was in power in Uganda but latter declined in the years after 1979. In 1984, the Kenya government, in an operation known as *Nyundo* or *Lotiririo* massacre, resolved to forcefully disarm its citizens in West Pokot (Onyango, 2003 in *The Daily Nation* August 15<sup>th</sup> p28). The decision of the Moi government to disarm the Pokot was by extension supposed to control and pacify them, draw them closer to the rule of law and order as well as inculcate modern decency in the region. However, this forceful disarmament programme failed. Singo Wairagu (2001) indicated that, most probably, the main reason for these failures was the fact that the Pokots are found on both sides of the international border and are said to be in possession of both Kenyan and Ugandan national identity cards.

This situation therefore saw the people of West Pokot retreat into Uganda where they were welcomed by their counterparts, the Upe Pokot. This kind of operation where the Upe and their cousins the Pokot of Kenya criss-crossed the border was not only in the domain of the locals but was always reinforced by their political leaders whenever they addressed meetings across the border. For instance, in 2002, Poghisio allegedly assured the Upe Pokot warriors opposed to Museveni's disarmament programme to cross with their guns to Kenya as they would get protection from the Kenyan government (Etengu 2002 in the *New Vision*, January, 20<sup>th</sup> p61).

Focus Group Discussion groups in West Pokot confirmed that, in 2001, the Moi government, again with little success, carried out another disarmament programme on the pastoral groups of West Pokot, Marakwet and Turkana. This time, the government was more diplomatic by offering amnesty to anyone who handed over his or her guns to the D.C. Three reasons have been identified for the failure of this programme. Firstly, was that the government's decision to leave the operations in the hands of the local administrators namely chiefs and sub-chiefs.

It was widely believed that chiefs knew that they were disliked and less respected because they were corrupt and always shared the spoils from cattle raids. More importantly, revealing the identity of those who possessed guns or traded on the same meant that their lives were at risk, as they became targets of attack by the victims. Secondly, the Pokot elders<sup>42&50</sup> argued that to return the guns was like inviting trouble from the Karamojong raiders who were allowed by their government to use them as ‘walking sticks’. Thirdly, was that the operation was not taken seriously as the government turned its attention to the 2002 general elections in which the opposition would have used the operation for political mileage against the government’s presidential candidate.

With the exception of the 2014 forceful disarmament of the Pokot and Turkana where administration police officers lost their lives and guns while 21 guns were recovered, all other disarmament programmes by the Kenya government on the Pokot have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful. In Uganda, all the disarmament initiatives have been aimed at the Karamojong. Several reasons have been put forward to explain this. The first reason is that in 1979, the Matheniko, a sub group of Karamojong, stormed the Moroto barracks and looted all the arms. Secondly, in the many guerilla wars in eastern Congo, Karamojong men were recruited and many of them left with their guns.

Thirdly, is their ability to make their own local guns *angametidai*. The fourth reason is the role of the external penetration of small arms from southern Sudan supplied by SPLM and through their trade with the Pokot in Kenya. Subsequently, the Karamoja area, just like West Pokot, is awash with small arms as one respondent<sup>38</sup> from an FGD in Kacheliba said, “here everybody has a gun, even women and children have guns”. He explained that, in the case of women and children, they own guns as custodians either of their sons, husbands or brothers.

It was this situation of Karamoja having many guns in the hands of the civilians that led the Ugandan parliament to pass a resolution in April 2000 that the Karamojong have to be disarmed within one year. The general consensus from FGDs and KII in Karamoja was that disarmament is a waste of time and resources arguing that they use their guns to protect themselves against their enemies, the Pokot. To avoid direct confrontation with the Karamojong and in order to be seen to be fair, the Ugandan government in December 2001 created the first phase of the disarmament programmes which was highly voluntary (Onyango 2010). Before the implementation of the programme, the government made extensive consultations with civil society groups, local and non-governmental organization, members of parliament, Karamoja university students and elders (Etengu 2007 in *The New Vision*, October 14<sup>th</sup> p52 2007).

It was from such consultations that the government and these groups embarked on a vigorous sensitization programme. The sensitization was confirmed by a government official<sup>8</sup> who said that it was based on a ministerial policy that had outlined what the government was going to undertake namely to guarantee better protection to the people through the increase of quantity and quality of the police, intelligence and local defence forces establishment of permanent barracks along the Kenya-Uganda border and providing incentives to all individuals who handed in their guns. The incentives included an ox-plough, a bag of maize flour and iron sheets for home construction, recruitment and training vigilante groups as well as arming and paying them.

The vigilante were to be under an army commander and their mission was to guard against inter clan raids (Olupot and Olita 2007, in the *New Vision*, July 25<sup>th</sup> p46). The failure of this first phase of disarmament in Uganda was because the officials entrusted with sensitizing and rewarding the warriors ended up misappropriating the funds (Disarmament Programme File no. 42/A DC. Moroto, 2014). In addition, the exercise was uncoordinated and poorly conducted. To

begin with, no security was provided for those who had volunteered to surrender their guns. Secondly, participants in the vigilante programme failed to get their incentives. Lastly, the disarmed group became vulnerable to attacks from those who had not surrendered. According to a respondent<sup>8</sup> in a KII session, the victims were easily identified especially the few who were lucky to get iron sheets and construct houses distinct from the regular *manyattas*. One elder<sup>7</sup> in Moroto observed that:

“Our people for the first time trusted the government and we were willing to hand over our guns but immediately they could not give us security and compensate us well. Many people retreated with their guns. There is no way the program will work without alternative security” (January 21<sup>st</sup> 2012, Moroto).

The failure of this first phase of disarmament was due to the fact that the Museveni government reneged on its promises to the Karamojong who, for a long time, were defiant to government policies. In May 2002, Karamojong fighters resisted disarmament openly and killed 19 Uganda People’s Defence Force soldiers (Mkutu, 2003; 167). When the voluntary disarmament ended in mid 2002, the disappointment was that out of the targeted 100,000 guns, only 10,000 were surrendered (Security Report file no.27/A DC Moroto 2014). In a nutshell, the bulk of the guns remained in the hands of the Karamojong civilians. Consequently, the Pokot-Karamojong conflict persistence continued. Indeed, as Vries (2007) indicated, the confrontation becomes even more dreadful after the failure of the disarmament programme.

The second phase of Karamojong disarmament began in 2004 and was to take 12 months. In this phase, the elders openly opposed forceful disarmament arguing that it was bound to be countered with the full force of the warriors. By this time, the security situation in Karamoja had deteriorated as the group that had surrendered their guns re-armed themselves and even formed local alliances (Onyango, 2010). Just as the first phase failed, the second one also ran into

problems of mistrust by the local people who became suspicious of the government's intentions. In as much as the government did not intend to use force, the fact that the elders did not support this phase resulted in a change of mind and it began to force the Karamojong, which sent the wrong signals to the local people. A report by Olupot and Olita 2007 in *The New Vision*, July 25<sup>th</sup> p49 confirmed that the operation began with deployment of heavily armed soldiers, armored vehicles, armed tanks and two military gunships based at the army division's headquarters in Mbale. The unfortunate thing that stifled the second phase of the disarmament programmes was that between 2001 to 2003, the Museveni government had a security challenge from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that was already plundering the North and was extending to the Teso region in the East (Security Report File no. 37/A DC. Nakipiripirit, 2014).

According to an officer<sup>58</sup> at District Office in Abim, the government then turned its attention on the LRA war leaving a lean force in Karamoja to carry out the disarmament. He also held the view that the timing of the second phase was poor since it was in the year preceding the presidential election in 2006. Being in need of both the Teso and Karamojong votes, the Museveni government then slowed down on the Karamoja disarmament programme but instead intensified its fight against LRA advancement in Teso district. The main concern here is that the government found itself in a dilemma on whether to fully support the disarmament or crush LRA advancement altogether.

The government soon disengaged from the disarmament programme especially when her lean force registered a lot of casualties in Matheniko, Dodoth, and Tepeth against the dreaded Jie (Security Report File no. 32/A Karamoja District, 2007). However, it is important to take cognizance of the fact that between 2006 and 2016 the two governments have approached their disarmament plans diplomatically with each requesting gun holders to either surrender or register

them with their respective authorities. It is notable that in both countries, the governments either used wrong approaches (coercive power) or bad timing to handle their disarmament programmes. In terms of time, it is evident that it would come one year or so to a presidential election leading to the failure of the programme in Kenya and Uganda. In addition, the two governments were yet to agree on a joint disarmament programme and effective supervision of the borderline. Subsequently, the failure of the disarmament programmes has spurred conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong as the runaway insecurity is experienced to date.

#### **4.8 Resource Scarcity and Climatic Variability**

A number of scholars hold the opinion that scarcity of resources is crucial in understanding pastoral conflict persistence. Studies by Dyson – Hudson, 1958; Barber, 1968; and Dietz, 1987 argue that period of conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong escalated during droughts and wet seasons. While responding to KII questions a Karamojong Warrior<sup>56</sup> confirmed that cattle raiding between them and the Pokot always took place during the wet season. He went ahead to explain that they associated this time with restocking of livestock herds after a devastating dry spell and that it is during such times, that animals were stronger to walk long distances and healthy enough to fetch better prices. In addition, such a time was perfect for raiding since there was enough bush cover.

Meir and Bond (2007) also confirmed a positive correlation between pasture abundance and the frequency of raids in the borderline of Kenya and Uganda, specifically between the Pokot, Karamojong, and Turkana. It is reported that raiding was always in the months preceding the long rains (March to May) and short rains (October to December). This trend owes to the raiders' anticipations of favourable conditions for herd rebuilding after dry season losses. This qualified

the role of climate variability in the persistence of pastoral conflict. It is, however, important to note that the deterministic relationship between resource scarcity and pastoral conflict lay in the absence of customary institutions that fostered relations between neighbours. Such relations that would have allowed for reciprocal resource sharing and livestock lending are not currently evident between the Pokot and Karamojong leading to conflict persistence between them. Similarly, Opiyo, (2012) was more specific when he indicated that in the period 1999 to 2003, both West Pokot and Karamoja experienced severe drought, which led to increased conflict. The central premise of this argument confirms conflict theory's position that during times of scarcity, often caused by climate variability, the Pokot of Kenya and Karamojong societies always competed to maximize their share of the limited resources.

It is this struggle to control the limited resources that inevitably resulted in this persistence of the conflict. However, as observed by Oberschal (1973), pastoral conflict can not be adequately explained by the resource scarcity alone but also by dynamics of cooperation and co-optation within communities as has been observed by this study. For instance, both the environmental theorists and conflict theory stress the impact of environmental changes brought about either by drought or floods as contributing to the concept of scarcity.

The emphasis here is particularly on the role of drought in the diminishing or shrinkage of pasture and water. However, this approach is devoid of the role of the many ritual practices such as *asapaan* that involve the use of cattle and the role of cattle raids on scarcity of the animals. This is due to the fact that cattle raids no longer operate within the confines of their redistributive roles but on predatory functions that cause scarcity of the animals which is this study's position. Likewise, the continued neglect or marginalization of the youthful warriors by the state amidst the declining cattle economy has increased their desire to get involved in rusting so as to secure

the livelihood. It is the position of this study that formerly, pastoralism offered fulltime engagement for all age groups but due to poverty (a tenet within conflict theory) the young men have found themselves in a difficult situation since there are no more cattle to herd, and no jobs to earn money yet their families look up to them to fulfill their obligations of being providers. It is the position of this study that rather than look at the pastoral conflict from a cultural ways as emphasized by conflict theory's tenets of scarcity, inequality, marginalization, poverty and traditional beliefs, it should also be approached from the role played by cattle raids on the reduction of the animals and not the role of environmental catastrophe on pasture and water.

Besides, the warriors<sup>4&19</sup> interviewed during FGD and KII sessions argued that today, they regard their peers who are in formal employment and live in urban centers after breaking from the shackles of traditional cattle raids and now possess vehicle, modern houses, cell phones and drink bottled beer. They confirmed that, owing to their joblessness, many have joined the raiding ranks so as to get the goodies that they see their privileged peers enjoy. This study found that they have consequently become ready labour for hire in the market raids by influential and affluent people living in urban centers. It is this commercialization of raids which is directly linked to foreign market together with the proliferation of small arms that act as an impetus to pastoral conflict persistence right from the colonial period.

#### **4.9 Impact of the Conflict on the Two Communities since 1962**

Being pastoralists, cattle have been the backbone of both the Pokot and Karamojong's livelihoods. This means that economy, culture, as well as livelihood of these two communities was and still is constructed around cattle. As was observed in the earlier chapter, these people got their cattle through raids, inheritance, bride wealth payment, and traditional raids or by lending.

More importantly, they used cattle as a social factor to cement their relationship with their deities and for other ritual purposes (Knighton, 2005). Cattle ownership was thus not only symbolic but also ensured their economic survival as well as social cleansing. The management of cattle and livelihood for these two communities was therefore rooted in their culture with its authority of control embedded or rested on elders (Mkutu, 2003; Ocan 1994; Markakis, 1993). Among these pastoral groups, and by virtue of their seniority, elders were respected and considered wise. Their decisions were never challenged because they provided working solutions to the problems faced by the people (Onyango, 2010).

The recent developments of pastoral conflicts that arose from resource sharing between the Pokot and Karamojong have since distorted the hitherto cultural activities and more particularly their elders' balance of power. Based on this, the traditional authority of the elders in decision making concerning raids has been ignored by warriors who no longer take instructions from them. Vries (2007) indicates that, compared to the warrior groups before 1979, the more recent warrior groups are arrogant and stubborn. One elder<sup>45</sup> from Kapenguria in West Pokot described the situation as follows:

“The ‘*Ngopotom*’ (Pokot) and ‘*Ngisigira*’ (Karamojong) warriors who raided before 1969 were organized, listened to elders and appreciated their traditional values but the younger warriors of the later years and now ‘*Ngimunyongkwa*’ (Pokot) and ‘*Rumukorog*’ (Karamojong) are stubborn, arrogant and mannerless. They have grown up with guns, don’t have traditional values and can even shoot their fathers upon any disagreement”(Interview on August 6<sup>th</sup> 2013 Kapenguria).

This quote clearly illustrates how times have changed among the Pokot and Karamojong with respect to the influence of modernity. It reflects the widely held belief that there is declining respect for the elders and for their traditional culture due to small arms and prevalence of light weapons, commercialization of raids and the urgent need to get rich quickly. The study also

observed that the warrior's attachment to guns and gun culture is not new as this has been the case with traditional weapons. However, most of the leaders interviewed during KII and FGDs were in agreement that the misuse of the weapons in youths' possession, the erosion of the elders' authority and the conflict which has become more destructive and violent has led to conflict persistence and increased casualties in Karamoja and West Pokot.

They held the position that their traditional culture was being eroded too fast and were worried that sooner or later, their customary codes of behaviour may be a thing of the past. According to a Pokot elder<sup>49</sup>, the rebellious generations that do not respect elders are referred to as *Kakeriakech* or the group that do not care. He held the opinion that this group from the 1980s is mindless about their elders' blessing whether on matters of marriage, conflict resolutions or raids. In his view, conflicts and violent acts between them and their neighbours have increased because the rebellious groups have become thieves (*chelolos*) who carry out their activities without the consent and blessings of their elders. Vries (2007), indicates that the operation of the *Ngimunyongkwa* and *Chelolos* have broken the hitherto social understanding and harmony between the Pokot and their neighbours leading to cycles of violence and provoking retaliation from the offended communities.

Given that the social structures of both the Pokot and Karamojong have been distorted, their local decision making structures and authority were also altered. The study established that the cross-border pastoral resource conflict persistence has led to the emergence of a very powerful axis of young warriors whose authority is anchored on the power of the gun. This was noted to have come from the 1980s commercialization of raids which engulfed West Pokot and Karamoja thereby altering their traditional order and authority.

Due to runaway insecurity, the economies of the two areas have been rendered weak as compared to those in other parts of Kenya and Uganda. Data from FGD and KII indicate that cattle raids and counter raids by bandits have led to the emergence of a new group of people in West Pokot and Karamoja known as ex-pastoralists. These are pastoralists who, before the raids, owned hundreds of herd of animals but have been left with none after the raids. These new groups of people hitherto belonged to the ranks of the wealthy in their communities but are today ranked below the poverty line having lost all their animals to the raiders. In addition, this has caused a drastic decline in the cattle per capita income in the two areas.

In as much as almost all sectors have suffered the wrath of pastoral conflict in Karamoja and West Pokot, the one sector where immense effect is greatly felt in the two regions is education. According to the records from the Ministry of Education in the two countries, the spectre of conflict in the two regions has compounded educational challenges by scaring away both students and teachers. This is against the backdrop of the fact that this sector bears the reality of many years of marginalization. A teacher<sub>22</sub> at Kapenguria in West Pokot, for example, indicated that hundreds of children cannot go to school because of insecurity. The few who are lucky to go study under deplorable conditions, like under trees, and lack many learning materials.

In Karamoja, a teacher<sub>13</sub> corroborated that the situation is not any different as the learners also study under dehumanizing conditions. All these happen against the cardinal norm of education being the social pillar of every society. Elders<sub>18&24</sub> from the two communities held the position that when children are kept in school, they get to learn the beauty of their dreams, appreciate their capabilities, talents and potentials. This will salvage them from being lured into criminal acts such as banditry. They confirmed that lack of education has diminished the youths prospects for a better future which has made them easy targets for recruitment by the cartels and cattle

barons. For instance, in West Pokot, at least 35 primary schools, and 17 secondary schools that were hitherto active have been closed down while some have been vandalized (County Director of Education Kapenguria 2015).

The study also noted that, boys as young as 12 years are being used as warriors turning them into killers at a tender age. A Kenya police reservist<sup>8</sup>, at Kapenguria confirmed that, together with his colleagues on security patrols, they had been ambushed on several occasions by young bandits aged between 14 and 16 years who appeared well trained. In both Karamoja and West Pokot, the leaders<sup>44&48</sup> interviewed were in agreement that it is not strange to meet boys as young as eight years clutching guns instead of being in school. According to one District Education Officer<sup>60</sup> in Karamoja, many boys drop out of school in standard five after which they marry. Because they have no other source of income to pay the more than 30 cows demanded as bridewealth, they resort to raiding neighbouring communities. This results in the persistence of conflict. Information from an FGD in Kapenguria established that insecurity emanating from the conflict has provided bandits with a good opportunity to engage in illicit arms trade. He explained that it is this kind of opportunity that the Pokot and the Karamojong have constantly used to get arms for themselves.

The general opinion of those interviewed during KII sessions was that most of the acquired arms have been used by members of these communities for protection as well as wreaking havoc on their enemies. A study by Kamenju (2013) confirmed that given their proximity to the politically troubled Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan, Karamoja and West Pokot have been awash with small arms trade, a situation that has contributed to the runaway insecurity in the two regions. Due to this, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have always reacted in similar fashion by blaming local politicians and giving ultimatums on disarmament. These have

always failed to end the conflict or reduce the number of arms in the hands of civilians. In Kenya, for instance, a Cabinet Secretary in charge of Security and Interior Affairs, has always maintained that the communities and their leaders are responsible for their own security and therefore any aspect of insecurity should be blamed on them (*Daily Nation's Editorial Team on 6<sup>th</sup> Saturday May 16,2015*).

The government's assertion that the community and their leaders are responsible for their own security received an emotional reaction from elders in FGD sessions in Kacheliba and Kapenguria where they wondered aloud that, if the residents and their leaders were responsible for their own security, why the government would still want to disarm them. Most of these leaders were of the opinion that the government was to blame for the insecurity in their areas hence the need for them to arm themselves. It is the position this study that, while the raiders should be held responsible for their criminal activities while the ultimate responsibility of providing security lies with the government. An elder<sup>49</sup> in West Pokot, while reacting to the cabinet secretary's order, lamented that:

“I wonder why the government insists on disarmament whenever there is a raid yet this approach has always failed to end the cattle rustling. As a matter of fact, disarmament only served to worsen the situation by fuelling cycles of raids and violence”

It is apparent, therefore, that the government often engages in desperate knee-jerk responses that hardly offer a lasting solution to the problem. According to Eaton (2004), the idea of self-defence is at the heart of the violent cattle raids because the Pokot, like other pastoralists, believe that they cannot rely on formal security and legal recourse. They, therefore, resort to organizing counter-raids to recover their stolen cattle. Besides, it is normally unclear to them where their stolen livestock end up and therefore counter raids have often seen innocent pastoralists suffer

prompting further retaliatory attacks. A study by Greiner (2012) indicated that cattle rustling have been handled differently from other forms of crime, which has worsened the situation by entrenching it as a cultural activity that has become ritualized. He further points out that the role of politics in the raids have been ignored yet pastoral raids are increasingly enmeshed in politicized claims over administrative boundaries, struggles for exclusive access to land and attempts to establish or safeguard an ethnically homogenous electoral base.

This study also observed that the collapse of pastoralist livelihoods has led to large immigration and displacement of communities leading to destitution, idleness, and drugs and substance abuse among the youth in West Pokot and Karamoja. Subsequently, the death of many men after the raids on both sides of the border has changed the hitherto established family roles with women assuming additional responsibilities. As Odhiambo (2012) indicates, the death toll arising from the cross border resource conflict persistence is enormous as statistics keep increasing. For instance, FGD in Abim and Moroto confirmed that in June 1971, the Pokot herdsmen of Kenya massacred over 200 people in Kapchorwa and a counter attack by the Karamojong left the village of Alale ransacked, over 2000 head of animals stolen and 150 people killed (Turton 1994). The attacks and counter attacks did not spare the lean security personnel on either side of the border.

Security report at Kapenguria police station indicates that the raiders frequently attacked police stations and posts on the Kenyan side of the border. In concomitant, a study by Amutabi (2010) confirmed that such attacks were and still are common given the fact that the raiders are always equipped with more sophisticated weapons than those possessed by the government security personnel. Similarly, a trader<sub>5</sub> confirmed that in 1999, a dare devil attack occurred at Sigor where property of unknown value was destroyed and over 200 people were killed. The Kenyan

government blamed the attack on Uganda Defence Force (UDF) but the Ugandan authority laid the blame on the dreaded Matheniko raiders. Reports from Oxfam (2004) also reinforced this position by indicating that in the year 2011, bandits from Karamoja ambushed and abducted 18 Kenya police officers who were manning Kacheliba, Lelan and Sigor stations on many occasions. The police officers were held at Nakapiripirit about 200 kilometers from Kapenguria.

On September 2012, Omonso reported in the *Daily Nation* p59 that 40 people had been killed in a week-long violence between the Karamojong and Pokot. Out of the 40 people killed, only 15 were warriors from Karamojong while the rest were Pokot. The report indicated that the raids started when some bandits from Pokot attacked a village in Karamoja that left three catholic nuns raped and 400 head of animals stolen from the village. This attack drew the attention of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni. He warned the Pokot from what he called "stealing Karamojong cattle" when he attended the inauguration ceremony of Uhuru Kenyatta in January 2013 (East African Standard News Paper p6). Significantly, the cattle raids often leave a trail of destruction in its wake. This is evident in the loss of property, displacement of people and loss of lives. Thus, the raids are no longer carried out under the traditional premise of replenishing pastoral stock or bride wealth payment but are motivated by malicious, selfish, and commercialized interests.

In February 2015, Katerega reported in the *New Vision* p32 in a feature he termed 'Ugandan Kosovo' in which bandits from Chepareria village in West Pokot attacked and killed over 60 people in Katido and made away with over 4000 animals (refer to Appendix III for a detailed account on the frequency or spasmodic cattle raids involving the two communities since 1902). In tandem with the foregoing, studies by Markakis, (1993), Mkutu, (2003), Eaton (2007) and Odhiambo (2010), have indicated that most of such raids were carried out by disgruntled

unemployed youth used by crooked politicians and businessmen. In the two regions, it was noted that there exist victims from the raids who cannot make a living from pastoralism after losing all their animals to the raiders. In terms of characteristics, these are the poorest and are either settled in small rural areas or live in ramshackle houses in urban centers like Kapenguria and Nakapiripirit. This study noted that such people survive on either food aid, wild fruits or by begging for food in villages and in towns or market places. However, a few of them earn a small income from either sale of firewood or charcoal. This still leaves them in an extremely vulnerable situation.

It is important to observe that the charcoal and firewood businesses have had far reaching implications on environmental and ecological surroundings of the already fragile West Pokot and Karamoja regions. Those interviewed across the two areas indicated that the other alternative means of livelihood for such victims is poaching. For instance, in Karamoja, Kidepo Game reserve hosts a number of wildlife such as zebras, ostriches, antelopes and even elephants (Kidepo Game Reserve Report, 2015). Poachers from Karamoja and West Pokot hunt down these animals for their meat, tusks, horns and skins that they sell to business people for export. This study also observed that, in as much as pastoralists make considerable contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDPs) of Kenya and Uganda, those who engage in it are the most impoverished compared to the rest of the citizens in the two countries.

The World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralist (WISP) has categorized the contribution of pastoralists to their economies into either direct or indirect values. Direct values are products such as milk, fibre (wool) and meat while indirect values are the benefits of agricultural inputs from animal manure and products from pastoral range land such as honey, services from biodiversity conservation and wildlife tourism (WLSP, 2007 and Oxfam, 2008).

In Kenya, for instance, pastoralists in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALS) supplies the majority of the meat consumed in the country accounting for 8% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (Kenya Annual Budget report 2012). The same report indicates that the livestock sector accounts for 90% of employment and 95% of household income in Kenya's ASALS. In addition, pastoralists are custodians of the dry environments and wild areas that contribute to a tourist trade worth more than Ksh 50 billion every year (Ministry of Tourism Department 2015).

In Uganda, pastoralists form 55% of the national meat, milk, hides and skins that are exported to Europe and Asia earning the country 10 million US dollar annually (Muhereza, 2003). Overall, the pastoralists contribute 7.5% of Uganda's Gross Domestic Product (Uganda Annual Budget Report, 2015). In spite of all these contributions to the economies of Kenya and Uganda, many pastoralists are among the poorest and most vulnerable in the two countries (Oxfam report 2010). This has arisen from the fact that the direct economic value generated by pastoralists is not retained in their communities and the indirect value is unrewarded and unacknowledged by the decision of policy makers in Kenya and Uganda (Oxfam 2014). In Kenya, for instance, pastoralists' areas have the highest indicators of poverty and least access to basic services in the country.

The worst of it is the fact that a huge proportion of their populations fall below the national poverty line of 53%. For example, Pokot poverty levels stood at 91%, Turkana 95% Samburu 82% and Maasai 73% (Oxfam 2005). The situation was the same in Uganda where pastoral areas mainly in the North were the poorest in the country. The poverty levels among the Karamojong stood at 87% compared to 58% national poverty level (Uganda Bureau of statistic 2005). Due to the runaway insecurity, which has been attributed to the cross-border pastoral conflict persistence, the Pokot and Karamojong have less access to proper education and health care

services than any other region in the two countries. In the absence of strong and respected traditional institutions and the existence of external influence like use of small arms, extreme climatic conditions and unfavourable government policies, pastoral conflicts between the Pokot and Karamojong has persisted since the colonial period. In a nutshell, the Pokot and Karamojong conflict has distorted the socio-economic and political fabrics of West Pokot and Karamoja. It has done this by tearing apart these peoples' patterns of production, formal trading net works, and forms of employment, political order, service delivery and education. This study has observed that despite the negative attributes that have engulfed the two areas, some people, albeit in contrast, heavily benefited from it with the majority being impoverished by this menace.

The beneficiaries are the elder's warriors or youth who are in close association with the cattle barons that facilitate their activities leading to this conflict persistence. The impact has always been such that after the raids people not only lose their lives, have their property destroyed animals looted but have also had their social order disrupted. For instance, it was observed during the interviews and focus group discussion that in both West Pokot and Karamojong, communication was largely done on a face to face level so that an increase in armed violence has prevented people particularly elders from making their most essential contacts of doing dialogue.

The general opinion was that people, especially the Upe and West Picot, have abandoned visiting their relatives who live far away for fear of being robbed, taken hostage or being killed by the enemy community should they unluckily come into contact with them. As noted earlier in the study, inter-group meetings was instrumental in these people's dispute resolution, sustenance of resource sharing agreements and access rights to pasture. Many elders confirmed in the FGDs that they fear travelling to meetings meant to resolve resource disputes owing to the state of insecurity in West Pokot and Karamoja which emanates from persistent raids or rustling. This

has greatly impaired not only their social networks but has, in turn, had a negative impact on their traditional order and survival strategies. The impact on their traditional political order is such that the local decision making, which was in the hands of the elders in the past, has been usurped by the youth or warriors who have enriched themselves from the commercialized raids. It was confirmed during FGD and KII that the warriors today rely on the power of the gun and no longer take orders or advice from their elders as was before. Consequently, the social-political order which formed the two communities' home-growth framework of crisis response used during periods of adversities has all crumbled due to this persistence of conflict since the colonial period.

#### **4.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an analysis of the causes and impact of the Pokot and Karamajong conflict persistence. It has exhibited that natural resources of water, pasture and cattle have been at the centre stage of this conflict. This chapter has pointed out that this conflict has been made possible, in part, through the proliferation of small arms, poor and uncoordinated disarmament programmes, commercialization of raids as well as through resource scarcity and climate variability. More important it has articulated the marginalization of the two communities by the colonial and post independence regimes in Kenya and Uganda. Together with this is the role of cattle barons or warlords whose involvements are key in the conflict. It is also evident from the chapter that the adverse environment (ecology) and lack of alternative sources of livelihoods have synergized the raiding and counter raiding in the two communities. It has been noted that physical environment, weather constraints and explicable epidemics have been contributive factors to the phenomena.

On the impact of the conflict, it has indicated its key aftermath as human death, loss and destruction of property, insecurity and under development in the two regions. It also noted that despite contributing 7.5% and 8% of Uganda and Kenya's GDP, the pastrolists are the poorest in the two countries. It has further noted that so long as these two communities continue to live a life style dictated by their harsh environment and influence not just by cultural beliefs, but by poverty, illiteracy, suspicions and rivalry, and insecurity their development will still drag. The next chapter discusses the efforts of conflict mitigation or prevention since 1962.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **MITIGATION, PREVENTION AND ALLEVIATION OF THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG CONFLICT PERSISTENCE SINCE 1962**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Right from independence in Kenya and Uganda, there have been a number of attempts to prevent, mitigate, or resolve pastoral conflicts along their border. In particular, the efforts have targeted the Pokot and their pastoral counterparts, the Karamojong. Broadly, these efforts can be classified in terms of the roles played by international humanitarian agencies, regional intervention groups and the local community based initiatives with the approval and support of the Kenya and Uganda governments. This chapter begins by looking at the role of the governments and international agencies in this impasse.

#### **5.2 Role of the Governments, Various International and Humanitarian Agencies**

Right from the time of independence (1962 in the case of Uganda and 1963 for Kenya), the two governments have partnered with many humanitarian agencies to ensure peace and sustainable development in West Pokot and Karamoja. For instance, in Uganda, the Obote 1 government launched Karamoja Initiative for Development in 1966 and Mission for Peace in Karamoja in 1969 while Iddi Amin Dada came up with the Karamoja Disarmament Programme in 1972 (National Archives Entebbe, 1980). In 2008, the Uganda government launched the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) and Karamoja Peace Development Plan (KPDP) funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which aimed at promoting peace and development in Karamoja and the neighbouring areas. In West Pokot, the Kenya government, through UNDP, initiated the Pokot Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PPRDP) (UN Report, 2005). Similarly, the European Union, through Non –

Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Instrument for Peace and Stability in West Pokot and Quick Action Fund for Peace in Karamoja, facilitated peace initiatives among the residents in the two regions. Other international and NGOs in the Karamoja region included the Danish Church Aid Consortium, Oxfam GB, Media and International Peace Reserve Group, Uganda Red Cross Society, Action against War (AAW), World Vision Uganda and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Uganda Government Report on Peace and Conflict 2010). In West Pokot, they included Kenya Red Cross Society, Action Aid, World Vision Kenya, Care Kenya, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Pokot Zonal Peace Development Agency (PZPDA) and Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) (West Pokot Development Plan, 2009).

This study observed that all the bodies listed above had the objective of facilitating for peace and sustainable development in West Pokot and Karamoja. One NGO official<sup>27</sup> at Chepareria corroborated that these International agencies purposely focused on strengthening the role of the government and the traditional leadership in the two communities in peace building and maintaining livelihoods. For instance, the UNDP sponsored programmes mainly cover the strengthening of traditional meditational reconciliation, conflict resolution mechanisms, peace building, dialogue and promoting long term reconciliation between the Pokot and Karamojong (Mkutu, 2008).

From the foregoing, this study notated that conflict in West Pokot and Karamoja has not gone unchecked as many people may imagine. This was confirmed by an NGO official<sup>28</sup> at Kotido that there are numerous peace initiatives that have been put in place to prevent, manage, resolve or alleviate the conflicts. Leaders who were interviewed were, however, of the opinion that, despite these efforts, a state of belligerence still exists between the two communities. This study

established that this kind of situation has been brought about by mistrust and non – commitment by the peace negotiators from either group. Except for Karamoja where there has been a reduction in their intra- pastoral conflicts, their counterparts in Kenya have recorded a threatening rise in such cases. A study by Huho (2012) confirmed that conflict related to competition over natural resources like water and pasture between the Pokot and Karamojong still persists.

Subsequently, the gravity of this conflict has prompted joint consultative and peace meetings known as the Moroto cross-border peace initiative held in Moroto, Uganda in 2001 and then in Kapenguria, Kenya 2002 (*New Vision* Editorial team May 4<sup>th</sup> 2004). The two peace initiative meetings mainly used the grass root peace building strategy to meet their objectives. In this case, council of elders from both communities made treaties on peace keeping. Focus Group Discussions across the two regions noted that this involved the slaughtering of a white he-goat whose blood was used to cleanse the bad omen that causes conflict between two communities. The elders then shared a meal as a sign of peaceful co-existence. However, the weakness of the two Moroto meetings lay in the fact that they largely dealt with the situation at hand and thus served a specific warring moment, which was not long lasting.

This study also observed that even after the brokering of peace through the councils of elders, sometimes conflict flared depending on the intensity of the environmental situation that existed.

For instance, an interview by an elder<sup>34</sup> confirmed that if livestock loss continued unabated due to climate vagaries, rustling persisted despite a peace meeting deliberation or the pronouncement of ceasefire by elders. More importantly, the impact of climate change was viewed from an individual rather than a society perspective hence the persistence of the conflict. Yet another grass root peace building initiative for both the Pokot and Karamojong has been the annual Tegla

Lorupe Peace Race Foundation, which was founded in 2003 by the renowned Kenyan world Marathon runner Tegla Lorupe from West Pokot. The main theme of the initiative has been the engagement of the Pokot, Karamojong and other warring pastoral communities from Uganda in sporting activities. This is seen as a way of educating the people on the importance of peaceful co-existence. During such times, the rival communities, through the help of the Tegla Lorupe Foundation, organize annual cultural fashion shows and peace races, which brings together the Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana, Sabaot, Sabiny and Samburu (Huho, 2012). The foundation holds peace races annually in Kapenguria, West Pokot and in Moroto, Uganda.

Some of its recent major meetings include the Kapenguria Peace Race (14<sup>th</sup> Nov. 2009), the Great Turkwell Peace Race and Beauty Show (25<sup>th</sup> September 2010), the Moroto Peace Race in Uganda (27<sup>th</sup> – 28<sup>th</sup> may, 2011) and the 2015 Kapenguria Peace Race and Beauty Show which was presided over by Uganda's First Lady Janet Museveni (*New Vision Editorial Team August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2015*). In all these events, participation is open to all members of the rival pastoral communities. Other than the winners, all participants are awarded prizes.

Similarly, studies by Kona 2001; Adan 2005 and Lind 2006 have identified Pokot Education and Development Program (PEDP) and Karamajong Peace Development Plan (KPDP) as the other community development initiatives that largely handle conflict resolutions between the Pokot and Karamojong. For example, in 2003 the two groups (PEDP and KPDP) organized a peace dialogue between the two communities in Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Kaabong in Karamoja as well as Alale, Chepareria and Lelan in West Pokot. One NGO official<sup>25</sup> in Lelan confirmed that the other local groups that have championed peaceful coexistence between the two communities with little success are the Daima Initiative for Peace and Development (DIPAP) in West Pokot and Karamoja Women Peace Crusade KWPC in Karamoja.

In addition, there have been activities by POKATUSA (Pokot Karamojong Turkana and Sebei) organization established in 1997 coordinated by World Vision and funded by Department International Development (DFID) (Mkutu, 2003). POKATUSA has two structures that deal with peace and security issues that include the District Peace and Reconciliation Committee (DPRC) and the Location Peace and Reconciliation Committee (LPRC). It consisted of Members of Parliament (MPs) District Commissioners (DCs) teachers, warriors, women, and church leaders. LPRC comprised the rest with the exception of MPs and DCs. They also had a Joint Venture Committee (JVC) that included the representatives from the two national governments. The role of the latter group was to influence pastoral policies at their national levels. They were also mandated to supervise all POKATUSA projects on the ground (Mkutu 2008). Despite all these, POKATUSA was ineffective and it registered minimal success in so far as the Pokot and the Karamojong conflicts and sustainable development were concerned.

An elders<sup>49</sup>, indicated that the main reason for its failure was the frequent disagreements between the MPs and the government officials on the peace agenda and development projects to be undertaken by the body. Coupled with the fact that there was mismanagement of funds, DFID pulled out from sponsoring POKATUSA. This step rendered all activities of the body moribund. Just before the establishment of POKATUSA, a government official<sup>58</sup> in Abim confirmed that there existed the Karamoja Project Initiative Unit (KPIU) founded in 1995 and the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP) formed in August 1998.

The aim of these organizations was to promote peace by reviving the cross-border authority of elders. According to another government official<sup>47</sup> in Sigor, the organizations managed to arrange for cross-border council of elders' meetings. The first one was held in May 2002 at Achosichor in Nakapiripirit attended by the Pokot, Matheniko, Pian and Tepeth. The second

meeting was held in West Pokot in August 2004 and was attended by Pokot, Pian, and Dodoth. The third (October 2008) and fourth meetings were held in Moroto attended by the two conflicting communities' leaders including their members of parliament. The fourth meeting held in March 2010 was presided over by Hon. Peter Lokoris Minister for Karamoja (*New Vision Editorial team* March 6<sup>th</sup> 2015). Despite the fact that efforts were made for cross-border peace meetings, they both remained personal relations exercises by the organizers and elders. This was on account of the fact that none of them involved the key stakeholders who were the warriors or the youth. It also emerged through KII that this conflict persisted because, as the elders met and discussed peace matters, the youth either stayed back in the *Manyatta* or were in the bush planning further raids and counter-raids.

In tandem with these observations from interviews, a study by Nyaba and Omurungi (2010) confirmed that efforts have also been made to initiate peace matters at the regional level. They include peace initiatives by, the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC) who have come up with various peace crusade groups. For instance, the AU has supported women's peace crusade in cross-border areas of Kenya and Uganda using a number of peace choirs to raise awareness on security issues.

On their part, IGAD and EAC have developed a Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) as part of their conflict management and resolution mandate. Unfortunately, (CEWARN) does not address what Mkutu (2003) calls *Alomer* Security Council. This is a Kraal council that monitors the movement of warriors, identifies criminals, disarms them and uses the traditional method *Ameto* to punish them. Consequently, the failure to incorporate functional and respected traditional structures like *Alomer* have weakened the operations of CEWARN and

rendered the objectives of IGAD and EAC obsolete in so far as the management and resolution of the conflict between Pokot and Karamojong is concerned. Within the East African Community, there exists Eastern African Police Chiefs' Co-operation Organization (EAPCCO) initiative (Niamir, 1999). Its main-objective is to prevent, combat, and eradicate cattle rustling in Eastern Africa. It also uses anti-cattle rustling messages to promote peace and human security in the region. Their activities include combined border operations, public education and awareness programmes. These encourage respect for each other's livelihoods and lives. The member states have recognized that cattle rustling cannot be addressed from law enforcement only and that an all-inclusive approach involving a range of stakeholders such as civic, community and traditional leaders, need to be adopted.

It can be confirmed therefore that, the post-independence period saw a further weakening of traditional governance institutions in pastoral areas on either side of the Kenya-Uganda border. This was due to the fact that the post independent regimes in Kenya and Uganda deliberately refused to recognize the role of traditional institutions in management at the local level. In the process, these regimes perfected the colonial legacies. A church leader<sup>11</sup> in Alale was pessimistic about the role of the government chiefs and other administrators. Most of them held the opinion that most government administrators, particularly the chiefs, colluded with members of their communities to conceal cattle raiders or rustlers. In addition, they helped them use unorthodox means to avoid prosecution upon being identified. Since the chiefs were believed to be accomplices, it was assumed that they shared the spoils.

According to the respondents during KII, the omission of traditional elders from the political structures of the colonial and post-colonial governments was the main reason behind insecurity

in West Pokot and Karamoja. This formed the basis on which these people have ignored the formal, administrative and legal systems to continue to operate on their traditional structure.

One Karamojong kraal guard<sup>63</sup> in Abim reinforced this by saying:

“The Karamojong will never, ever accept ‘foreign power’ because they are not part of our traditional judicial system. If anything, they have no power from our god. We have told our children to ignore them since they are not part of our system”(February 27<sup>th</sup> 2014, Karamoja).

The reservation, with which the Karamojong treat their government’s legal structure, is a clear reflection on how recalcitrant the pastoral communities are to their current political order. The Pokot also have the same mentality and have remained deviant to both the colonial and post-colonial governments’ legal framework in Kenya. Consequently, the erosion of these pastoral institutions and the failure to incorporate them in the new legal structures has created a non-bridgeable security gap and lapse between these governments and the pastoralists. This has resulted in other members of the community taking the law into their own hands. In West Pokot for instance, a respondent<sup>26</sup> in Alale confirmed that:

“Today, the ability of our community elders to exercise their control over us is far from being imagined. Leadership, power and wealth can now be got not through the beaucratic process of social order and blessings but by one’s ability upon deciding to do so”(March 9<sup>th</sup> 2012, Alale).

The erosion of traditional governance institutions has further altered the relationship and operations of the elders and warriors in West Pokot and Karamoja areas. This alteration is such that elders have to negotiate with the youth, which was initially an abomination. This situation has further been compounded by what appears to be the near absence of state authorities along the Kenya-Uganda border. Mkutu (2003) confirmed this when he observed that, police on both sides are poorly paid and are unable to effectively man the border. Their coordination is equally poor unless a raid takes place. It is this situation of erosion of traditional authorities and the

notable absence of the government in these areas that have acted as an impetus to the persistent cattle raids and counter raids between the Pokot and Karamojong.

### **5.3 Proposed Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Resolution Mechanisms**

In as much as most studies McCabe (1990), Galaty (1994) Ocan (1994), Lamphear (1976) and Mkutu (2001; 2003 & 2008) concur with the view that the incorporation of pastoral groups into the wider global economy has weakened the elders' authority to the extent that they can no longer cope with the contemporary forms of conflict, this study presents a contrary position. The position of this study is that customary institutions are still key in the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of pastoral conflicts. This is possible with a few adjustments in the composition of the Elders' Peace building Committees with all the members being genuinely committed and playing their roles diligently.

This can be achieved if the Elders' Peace Committees (EPCs) is inclusive so that no stakeholder is sidelined during the peace process. This emanates from the fact that previous joint peace initiatives have tended to exclude some of the major players in the conflict. Besides, these peace building groups have concentrated on the current conflict situations without paying due attention to the root causes of the problem. In other words, they have been more reactive than proactive and this has led to short term peace existence between the two communities. Ruto (2010) states that lasting peace among warring communities can only be achieved by addressing the root cause of the problem and only if the peace building team is sincere and all inclusive.

Similarly, the Pokot and Karamojong cross-border conflict can be mitigated or prevented through the Kraal or temporary camp level. Studies by Gulliver (1955); Dyson – Hudson (1958, 1966); McCabe (1990); and Knighton (2005) reveal how either the Pokot or Karamojong

organize their livestock grazing areas. Interviewed leader<sup>51&63</sup> indicated that frequent kraal movements ensure the improvement and increased quality of pasture was often divided into home area, a grazing area, and a grazing reserve. Team mobility ensures that the kraal members and their livestock were kept under surveillance. This study established that, due to the current global trends and the commercialization of raids, most warriors are not keen on keeping security vigils at the kraals. The kraals have thus become exposed to insecurity threats especially those posed by external raiders. Besides, these rustlers not only outnumber the security at the Kraals but also possess weapons that are more sophisticated.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has accounted for the opinions that have been actualized to mitigate, prevent or alleviate the Pokot and Karamojong conflict persistence since 1962. It has accounted for the role of the two Governments, International Organizations and Humanization Agencies to ensure peaceful co-existence between the two communities albeit to no avail. The chapter ends by giving a myriad or raft of suggestions to this manace.

## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 Introduction

This study set out to conceptualize cross border resource conflict persistence between the Pokot and Karamojong. We sought to investigate for instance, the reasons behind the persistence of the conflict despite the existence of conflict resolution mechanisms and to assess how the colonial and post colonial activities influenced or aggravated the problem. This chapter summarizes the major findings of the study and makes some recommendations regarding ways and means of mitigating, preventing or alleviating the conflict.

#### 6.2 Summary

The findings of the study were summarized as follows;

The finding of this study was that this conflict is spasmodic, covert and reprisal which arose from the two communities' declining gerontological authority, strict adherence to their traditional or cultural demand for cattle to either fulfill their ritual rite of *asaapan* or to pay their bride wealth as well as improve their social status in their communities. That the conflict which was initially redistributive became predatory. That the conflict was both latent and protracted.

The other finding was that the British colonial activity of boundary creation had far reaching affect on the Pokot and Karamojong. That during its creation process, the leadership of the two communities were never involved hence the discrete manner in which they constantly abused it. More importantly, it was this study finding that the created boundary placed the hither to communally used natural resources of water and the people's perceived pasture on either side which led to their frequent and persistent conflict whenever a group crossed over to access them. That the boundary was not only undemarcated but also porous and poorly patrolled. This study's

finding on the causes and impact was that there existed an array of factors both intrinsic and extrinsic. It was its finding that the nexus of the intrinsic factors were in the quadrahelix of (i) Harsh ecological or environmental conditions of West Pokot and Karamoja. (ii). Marginalization of the two communities by both the colonial and independence governments (iii) High demand for cattle to fulfill traditional and cultural norms and (iv) the role of politicians more particularly their reckless and incendiary ethnic bating rhetoric's. On the other hand, this study's findings on the extrinsic factors were the cross cutting issues of the proliferation of small and light arms in both areas, the emergence of cattle barons and the availability of ready external markets all leading to the commercialization and predatory nature of the raids. On its impact, this study's finding was that it had far reaching effects on the health, education and infrastructural developments in the two areas.

Similarly, it led to the displacement of people, loss of property, deaths as well as the emergence of a new group of people known as ex-pastoralists. The study's findings on conflict mitigation, prevention and management was that as colonialism progressed and even during post independence time, the two communities still used their traditional court system or council of elders to try and resolve their conflicts. For instance it was this study's finding that they initiated their peace meetings through the use of peace messengers. However with time, the leadership of the two communities had declined a position that was usurped by a vast majority of their youth who neither recognized traditional or formal authority a situation that sunk the two communities into persistent conflict which rendered their previously used methods of conflict mitigation and management null and void.

### **6.3 Conclusions**

The study concluded that:

This study concludes that the Pokot and Karamojong conflict persistent has gone unabated due to factors such as decline in the two communities council of elders, high demand for cattle to fulfill cultural and traditional norms need to replenish or respond to catastrophic effects, continues use of the peoples perceived traditional pasture land, marginalization of the people and the predatory nature of the raids.

That the creation of the boundary without involving the leadership of the two communities has led to the discrete manner in which it is circumvented the people still operate on their local boundary frontier of separation and frontier of contacts.

This study concludes that both the intrinsic and extrinsic factors remain the determinants of this conflict. That the effects of the conflict in the context of insecurity, underdevelopments in the two areas, high poverty levels, loss of lives and destruction of property have a direct link to the activities of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors of the conflict.

If has also concluded that the ineffectiveness of managing this conflict lies in the fact that the colonial and post colonial governments disregard for the two communities' traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution which remains a stumbling block in achieving peace and harmony for the two communities. It concludes that an all-inclusive approach that involves all stakeholders be put to use for the conflict mitigation and management.

## **6.4 Recommendations**

This study has four recommendations as follows:

1. It was observed that traditional cattle raiding were not only significant to the Pokot and Karamojong's socialization process legitimized by their elders, but it was also a full time commitment for the youth and warriors. However, with the decrease of the cattle due to its high demand to fulfill cultural conditions, the declining power of their elders and the joblessness situation which has rendered most youths to raiders for hire. It is this study's recommendation that funds be set aside by the Kenya and Uganda governments for the youth to commit them to more-economically productive ventures like doing business. This will go a long way in delinking them from the raiders for hire situation where they are used as conduits for not only creating fear and despondency, pandemonium and mayhem but also rendering the raided areas in situations of haplessness and miseries. It also recommends that cattle insurance policy be introduced to cushion those who lose their animals to the raiders.

2. To curb the discrete manner in which the boundary is always circumvented or abused through cattle trafficking, this study recommends that Kenya and Uganda governments should consider introducing an electronic method of identifying cattle by use of micro computer chips with electronic code for each cattle to trace their movements. It further recommends the enforcement of certificate of transhumance to ensure that only legally acquired cattle cross the boundary. It is also this study's recommendation that the two governments should buy Boeing Scan Eagle Quadra copter for their boundary surveillance and monitoring.

3. On its causes and impact, this study recommends that alternative means of getting livelihood be put in place for the two communities. That the two communities, be encouraged to change

their mode of production from pastoralism to irrigation agriculture for example, there exist good areas in the two regions that can support Merica 4 and 10 rice irrigation. They include Kongelai, Sigor and Lomot in West Pokot and Namalu, Iri and Karita in karamoja. It is also this study's recommendation that water bore holes be sank across the two regions to help the pastoralist during dry seasons. It also recommends that the two governments should improve on the infrastructure of the two areas so as to open them to foreign investors. Top in their list should be runaway security as well as health and education sectors which are in deplorable states. They should heavily prosecute the cattle barons.

4. On mitigation and prevention mechanisms, this study recommends that all stakeholders be included in peace meetings. This should include women and the warriors. It also recommends the use of hybrid court system where the formal and traditional courts are fused. This will build the people's confidence and attitude towards formal court system. It will also see them use a bottom-up rather than their defunct top-bottom approach. The the two governments should be more proactive than reactive to this conflict so that they are not seen as merely fire fighting or just treating the symptoms of the problem but handling the actual problem.

### **6.5 Suggestions for Further Research**

In the past, the process that triggered conflict between neighbouring communities was that which pertained to their cultural demands like cattle raiding for customary payment of bride wealth or attainment of social status as internal mechanisms to redistribute wealth in times of crisis. However, external influences emanating from global trends such as commercialization of raids, emergence of cattle barons and use of sophisticated weapons have compounded the conflict by creating its predatory phase. This conflict is believed to be affected by a disorder which centers on the inability of the traditional elders from the two communities to manage. Although these

changes have been attributed to the existence of a rebellious youth, this study recommends that further research be carried out on:

1. The impact of gerontological authority in pastoral conflicts.
2. Border security and its relations between the people of Kenya and Uganda.
3. Food security and coping mechanism for the pastoral groups.
4. The role of other stakeholders ( women and warriors) in pastoral conflict management

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## APPENDICES

### INTERVIEW GUIDE

Hello, my name is Jacob Adipo Ogallo. I am a doctoral student at Maseno University in the department of History and Archaeology. I am conducting a field research on the topic Pastoralists in cross border resource conflict between Pokot of Kenya and Karamojong of Uganda since 1902. I was glad if you could spare your time to respond to the questions listed below.

#### SECTION A and B: Background Information

1. Respondents name or

No.: \_\_\_\_\_

2. County/District:

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Division/Sub-

County: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Gender:

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Position held in the community/job:

\_\_\_\_\_

6. Ethnic group:

\_\_\_\_\_

7. Where did the Pokot or Karamojong come from?

8. Why did they leave the place they were occupying before coming to their present land?

9. Around what point in time did they leave their place of origin.

10. Did they leave as a group, clan or sub- group?
11. Around what period did they settle as their present place?
12. Did they emerge as a distinct group or they emerge as a homogeneous group in their present area of settlement?
13. What were the major pre- colonial political institutions of either the Pokot or Karamojong?
14. In what ways did colonialism affect these institutions?
15. For how long have you lived in your current resident?
16. Are you aware the Pokot and Karamojong neighbour each other on the Kenya-Uganda border?
17. How did the two communities relate before the coming of the British?
18. Did they have anything in common whether social, political or economic? Explain your response in each category
19. If your response to the above question is yes, how did the similarity come about or who borrowed what and from whom?
20. How were the commonalities carried out?
21. Were there any aspects of conflicts or raids then? What caused it?
22. When did you first come into contact with the British?
23. Could you know why the British came to your area?
24. Did you welcome them when they came?
25. How did they perceive or treat you?
26. How did you react when you realized they were out to rule you?
27. What new things did they introduce in their new system of rule?
28. Did you like them?

29. Did their activities encourage your co-existence? Explain your response
30. Did they find any aspect of conflict or raid between you and your neighbour (Pokot or Karamojong) if yes, which ones and what caused it at this time?
31. Were such raids organized? If yes, by who and for what purpose?
32. Who were the main actors and what weapons did they use?
33. How did one acquire cattle in your community?
34. How do you rate cattle and other animals and why?
35. When exactly do you trace the beginning of the conflict or cattle raids between the two of you (Pokot and Karamojong)?
36. Who started it and how did it happen?
37. How frequent were these raids during this time (colonization) and why?
38. What did the raiders target at this time? And why?
39. Where there specific time for the raids and why? Explain your response
40. Were there casualties after the raids during colonialism? If yes how were they handled?
41. How was the cattle raid dispute solved during the colonial time? How effective was this process?
42. What role did either girls or women play in the cattle raids? If so explain.
43. Why do people still involve themselves in cattle raids?
44. What benefits did they get from the raids?
45. Do the raids change people's status or standing in your community and how?
46. Are there people (youth) in your community who do not participate in the raids and they are successful? What do they do for a living?
47. How do you rate them and yourself?

48. Other than cattle which animals do you also keep?
49. What do you use cattle for? Explain or elaborate
50. Other than the economic gain, what other things or value do you get from cattle?
51. What cultural activity did the Pokot or Karamojong adopt from each other?
52. What was Lokotyo, how was it made and what was it used for?
53. What was the link between Lokotyo and cattle?
54. Did it use have a ceremony and how was it done?
55. Were there conditions that accompanied its use?
56. What constituted the political institutions of the Pokot and Karamojong?
57. How was it organized?
58. How did they call their court system and how did it operate?
59. In case any misunderstanding occurred from cattle raids how was it handled?
60. How did they compose their court office? And how different were their office bearers from the other leaders?
61. What was the general perception of the people about these courts?
62. What conditions did either a Pokot or Karamojong fulfill to be an elder?
63. Did you people have rite of passage and how was it carried out?
64. If yes, what role did the initiates play before the ceremony?
65. Who graced the occasion and how?
66. Other than ceremonies what other thing did you use cattle for?
67. Was there a significance between the number of cattle one possessed and his social status and why?

68. Were there particular cattle of preference? How did they call it and even treat it alongside other cattle?
69. How were the problems arising from cattle raids handled during the colonial period?
70. What changes were brought by the British in the context of conflict management and how helpful was it to your people?
71. Are you aware of the boundary that they created between the two of you? Did you have boundaries before the arrival of the British? How did they operate?
72. What has been your perception of this boundary? Were you consulted during the boundary creation by the British?
73. Has it been of help to your people? Elaborate
74. If it has not benefited you how did its charge affect you?
75. With the existence of the boundary do you people still carry out cattle raids between the two communities? If yes how and why?
76. When exactly do you trace your conflict with your neighbor the Pokot or Karamojong in the colonial period?
77. How did it happen?
78. Is there a way in which the created boundary lead to or enhance conflict between the two of you and how?
79. Did this boundary creation affect the use as pasture and water by your people? If yes, how?
80. Which water points and pasture areas were affected by this boundary creation and do you people still use them? If no why?
81. Did the British recognize your traditional leadership?
82. Were the native chiefs respected by your people and why?

83. What duties did they do?
84. Did the colonial government develop your area? Elaborate
85. Which instruction were created o established in your area by 1950?
86. Interm of development, how do you compare your area and other parts of your country?
87. Has the government ever carried out disownment programme in your area? When and how was it done?
88. How successful or disappointing was it? Elaborate
89. Who were responsibility for implementing this programme and how was it done?
90. What conditions improvise was given for this programme by the government? Were the people consulted before the programme implementation?
91. How did your people perceive the programme and government promises?
92. Were there people who volunteered to surrender their arms?
93. How were they treated by their colleagues?
94. Could one identity them and how?
95. Do you think your government is doing enough while handling security in your area? Explain
96. Are the cattle raids still there why and how is it carried out today?
97. Why should you arm yourself yet security is the responsibility of your government?  
Elaborate your response
98. How has the government officials reacted to the security situation in your area?
99. Do you think they are doing enough for you in this regard? If no why and how?

## **FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE**

1. Based on your knowledge or experience, how did your people come to settle in their present place?
2. Based on your knowledge or experience, how did you organize yourself socially, politically and economically before the coming of the British?
3. Based on your knowledge or experience, how did the Pokot and Karamojong relate during the:
  - Pre-colonial period.
  - Colonial period.
  - Post-colonial period.
4. Based on your knowledge or experience, how did the creation of the boundary influence the conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong in reference to:
  - Natural resource sharing.
  - Cattle and Human movement across it.
  - Cattle raids.
  - Activities of government officers.
5. Based on your knowledge or experience, how did the following cause conflict between the Pokot and Karamojong:
  - High demand for cattle to fulfill cultural obligations.
  - Weak traditional institutions.
  - Marginalization.
  - Proliferation of small arms.

- Commercialization of raids.
  - Failure of disarmament programs.
6. Based on your knowledge or experience, what has been the impact of the conflict on the two communities in reference to:
- Infrastructural development.
  - Health and educational sectors.
  - Security.
  - Property and lives.
  - Economic growth and peoples' livelihood.
7. Based on your knowledge or experience, how can the following be used as strategies to manage or alleviate this conflict:
- Reinforcement of traditional institutions.
  - Involvement of warrior/ youth and women in the peace initiatives.
  - Strict security policies along the borders.
  - Input of international agencies and NGOs.
  - Encouragement of local peace initiatives in the two areas.
8. Based on your knowledge and experience, how did the following facilitate cattle acquisition;
- Accumulation or prestige
  - Marriage/dowry payment.
  - Lending
  - Trading

9. Based on your knowledge and experience, how did the Pokot or Karamojong use them in reference to;

- Ceremonies
- Food
- Trade

10. Explain in details which ceremony required the use of cattle and how was it undertake

11. Based on your knowledge and experience how did either the Pokot or Karamojong treat and use the following cattle.

- Steer cattle
- Normal cattle

12. Based on your knowledge and experience how did either the Pokot or Karamojong adopt the following from each other;

- Asaapan
- Siolip
- Atoro
- Amumu and Adongo
- Akirding
- Lokoty
- Lipia
- Talap
- Mis

13. Based on your knowledge and experience how did either the Pokot or Karamojong organize the following offices;

- Council of elders
- Court system

14. Based on your knowledge and experience how did either the Pokot or Karamojong solve the following conflict;

- Land
- Pasture
- Water
- Marriage
- Cattle raid

15. Based on your knowledge and experience how did either the Pokot or Karamojong perceive the role British in terms of;

- Colonization
- Creation of new political order
- Conflict resolution
- Boundary establishment
- Creation of new legal system
- Arms control and use

16. How did the above issues impact on your people?

17. Based on your knowledge and experience how did the colonial and Post independence governments in Kenya and Uganda handle the following in West Pokot and Karamoja?

- Inter-tribal conflict
- Disarmament programme
- Infrastructural development or improvements

- Security
- Conflict resolution or prevention

18. Suggest some of the ways through which the above can be handled to ensure peaceful co-experience between Pokot and Karamojong.

## **IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE**

1. Explain where Pokot or Karamojong came from
2. Explain why they left the place they were occupying before coming to their present land
3. At Around what point in time do you think they left their place of origin?
4. Explain if they left as a group, clan or sub- group
5. Explain the cultural activity the Pokot or Karamojong adopted from each other.
6. Are you aware Lokotyo? Kindly explain how it was made and was it was used for.
7. Explain the link between Lokotyo and cattle.
8. Kindly elaborate how the ceremony was done.
9. Elaborate how the Pokot and Karamojong organized their social, political and economic institution
10. Explain how your people perceived their political offices and the office holders.
11. Kindly explain how their traditional Court systems worked.
12. Expand on how misunderstandings from cattle raids were handled by your community.
13. Explain how the rite of passage was carried out in your community.
14. Other than ceremonies explain the other things that cattle were used for?
15. Explain if there was any significance between the number of cattle one possessed and his social status in your community.
16. Were there particular cattle of preference in your community? Explain how they were called and even traded the other cattle?
17. Explain how your people reacted to the British intrusion in your area?
18. Expand on some of the changes they brought in your area?
19. Kindly explain the kinds of boundaries you operated on before the coming of the British.
20. Are you aware of the boundary that was created by the British which separates the Pokot and Karamojong; if yes then explain your perception of the new boundary.

21. Elaborate the contribution of this boundary to your people
22. Kindly explain the role of this boundary to the cattle raids between your communities
23. When exactly do you trace your conflict with your neighbor the Pokot or Karamojong in the colonial period? Explain how it happened
24. Is there a way in which the created boundary led to or enhanced conflict between the two of you? Explain how?
25. Kindly identify which water points and pasture areas were affected by this boundary creation and explain if your people still use them? If no elaborate.
26. Explain the kind of political order which the British created in your area?
27. Explain your people's perception of the native chiefs and their roles.
28. Did the colonial government develop your area? Elaborate
29. Explain the kind of infrastructure that was created or established in your area by 1950?
30. Interm of development, how do you compare your area and other parts of your country? Elaborate on your response.
31. Kindly explain the role of the government in the disarmament programme in our area.
32. How successful or disappointing was it? Elaborate
33. In details, kindly explain how the programme was roled out in your area
34. Explain the conditions or promises given by your government in this programme.
35. Elaborate how your people perceived the programme and government promises?
36. Were there people who volunteered to surrender their arms? Elaborate your response.
37. Explain how those who volunteered their arms were treated by the rest of your community members.
38. How were they identified? Elaborate please

39. Do you think your government is doing enough while handling security in your area?

Explain

40. Are the cattle raids still there in your area? Explain why and how they are carried out today?

41. Why should you arm yourself yet security is the responsibility of your government?

Elaborate your response

42. Explain how your government handles or manages pastoral resource conflict in your area.

43. Do you think it is doing enough for you in this regard? Explain your response.

44. In your view, kindly suggest how the Pokot and Karamojong conflict can be managed, prevented or eradicated today.

## **APPENDIX II.**

### **INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED (REAL NAMES WITH HELD)**

1. Sabila John, 43 years a youth in Kacheliba on 3/4/12
2. Longitabe Petro 71 years an elder in Kotido on 3/6/10
3. Lodichu Musa 80 years an elder in Abim on 16/2/11
4. Tongole Cheketie 52 years a youth in Kaabong on 17/2/11
5. Chepyegon Thomas 61 years a trader in Sigor on 5/10/14
6. Chebom Chirchir 81 years an elder in Chepareria on 7/10/14
7. Lokwale Ekiru 78 years an elder in Moroto on 21/1/12
8. Moiben Daniel 60 years a government official in Kapenguria on 10/11/10
9. Lorot Elias 72 years a Kraal guard in Lelan on 1/12/11
10. Lomaipong Thomas 62 years a political leader in Lelan on 1/12/11
11. Lorot Winfred 60 years a church leader in Alale on 14/12/11
12. Mama Seita Negima 76 years an elder in Nakapiripirit on 7/1/13
13. Olosoli Joan 48 years a teacher in Nakapiripirit on 8/1/13
14. Nagusi Lolyom 55 years a trader in Nakapiripirit on 9/1/13
15. Loremoi Fabiano 42 years a youth in Abim on 3/8/14
16. Kopus Paulo 38 years a youth in Kaabong on 3/8/14
17. Kibet Thomas 50 years a teacher in Kotido on 27/3/15
18. Ongoba Lesalael 81 years an elder in Moroto on 3/11/11
19. Barkei Renson 42 years a youth in Sigor on 12/9/15
20. Lesalach Vicky 62 years a trader in Moroto on 3/11/15
21. Lechamangany Leno 72 years a kraal guard in Abim on 12/10/12

22. Lekoton Joshua 65 years a teacher in Kapenguria on 12/4/12
23. Nakuret Jeremiah 72 years a political leader in Kapenguria on 13/1/13
24. Longusuranga John 80 years an elder in Sigor on 13/1/13
25. Kapchrion Grace 46 years an NGO official in Lelan on 18/9/14
26. Kimosop David 52 years a church leader in Alale on 9/3/12
27. Takaramoi John 48 years an NGO official in Kaabong on 25/3/15
28. Ngolesia Winy 53 years an NGO official in Kotido on 30/4/15
29. Chepson Rebecca 67 years a trader in Kotido on 30/4/15
30. Kipang Sammy 52 years a teacher in Kacheliba on 4/5/14
31. Oempaka Amos 69 years a trader in Kaabong on 26/2/15
32. Ongatelum Jairo 78 years an elder in Kaabong on 26/2/15
33. Matunda Justus 48 years an NGO official in Moroto on 29/6/15
34. Longore Edwin 80 years an elder in Nakapiripirit on 2/10/14
35. Ekranal Elly 63 years a trader in Nakapiripirit on 2/10/14
36. Losenguria Petro 72 years a church leader in Nakapiripirit on 2/10/14
37. Lotela Yokir 70 years a kraal guard in Abim on 20/5/14
38. Kaonket Kasat 62 years a kraal guard in Kacheliba on 6/5/13
39. Norwer Remjus 64 years a trader in Sigor on 12/5/13
40. Omeri Adongo 76 years an elder in Lelan on 26/5/13
41. Kapkoilet Joel 42 years an NGO official in Lelan on 30/5/13
42. Adamangura Peter 72 years an elder in Kacheliba on 3/6/13
43. Orieng Jailaton 48 years a youth in Alale on 18/6/13
44. Limu David 66 years a political leader in Kapenguria on 28/6/13

45. Louso Rispa 74 years an elder in Kapenguria on 6/8/13
46. Lodinyo Samuel 48 years a youth in Sigor on 24/3/14
47. Muganda Alex 65 years a government official in Sigor on 22/3/14
48. Mugger Moses 56 years a political leader in Kotido on 22/3/14
49. Mutesa Lemonades 78 years an elder in Lelan on 3/3/14
50. Mzee Raphi 82 years an elder in Lelan on 31/3/14
51. Nebula Kitanyang 71 years a kraal guard in Lelan on 3/3/14
52. Lemonade Susana 77 years an elder in Lelan on 3/3/14
53. Rono Bernard 46 years a youth in Abim on 6/7/14
54. Yego Philip 48 years a youth in Kotido on 6/7/14
55. Tugla Muselit 51 years a youth in Abim on 26/6/15
56. Krop John 42 years a youth in Abim on 26/6/15
57. Longapoi Esther 38 years a youth in Abim on 26/6/15
58. Lotodo Ben 61 years a government official in Abim on 26/6/15
59. Olepachinet Tom 65 years a political leader in Nakapiripirit on 29/11/14
60. Kanyangaran Elly 62 years a government official in Nakapiripirit on 29/11/14
61. Kangatiep Polenk 60 years a church leader in Nakapiripirit on 29/11/14
62. Mwangi John 48 years an NGO official in Kotido on 16/7/14
63. Kolimoru Oding 68 years a kraal guard in Abim on 27/2/14
64. Ngikangurale Kwangai 62 years a kraal guard in Nakapiripirit on 27/2/14

**APPENDIX III.**

**Table showing the statistics on spasmodic cattle raids between the Pokot and Karamojong since 1902**

No.	Year and Date of Raid	Where the raid occurred	Group responsible for raiding	Group being raided	Numbers of livestock stolen		Number of people wounded	Number of people killed		Number of livestock recovered		Remark
					Cattle	others		Raider	Raide	Cattle	Others	
1.	January 1902	Not specified	Karamojong/Sabiny	Pokot (suk)	591	-	-			-		
2.	1 <sup>st</sup> April 1902	Sapolot	Pokot (Suk)	People of Karamoja	216	120 goa	1			93		
3.	27 <sup>th</sup> June 1902	Chekwesta										

4.	3 <sup>rd</sup> February 1904	Kaptererwo				ts							
5.	14 <sup>th</sup> Feb 1908	Karamoja	Pokot	Karamojo ng	15	15	1						
6.	24 <sup>th</sup> Feb 1911	West Pokot	Karamojon g	Pokot	Seve ral	Sev eral	several						
7.	27 <sup>th</sup> Feb 1912	Alale	Karamojon g	Pokot	Seve ral	Sev eral	several						
8.	28 <sup>th</sup> Feb 1914	Kaplakep											
9.	31 <sup>st</sup> March 1916	Kabachra											
10.	15 <sup>th</sup> April 1918	Kirki River											
11.	18 <sup>th</sup> April 1920	Kaptererwo											
12.	28 <sup>th</sup> April 1920	Chepsukunya	Karamojon	Sabiny	1	-	-				-	-	

			g									
13.	1 <sup>st</sup> January 1926	Cheptui	Pokot (suk)	Bagisu	240	-	-			38	-	
14.	2 <sup>nd</sup> April 1928	Karamoja	Pokot	Karamojo ng	15	50	1			80	-	
15.	Between 1 <sup>st</sup> January  And 30 <sup>th</sup> April  1931	(Not specified)	Karamojon g	People of Suk	643	25	-			-	-	
16.	19 <sup>th</sup> June 1950	Kapkwata	Karamojon g	-Do-	-	Goa ts	-			-		Repulsed by Home Guards
17.	28 <sup>th</sup> June 1951	Lumitila	Karamojon g	-Do-	22	-	-			-		
18.	8 <sup>th</sup> August 1955	Kamet	(Not	-Do-	4	-	-			4		

			known)									
19.	24 <sup>th</sup> September 1960	Kaserem	Karamojon g	-Do-	2	-	-			2	-	
20.	17 <sup>th</sup> November 1961	Cheptui	Karamojon g	-Do-	18	-	-			-	-	
21.	18 <sup>th</sup> November 1962	Sanzara	Karamojon g	-Do-	19	-	-			-	-	
22.	18 <sup>th</sup> December 1963	Kapnyikew	Karamojon g	-Do-	50	-	-			-	-	
23.	18 <sup>th</sup> December 1964	Kwanyiy	Karamojon g	-Do-	4	-	-			-	-	
24.	18 <sup>th</sup> December 1965	Kaptekep	Pokot	-Do-	3	-	-			-	-	

25.	19 <sup>th</sup> December 1966	kaproron	karamojong	-Do-	4	-	-			-	-	
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26.	24 <sup>th</sup> December 1970	Trans-Nzoia (Kenya)	Pokot	A pastoral group in Kenya	6	-	-			-	-	
27.	27 <sup>th</sup> June 1971	Kapchorwa  Alale	Pokot  Karamojong	People of Karamojong  Pokot	700  2000	-	200  150			-	-	
28.	16 <sup>th</sup> February 1972	Kaptum	Karamojong	-do-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	
29.	15 <sup>th</sup> March	Kapteka	Not known	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	Raiders crossed the

	1974	Tranz-Nzoia		Karamojong									cattle to the Kapchorwa in Ugandan side of the boarder
30.	17 <sup>th</sup> March 1976	Kapkomboi, Trans-Nzoia District	Not known		7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-Do-
31.	18 <sup>th</sup> March 1977	Kenya	Pokot		13	-	-	-	-	7	-		
32.	20 <sup>th</sup> march 1978	Kenyan side of the border	Not known		31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-do-
33.	21 <sup>st</sup> March 1979	Bukwo Sub- county (Kapchorwa)	Not known but from Matheniko	People of Kenya	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
34.	21 <sup>st</sup> March		Karamojong	Kenyans	21					0			District Commissioners in Kenya of the area

	1980												where the cattle was rstled from reported that they cows crossed to Namalu-in Nakapriripirit District
35.	6 <sup>th</sup> May 1981		Karamojong	Not known	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	0	The cattle was recovered from Chesower Sub- county, Kapchorwa district by Home Guards
36.	16 <sup>th</sup> May 1982	Mwolem farm, endebbes in Kenya	Pokot	Kenyan	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
37.	17 <sup>th</sup> May 1983	Suam Sub- county	Not known	People of Kapchorwa	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

		Kapchorwa										
38.	18 <sup>th</sup> May 1984	Kapkoi vilage in Trans- Nzoia district in Kenya	Not known	Kenyan	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	The cattle crossed to Uganda via West Pokot in Kenya
39.	23 <sup>rd</sup> May 1985	Kam Pombol in Trans- Nzoia district, Kenya	Karamojong	Kenyan	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	
40.	21 <sup>st</sup> June 1990	Kipthaioth vilage Endebbes, Kenya	Pokot	Kenyan	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	The pokot raiders crossed with the heads of cattle to Kabei Sub- county in Kapchorwa
41.	1 <sup>st</sup> July 1991		Pokot		0	0	0	0	0	2	0	Ungandan police handed over to Kenyan

												authorities 2 heads of cattle and one Pokot raider
42.	13 <sup>th</sup> July 1992	Trans-Nzoia			0	0	0	0	0	5	0	The heads of cattle were recovered by Ugandan police in Kapchorwa and handed over to the owners from Kenya
43.	21 <sup>st</sup> July 1993	Kabong	Unkown people from Dodoth	Pokot	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	
44.	24 <sup>th</sup> July 1994	Kapsankwony district in Kenya	Karamojong	Kenyans	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	
45.	25 <sup>th</sup>	Mt. Elgon	Not known	Kenyans	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	The heads of cattle

	July 1995	district in Kenya										belonged to 9 different people
46.	5 <sup>th</sup> November 1996	Kaswam parish	Karamojong	Pokot	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	No livestock taken
47.	5 <sup>th</sup> December 1997	Chemwaram viage in kapchorwa	Not known but suspected to be karamojong	People of Pokot	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	
48.	11 <sup>th</sup> January 1998	Kabus viage in kapchorwa	Suspected to be karamojong	Pokot	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	
49.	17 <sup>th</sup> January 1999	Sigor	Karamojong	Pokot	2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unspecified number of Karamojong entered

													Kacheliba, Lelan and Sigor and ransacked their police station.
50.	7 <sup>th</sup> March 2000	Kenya (area not specified)	Pokot	Kenyans	17	0	0	0	0	0	0		
51.	9 <sup>th</sup> April 2001	Cheptuya parish, kapchorwa	Karamojong	Pokot	15	0	0	0	0	0	0		
52.	12 <sup>th</sup> April 2001	Chemwaram village in kapchorwa	Karamojong	Pokot	3	0	0	0	0	0	0		
53.	1 <sup>st</sup> July 2001	Lamintin village, Bukwa Sub-county	Not known but suspected to be Pokot	People of Karamojong	15	2 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0		

		kapchorwa										
54.	4 <sup>th</sup> July 2001	Sukuroi village, in Kapchorwa district	Pokot		5	0	0	0	0	5	0	
55.	24 <sup>th</sup> December 2001	Kenya (area not specified)	Karamojong	Kenyan	12	0	0	0	0	5	0	
56.	5 <sup>th</sup> June 2002	Kapkwiror via in Kapchorwa district	Karamojong	People of Uganda	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	
57.	11 <sup>th</sup> June 2002	Twiga, kitale district, Kenya	Not known	Kenyan	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	Animals crossed to Uganda
58.	22 <sup>nd</sup> August	Chemalum village in	Unidentified		5	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	2002	Kapchorwa										
59.	11 <sup>th</sup> September 2002	Kabagirya village, kapchorwa	Karamojong		54	0	0	0	0	0	0	
60.	17 <sup>th</sup> September 2002	Srinda village, kapchorwa			50	0	0	0	0	232	0	The recovery of the heads of cattle was by Uganda's army, the Uganda peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF)
61.	18 <sup>th</sup> September 2002	Ngenge sub- county & Cheptuya parish in kapchorwa	Karamojong	Pokot	400	0	0	0	0	232	0	
62.	17 <sup>th</sup> October	Kamuneni	Karamojong	Pokot	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	2002	village, kapchorwa										
63.	27 <sup>th</sup> October 2002	Kapsukwar village, Bukwa Sub- county 22kapchorwa	Pokot	Karamojong	95	0	0	0	0	1	0	
64.	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2003	Kapchangi village, kapchorwa	Not known but believed to be Pokot	Pokot	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	
65.	16 <sup>th</sup> December 2003		Karamojong	Pokot	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	
66.	17 <sup>th</sup> December	Kapkwai parish			4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	2003											
67.	18 <sup>th</sup> December 2003	Seretyo village			4	0	1	0	1	0	0	
68.	6 <sup>th</sup> January 2003	Kabei sub- county			Not know			0	5	0	0	The UPDF were persuing the Pokot cattle raiders who had taken unspecified heads of cattle
69.	17 <sup>th</sup> February 2003	Chebinyiny village			4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
70.	21 <sup>st</sup> February 2003	Chemoron village	Pokot	Karamojong	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	

71.	22 <sup>nd</sup> February 2003	Kaproron village	Karamojong	Pokot	25	3 donkeys	1	0	0	0	0	
72.	6 <sup>th</sup> March 2004	Nait village	Pokot	karamojong	150	120 goats 20 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0	
73.	12 <sup>th</sup> March 2004	Kaptolomo kon village			Enspecified	0	0	1	0	0	0	
74.	16 <sup>th</sup> March 2005	Bugwa viage	Karamojong	Pokot	9	9 goats	0	0	0	0	0	
75.	17 <sup>th</sup> March 2005	Kabur village			10	0	0	0	0	0	0	
76.	25 <sup>th</sup> March	Tirikoy viage			5	0	0	0	0	5	0	

	2005											
77.	27 <sup>th</sup> March 2005	Nait and Chebinyiny villages			17	21gosts	0	0	0	0	0	
78.	11 <sup>th</sup> April 2006	Bukow sub- district			Over 2000	Over 500	50	5	50	0	0	This was the worst raid in recent years carried out by the Pokot on the people of Kapchorwa
79.	8 <sup>th</sup> May 2006	Kabei sub- county	Pokot	Karamojong	55	4 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0	
80.	9 <sup>th</sup> May 2007	Bukwa sub- county			55	4 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0	
81.	9 <sup>th</sup> May 2008	Riwo village			4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

82.	10 <sup>th</sup> May 2009	Lungwa village			7	0	0	0	0	0	0	
83.	17 <sup>th</sup> May 2009	Bukwa Sub- county			105	6 sheep 2 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0	
84.	19 <sup>th</sup> May 2010	Kapkwireson village			2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
85.	3 <sup>rd</sup> June 2010	Chemosong viage	Karamojong	Pokot	0	3 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0	
86.	19 <sup>th</sup> July 2911	Chekwasta viage			3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
87.	19 July 2011	Kapmwokun village	Pokot	Karamojong	1	1 donkey	0	0	0	0	0	
88.	13 <sup>th</sup>	Nyalit parish			2	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	September 2011											
89.	15 <sup>th</sup> September 2012	Chebinyiny viage			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
90.	3 <sup>rd</sup> September 2012	Karamoja	Pokot	Karamojong	40	400	0	0	0	0	0	
91	10 <sup>th</sup> October 2012	Borowon village	Karamojong	Pokot	15	0	0	0	0	15	0	
92.	31 <sup>st</sup> October 2013	Tuwo village			3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
93.	3 <sup>rd</sup> December	Kamwam village			4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	2013												
94.	16 <sup>th</sup> December 2013				11		0	0	0	0	0		
95.	13 <sup>th</sup> January 2014	Kapkumolon village	Pokot	People of Karamojong	3	4 donkeys	0	0	0	0	0		
96.	20 <sup>th</sup> January 2014	Kamwokin village			9	0	0	0	0	0	0		
97.	26 <sup>th</sup> January 2014	Chemotow village			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
98.	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2014	Kere village				0	0	0	0	0	0		
99.	7 <sup>th</sup> February 2015	Kotido	Pokot	Karamojong	60	4000				14	0	<b>The military police protection unit (branch of the UPDF) recovered the heads of cattle that had been raided by Sabiny from Kenya</b>	

Source: National Archives Entebbe Security Report.

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



## NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Telegrams: "SCIENCETECH", Nairobi  
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NAIROBI-KENYA  
Website: www.ncst.go.ke

Our Ref:

NCST/RRI/12/1/SS-011/234/5

Date:

28<sup>th</sup> March 2011

Jacob Ogalo Adipo  
Maseno University  
Private Bag  
MASENO

### RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "**The proliferation of small arms, its trade and impact in West Pokot 1979 to 2004**" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **West Pokot District** for a period ending **31<sup>st</sup> December 2012**.

You are advised to report to **the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration & Internal Security, the Director, Kenya National Archives, the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province, the District Commissioner and the District Education Officer, West Pokot District** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **one hard copy and one soft copy** of the research report/thesis to our office.

**P. N. NYAKUNDI**  
**FOR: SECRETARY/CEO**

Copy to:  
The Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of State for Provincial  
Administration and Internal Security  
Harambee House, Harambee Avenue  
NAIROBI

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:

Prof./Dr./Mr./Mrs./Miss Jacob Ogalo Adipo

Of (Address) Maseno University

Has been permitted to conduct research in

KARAMOJA REGION

On the topic CROSS-BORDER RESOURCE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE POKOT AND KARAMOJONG SINCE 1902

For period ending 25/05/2011 to 20 13

Research Permit No. UGED/RES/55/884/2

Date of issue 25/05/2011

Fee received Ug Shs 20000



*Jacob Ogalo Adipo*  
Applicant's Signature

*[Signature]*  
Secretary  
National Council for  
Science and Technology

CONDITIONS

1. you must report to the District Commissioner and the District Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to cancellation of your permit
2. Government officers will not be interviewed without prior appointment.
3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimen are subject to further permission from the relevant Government ministries.
5. You are required to submit at least two(2)/four(4) bound copies of your final report for Ugandans and non Ugandans respectively.
6. The Government of Uganda reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice



REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

RESEARCH CLEARANCE  
PERMIT

(CONDITIONS- see back page)